A History and Analysis of the Maryland Greens

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
Dedication

I respectfully dedicate this thesis
to the memory of
Petra Karin Kelly (1947-1992)
whose life and work inspires
Greens around the globe.

Acknowledgements

I am thankful to my colleagues in the Maryland Green Party for sharing their insights and experiences with me. I gratefully acknowledge the hard work of my thesis readers, Professor Kriste Lindenmeyer and Professor Rebecca Boehling, whose comments and corrections improved the text immensely. I am especially appreciative of the support of my thesis advisor, Professor John Jeffries, and of the University of Maryland Baltimore County (UMBC) History Department for offering me the opportunity to complete this study. Professor Jeffries' dedication, advice and friendship are a source of much joy for me. Finally, I want to recognize the loving support of my wife, Lisa Goldstein, and my daughter, Skye Goldsmith, who have given me the time and the space to write this thesis.

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I. Introduction

In 2000, the Green Party entered the public consciousness in the United States when its presidential candidate, Ralph Nader, campaigned in all 50 states, appeared on the ballot in 43 states and the District of Columbia, and ultimately received approximately 2.8 million votes (2.7%) for president. Unlike other notable recent "third-party " presidential political campaigns, like Ross Perot's Reform Party races in 1992 and 1996, John Anderson's National Unity Party race in 1980, and George Wallace's American Independent Party in 1964 and 1968, Green Party election campaigns have been the result of a genuine national grassroots movement, which included the efforts of over a hundred and fifty thousand volunteer activists, and the campaigning of hundreds of Green Party nominees in local and statewide races throughout the country.[1]

By 2003, the Green Party was the fastest growing political party in the United States,[2] had the third-highest number of elected officials,[3] and had already had an electoral impact at every level of government, although not yet in every state. To the extent that the Green Party has become a viable "third" political party throughout the U.S., understanding its growth and development affords an insight into the challenges, goals, and opportunities of alternative (non-"mainstream") political expression in contemporary U.S. politics. And in practical terms, as long as the American electorate

[1] The apparent demise of the Reform Party in 2000, when Patrick Buchanan "hijacked" the presidential nomination and ran a moribund campaign, adds credence to the supposition that the Reform Party too was not much more than the vehicle of its founder's political ambitions. Among the "major minority" parties in recent US politics, only the Libertarian Party seemed, like the Green Party, to be a movement that was larger than the candidate it fielded for president.

[2] The Green Party was the only national political party to gain registered members after 2000. All other parties lost members, ranging from an 18% loss for the Reform Party to a .03% loss for the Republican Party. During this time, the Green Party gained 27.7%. Richard Winger, *Ballot Access News*, <http://www.ballot-access.org> [accessed November 4, 2003].

[3] Greens currently hold 170 elected offices across the US. National Green Party, <http://www.gp.org> [accessed 11/14/03].

remained nearly equally divided between the two dominant political parties (Democratic and Republican,) the Green Party's significance as a wellspring of alternative political ideas, and as a potential election "spoiler," gave the Greens an importance beyond the 2.7% of the national electorate that their presidential candidate received in 2000. To the degree that the Greens represent a contemporary expression of progressive politics in America, knowledge of Green Party support is a useful guide in understanding the direction and speed of the progressive movement(s) in the U.S. at a time of conservative ascendancy.

In important respects, the experience of the Maryland Green Party (MGP) paralleled that of Greens nationally: In both Maryland and across the US, faltering attempts to organize "Greens" began in the 1980s, were spurred by the 1996 Green Party presidential campaign of Ralph Nader, and accelerated during the 2000 Nader presidential campaign and thereafter. After 2000, the Maryland Green Party, like state and local Green parties across the US, continued to grow in terms of the number of registered voters, activists, and candidates it fielded for local and statewide races. Finally, the development of the Maryland Green Party may be reasonably representative of statewide Green Party growth in the same period, as Maryland represents a "middling case"—it was neither among the most populous or organizationally-advanced state Green parties (like California, Maine, New Mexico, Alaska, etc.) nor among the least active (like North Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wyoming, Louisiana, etc.) Like the majority of states in 2000, Maryland was also typical in that it was considered a "safe" or

"non-swing" state[4]. Unlike the experience of Greens in many other states however, the Maryland Greens as late as 2002 had yet to win (or even "spoil") any election in the Free State.[5]

Beyond setting a historical context for third-party presidential contests in general and progressive third-party presidential contests specifically, as well as documenting the history of the Maryland Green Party, this thesis offers a statistical analysis of Green support in Maryland, based on the results of over a thousand detailed surveys that were mailed to a random selection of registered Greens (of which 316 were completed and returned) and to all Green Party activists in Maryland (51) in 2003[6]. The statistical analysis attempts to construct a demographic portrait of Greens in the Free State in an effort to understand who the Greens are, and why they are attracted to the Green version of progressive third party politics.

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[4] "Safe" states are states where it is widely held that outcome of the presidential election is not in doubt because polls indicate that one of the presidential candidates has an overwhelming lead before election day; "swing" states are states where polls indicate the race is too close to call before election day.

[5] In at least one important respect the MGP appears to be atypical, and that is with regard to financing and donations. This issue is addressed in some detail in Chapter VI.

[6] Activists are defined as registered Green Party members who were involved in local, state, or national Green Party activities beyond merely registering Green and voting.

II. Third-party Presidential Candidacies[7]

There were twenty third-party U.S. presidential campaigns in the twentieth century in which the candidate received at least one percent of the total vote. As the table (Fig. 1) below indicates, the preponderance of these third-party presidential campaigns occurred in the first third of the century, and most espoused political philosophies on the left side of the political spectrum. In the second half of the century, ideologically conservative third-party candidates predominated. It is noteworthy that, due in large part to the systemic impediments described below, in only four of these campaigns (Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, Robert M. LaFollette in 1924, George Wallace in 1968, and H. Ross Perot in 1992) was the third-party candidate for president able to achieve even double digits—a testament to the difficulty of running a successful third-party campaign for president in America during a century in which voter loyalty to the Democratic and Republican parties trended from very strong at the outset to moderately strong by the close. The average percentage of the vote for the twenty top-performing third-party presidential campaigns in the twentieth century was a mere 6.4%. It is a stunning commentary on the ineffectiveness of these campaigns, and on the strength of the American two-party political system, that it would have taken the *combined* percentages of the first *ten* third-party candidacies for president in the chart (that is every candidate from Eugene V. Debs in 1904 through Eugene V. Debs in 1920) to have been able to achieve victory in a two-way contest—and that result was only made possible by Theodore Roosevelt's exceptionally strong showing in 1912.

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7 The term "third party" is a somewhat demeaning, American- centric expression that tends to have the effect of marginalizing minor political parties.

Year	Candidate	Party	Ideology or issue & Location on Political Spectrum (Left, Middle, Right)	% of Vote
1904	Eugene V. Debs	Socialist	Socialism (L)	2.9
1904	Silas Swallow	Prohibition	prohibition (M)	1.9
1908	Eugene V. Debs	Socialist	Socialism (L)	2.8
1908	Eugene Chafin	Prohibition	prohibition (M)	1.7
1912	**Theodore Roosevelt**	**Progressive / Bull Moose**	**Progressivism (L)**	**27.3**
1912	Eugene V. Debs	Socialist	Socialism (L)	5.9
1912	Eugene Chafin	Prohibition	prohibition (M)	1.3
1916	Allan Benson	Socialist	Socialism (L)	3.1
1916	James Hanly	Prohibition	prohibition (M)	1.1
1920	Eugene V. Debs	Socialist	Socialism (L)	3.4
1924	**Robert M. La Follette**	**Progressive**	**Progressivism (L)**	**16.6**
1932	Norman Thomas	Socialist	Socialism (L)	2.2
1936	William Lemke	Union	Depression-era relief (L) [8]	1.9
1948	J. Strom Thurmond	State's Rights	segregation (R)	2.4
1948	Henry A. Wallace	Progressive	Progressivism (L)	2.3
1968	**George Wallace**	**American Independent**	**segregation (R)**	**13.5**
1980	John Anderson	National Unity	Moderate (M)	6.6
1992	**H. Ross Perot**	**Independent**	**fiscal discipline (R)**	**18.9**
1996	H. Ross Perot	Reform	fiscal discipline (R)	8.4
2000	Ralph Nader	Green	Progressivism (L)	2.7

Fig. 0: Third-party Presidential Candidates in the Twentieth Century Who Received at Least One Percent of the Vote.

With the odds of victory being so poor[9] why would anyone try? In other words—*who* would attempt such a feat of political windmill tilting? Of these twenty top-performing candidacies, nine ran single-issue campaigns like those for prohibition of alcohol (Silas Swallow in 1904, Eugene Chafin in 1908 and 1912, and James Hanly in 1916); support for segregation (J. Strom Thurmond in 1948 and George Wallace in 1968); support of national fiscal discipline (and H. Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996); and support for economic relief from the Great Depression (William Lemke in 1936.) Five candidacies were run in support of socialism (Eugene V. Debs in 1908, 1912, and 1920;

[8] William Lemke's political philosophy defies easy characterization. A reformist, a radical, some ~~thought he was an extremist, Lemke~~ helped to enact liberal legislation, and his presidential platform called for depression- era economic relief. However, his campaign attracted high- profile support from anti-New Deal demagogues like Father Charles E. Coughlin, the "radio priest", and the Rev. Gerald L. K. Smith who was alleged to have fascist sympathies.

[9] In all of U.S. history only one third-party presidential candidate (Abraham Lincoln running as a Republican in 1860) has ever won, and it is debatable that the Republicans were actually the "third-party" in 1860, although they *were* the new party on the scene. In the twentieth century only one third-party presidential candidate (Theodore Roosevelt running as a Bull Moose / Progressive in 1912) has ever even finished in second place.

Allan Benson's in 1916; and Norman Thomas in 1932.) Four of the third-party candidates were disaffected or disenchanted Republicans or Democrats, nearing the end of their careers, who did not win their party's nomination (Theodore Roosevelt in 1912; Robert M. LaFollette in 1924; Henry A. Wallace in 1948; John Anderson in 1980.) One candidacy (Ralph Nader in 2000) does not fit any of the above mentioned categories as Nader was less a politician than a "consumer activist," had never formerly affiliated with any political party (including the Green Party under whose name he ran), and never sought the nomination of either the Democratic or Republican parties.

Beyond the ego-enrichment potential that a race for the most powerful office in the land (or world) offered to any individual candidate or political party, running in the highest-profile race was seen as an effective way to "get the message out" to a maximum number of Americans who might join them, and contribute time or money to their cause. Single-issue candidates (like those in support of prohibition or segregation) also hoped that once they had articulated, and perhaps "sanitized" their issue in the cauldron of a presidential election contest, their issue (like women's suffrage or the prohibition of alcohol, etc.) might be later absorbed by the Democrats or Republicans (or both) in subsequent election campaigns, and finally, become the law of the land. Some third-party presidential candidates, therefore, may have measured their notion of success in their ability to influence the electorate and dominant party officials, and not in their chances to actually win the presidency.[10]

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[10] According to Green party presidential candidate Ralph Nader, third-parties represent, "the seeds of political regeneration" in the American political system. Interview on *Democracy Now* with Amy Goodman, November 12, 2003. In 2004, Nader added that his independent third- party presidential candidacy was intended to help defeat the Republican incumbent by allowing him to stage a "second front" in the Democratic battle for the White House. (Source: Speech at the University of North Carolina, March 2004.) In 2004, some Green Party members advocated having a left-leaning third-party balanced by a right-leaning third-party as "the only strategy that makes sense is to cleave both [major] parties

Because the chances of winning were slight, third-party candidates had little fear of losing the election by speaking out too boldly, or by addressing a controversial issue in an indelicate way. The style for third-party campaigns was frequently the opposite of the dominant party candidates—the more "lively" their candidate's rhetoric and posture were, the more likely they would be able to generate an interest among the press and the voters.[11] Third-party candidacies therefore have encouraged less candidate self- restraint, and perhaps a more forthright exposition of their views. In that sense, third parties acted as something of a safety valve, letting off political pressure around divisive issues in a "harmless," or even potentially useful way. Third-party candidates also served the function of being a trial balloon to test the public's reaction to a new issue, platform, or policy. For example, the anti-corporate-globalization rhetoric that Ralph Nader articulated in his 2000 third-party presidential campaign has been adopted by some of the Democratic presidential candidates in 2004.[12]

A less- sanguine conclusion is that third-party presidential campaigns, by their dismal results (at least in nineteen out of the twenty most successful candidacies in the twentieth century) served mainly to confirm the supremacy of the established dominant parties, and the futility of trying to oppose them. Third-party campaigns, therefore, may have had the unintended consequence of firmly establishing two patterns that were

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simultaneously through a Green . . . . strategy with the Libertarians." Email from erm4you@yahoo.com on the greensUSA- Yahoo listserve, March 17, 2004.

[11] "The situation of the political leader who has not the remotest chance of securing office is radically different from that of the person who hopes or expects to be elected. . .The fear of losing an election for speaking out too boldly on issues was not a problem. . . ." Murray B. Seidler, *Norman Thomas: Respectable Rebel* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1967), p.86.

[12] The editors of the *Progressive* magazine (founded by the 1924 progressive third- party presidential candidate Robert M. LaFollette in 1909) agreed, "In a sense, Ralph Nader won the 2004 Democratic primaries because his message prevailed, as one candidate after another picked up planks of his [2000] platform or pasted in snippets of his speeches." Editorial, "Nader's Wrong Turn," *The Progressive,* April 2004, <http://www.progressive.org/april04/com0404.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

counter-productive to a vibrant democracy: the belief in voting for the "lesser of two

evils," and the concomitant belief in the futility of voting one's conscience.[13]

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[13] If an important indication of a political system's "vibrancy" is voter participation (turnout) then the U.S. is rated 114th out of 140 countries with an average of 48% turnout for all elections from 1945 through 1998. By comparison, Italy is rated first, with an average voter turnout of 92% during the same period, and Mali is last with 21%. Source: *Voter Turnout Since 1945: A Global Report*, International IDEA, <http://www.idea.int/publications/turnout/VT_screenopt_2002.pdf> [accessed April 20, 2004].

III. U.S. Elections and Third-party Participation

The U.S. is arguably the least friendly country in the democratic world for third-party campaigns at every level of office, from the lowest local race all the way up to the presidency. Some of the systemic impediments that severely suppress third-party activity also tend to contribute to the suppression of support for the weaker of the two dominant parties in a given race, while the most egregious hurdles are exclusively applied to third parties. All of the obstacles can be categorized into three broad categories: legal and institutional obstacles, the attitudes of the electorate, and illegal impediments.

Legal and Institutional Obstacles

The major legal impediments to third-party participation include, in what is roughly their order of importance: the winner-take-all election and plurality voting system; the end of "fusion" voting; restrictive ballot access and difficult nominating petition rules; public funding of elections for dominant parties; exclusion of third- parties from the presidential debates; the media blackout of third- parties; official party recognition and access to primaries; the Democratic and Republican- only state- funded primaries; the personal, periodic voter registration system; gerrymandering; the "shrinking" of the public space; and voting on a work day.

The Winner Take All and Plurality Voting System

The most significant legal impediment to third-party success is the winner- take-all voting system in extensive use in the U.S. Unlike countries that employ "proportional representation" systems where parties or candidates receiving as little as five percent of

the vote in a given election receive a proportionate number of members elected to the legislature, a party or candidate in the U.S. achieving as much as 49.9% of the vote in a given election might receive zero representation. In countries whose election laws have allowed for some method of proportional representation there frequently have been three, four, or more political parties represented in the government, and many more contesting for office.[14] Proportional representation encourages the development and maintenance of multiple parties, and seems to increase voter turnout, decrease voter apathy, and create a more vibrant democracy.[15] Many "third" political parties in Europe, for example, developed because they were able to "get one foot in the door" of government with a relatively small percentage of the votes. In the U.S., by contrast, a candidate or party has to win at least a plurality of the vote in a specific contest before being able to take a seat in a legislative body.

Throughout the U.S., the plurality voting method is in widespread use, wherein the candidate with the most votes wins the election. Plurality voting has had the detrimental effect of causing a "virtual disenfranchisement" of large number of voters.[16] After years of experience, voters in many jurisdictions came to realize that their party

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[14] For example, many European (and other) countries have political systems in which more than two parties share power: in 2001, Italy's House of Liberties included Forza Italia, National Alliance, Christian Democratic Center, Northern League, Olive Tree, Daisy Alliance, Sunflower Alliance, Italian Communist Party, independents, and non-affiliated members; in 2002, the UK's House of Commons included Labor, Conservative and Unionist, Liberal Democrat, and 29 members representing other political parties; in 2002, France's National Assembly included Union for Popular Movement, Socialist, Union for French Democracy, Communist, Radical, Green, and 22 members representing other political parties; in 2002, Germany's Bundestag included Social Democrat, Christian Social Union, Alliance '90/ Green, Freedom Democrat, and Party of Democratic Socialist members, etc. *CIA Factbook*, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public ations/factbook/> [accessed April 20, 2004].

[15] "On virtually every characteristic examined, the U.S. [electoral] system is structured in such a way as to increase the costs and decrease the benefits of voting." Ruy A. Teixeira, *The Disappearing American Voter* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992), p.17.

[16] "The spatially defined [geographic] unit of representation" and "the plurality method of voting" together "operated almost inevitably to create serious forms of misrepresentation, including what nineteenth-century Americans called 'practical' or 'virtual disenfranchisement.'" Peter H. Argersinger, *Structure, Process, and Party: Essays in American Political History* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992), p.71-2.

would never win any races; many voters may have stopped voting altogether because the result of the elections were known before the first ballot was cast. In a political environment that may effectively negate the will of as many as 49% of dominant party voters, the effective disenfranchisement of a relative handful of third-party voters is easily ignored. Furthermore, third-party candidates and parties were often accused of creating this "undemocratic" condition (by creating a situation where no candidate would be able to attain a majority of the votes,) and third-party candidates often had to expend a great deal of their resources defending their right to even participate in the contest.[17]

The End of "Fusion" Voting

Another legal obstacle third-parties face came about with the widespread end of "fusion" voting. Fusion normally involves the weaker of the two dominant parties sharing the same candidate with a third-party in an attempt to combine the votes of the two parties and defeat the stronger dominant political party. Using a hypothetical case, the Republican incumbent would be perceived to be the stronger candidate (estimated at 45% strength,) so the Democratic challenger (estimated at 40% strength) would lend his name to the third-party Populist ticket (estimated at 15% strength,) so he would gain the combined votes of the Democratic and Populist party voters (40% + 15% = 55%), allowing the challenger to win the election. According to the historian Peter H. Argersinger, fusion was common in the nineteenth century and was responsible for most

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[17] As the U.S. "mainstream" media focuses more on the "horserace" than on issues, it is not surprising that even a cursory examination of the mainstream reporting on the 2000 presidential contest, for example, reveals that the majority of articles on the Green Party and their candidate Ralph Nader emphasized the "spoiler- factor" nature of their campaign. (See, for example, the approximately 8,640 *Google* internet citations for the phrase, "Nader spoiler.")

of the election victories usually attributed to the Populist third-party candidates.[18] Fusion

voting "helped maintain a significant third-party tradition by guaranteeing that dissenters'

votes could be more than symbolic protest, that their leaders could gain office, and that

their demands might be heard. . . .That some politicians regarded fusion as a mechanism

for proportional representation is not surprising."[19] Fusion voting in presidential contests

peaked in 1896 when both the Democrats and the Populists nominated William Jennings

Bryan in his ultimately losing bid for president.[20] Subsequently, the dominant parties in

the state legislatures passed anti-fusion statutes in nearly every jurisdiction in the

country,[21] effectively removing the best vehicle third- parties had for running winning

campaigns and negating the "spoiler" factor.

Restrictive Ballot Access

Before the late-nineteenth-century national adoption in the U.S. of the

"Australian" ballot, a polling arrangement in which secrecy is compulsorily maintained,

and the ballot is officially printed and distributed by the government, ballots were printed

and distributed by political parties, and a party's ballot "access" meant the ability of each

political party to pay for the printing and distribution costs of their own ballots. Each

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18 Argersinger, *Structure, Process, and Party*, p.150.

19 Ibid., p.56.

20 The 1896 election foreshadowed twentieth-century political contests inasmuch as electoral politics became less significant because of "a narrowing of the role politics played in daily life" and because the administrative state supplanted most of the functions previously performed by political parties. Mark Lawrence Kornbluh, *Why America Stopped Voting: The Decline of Participatory Democracy and the Emergence of Modern American Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 2000) p.114.

21 The most important exception to anti- fusion is New York State, which still allows fusion in some statewide and local races, but not in the presidential contest. As late as the 1990's the New Party (a progressive third- party) had attempted to employ fusion as a "safe" way to develop their political party. When the New Party lost the 1997 Supreme Court ruling in *Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,* the New Party essentially folded, and states were empowered to ban fusion voting. Micah L. Sifry, *Spoiling for a Fight: Third- party Politics in America* (New York: Routledge Press, 2000), p.251. Fusion was also the great hope of, and ultimately rang the death knell for the Populist Party in 1896.

party had its own unique ballot, sometimes printed on a distinctively colored piece of paper, and often with a picture of an iconic leader or symbol of the party appearing at the top.[22] Therefore, any political party could in theory have a ballot, listing the slate of candidates that party was running. A partisan voter was handed the slip of paper, he carried it to the ballot box and dropped it in to vote the "straight" party ticket, without the need to read or write anything on the ballot. By contrast, adoption of the Australian ballot system meant there was now only one, single, "official" ballot, listing the candidates from all of the parties. Consequently, rules for deciding which party's candidates would appear on "the" ballot, and in what order (listed by party, or listed by office, etc.) had to be defined--and they were defined by the two primary political parties, the Democrats and Republicans. The rules for third-party ballot access have usually required that third parties had to collect a sufficient number of petition signatures before their candidates were included on the ballot. According to Richard Winger, a leading scholar on third-party ballot access:

> These restrictions did not emerge overnight. From 1888 to 1931, ballot-access laws were rather mild. In 1924, only 50,000 signatures on a petition were required to place a new party on the ballot in 48 states (a figure that represents 0.15% of the number of people who had voted in the previous election). During the 1930s, ballot-access laws became significantly restrictive, as they required new parties to gather more signatures and file for application earlier and earlier in the campaign year. Still, it was not until the 1960s that compliance with ballot-access laws became extremely difficult.[23]

The result of Democrats and Republicans determining the rules for third-party access was predictable: in almost every state increasingly restrictive requirements at all

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[22] Argersinger, *Structure, Process, and Party*, p.50.
[23] Richard Winger, "The Importance of Ballot Access," *Long Term View*, Massachusetts School of Law, Spring 1994.

levels of races (local, state, and national,) in the form of larger numbers of required petition signatures were passed into law.[24] For example, Richard Winger found that "in 1924 Senator Robert LaFollette was able to get on the ballot in 47 states as a third-party candidate for president, and he needed to collect only 75,500 valid petition signatures to achieve this. . . . In 1980 John Anderson needed 647,792 valid petition signatures to get on the ballot of all states."[25] The impact of restrictive ballot access through petition-gathering requirements, a requirement that only pertained to third-parties, was severe: Without automatic access to the ballots, third-parties spent much of their limited resources attempting to gain ballot access through petition drives,[26] because failing to achieve ballot access almost always meant election defeat—even for major-party candidates. And without automatic access to the ballots, third parties were denied the "synergetic" power of running whole slates of candidates for public office in a single election cycle.　　　　Introduction of the Australian ballot thus devastated third-parties.

Historian Peter Argersinger noted:

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24 Forty- eight states and the District of Columbia require third party presidential candidates to collect petition signatures in order to appear on the ballot. Each state requires a different number of signatures. Texas is among the most difficult states, as it requires over 64,000 signatures to be collected in just two months. By contrast, Tennessee requires only 25 signatures, and the state of Washington does not require any signatures—only a $1000 filing fee. Judy Woodruff, CNN Political, *Unit How It Works: How to run as an independent*, Monday, February 23, 2004.
<http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/02/23/elec04.hiw.independents/index.html> [accessed April 20, 2004,] and Brian Faler, "Nader Scrambles to Collect Thousands of Signatures," *Washington Post*, April 3, 2004, p. A06.
"Third parties have long struggled to get onto presidential ballots. Even when they do qualify in a given state, they often have to start again four years later. 'The entire system was set up to render third parties illegitimate,' said Lisa Disch, a University of Minnesota political scientist who has studied the issue." Nick Anderson, "Nader Has Qualified Nowhere, Plans to Everywhere," *The Los Angeles Times*, April 18, 2004.
25 Richard Winger, "What are Ballots For," *Libertarian Party News*, 1988. This represents a greater than eightfold increase in the number of voter signatures required, during a period of time when the total population of the U.S. had only doubled.
26 On the other hand, ballot access petition drives prove to be excellent opportunities for third-party supporters to reach out to the voters—it offers third-party supporters an "excuse" to engage an otherwise largely indifferent population in political discussions. Unlike the "favorable" unintended consequences of the Electoral College system (see below,) ballot access requirements were instituted by legislatures in part as a mechanism to force new parties to present their case to the public.

Not surprisingly, then, did the *Nation* attack ballot reform in 1891 by pointing out that 'under the old system' parties had had to pay for printing and distributing their ballots and had been unable to prevent the distribution of independent tickets, but that under the new system "party politicians can have their own ballots printed and distributed at public expense, while all independent ballots are practically prohibited from getting into the polling places."[27]

Exclusion from the Presidential Debates

The relatively recent phenomenon of the systematic exclusion of third-party candidates from the nationally televised presidential debates has perhaps become second only to the "winner- take- all" voting system in its detrimental impact on third-party presidential campaigns. Televised presidential debates began in 1960, and were a regular feature of every presidential election from 1976 through 2000. The televised debates attract huge national (and international) audiences, and are for many voters their principal, and in some case their only, exposure to the presidential candidates and their platforms. The performance of candidates in the televised presidential debates may be the single most important criterion for determining for whom "swing" (that is "independent" or loosely-affiliated) voters cast their vote in general elections.[28]

The nonpartisan League of Women Voters stopped organizing the televised presidential debates after the 1984 election: "'We have no intention of becoming an accessory to the hoodwinking of the American people,' proclaimed the League of Women Voters in retreating from sponsorship of a scheduled 1988 presidential debate.

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[27] Argersinger, *Structure, Process, and Party*, p.55.

[28] ~~"Nine out of every ten American~~ voters say they have watched a candidate debate some time in the past." League of Women Voters, *How to Watch the Debates*. <http://www.lwvcincinnati.org/Watch_a_Debate.ssi> [accessed April 20, 2004].
"Because civic groups and mainstream media in Minnesota decided to allow an unorthodox third-party candidate (initially derided as an unelectable "spoiler") into debates alongside the two major party candidates, Ventura became governor." Jeff Cohen, "Nader, Buchanan and The Debates", *Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR)*, April 21, 2000. Reposted at: <http://www.cafearabica.com/politics/politics15/polnadbuc.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

The League withdrew to protest the Democrats' and Republicans' attempt to dictate every detail — down to camera placement — of the 'debates,' which now deserve to be called infomercials."[29] In 1987 the Commission for Presidential Debates (CPD) took over the task. The CPD was founded by the former chairs of the Democratic and Republican parties. At the February 18, 1987, Washington D.C. news conference announcing the formation of the CPD, Paul G. Kirk, Jr., then the head of the Republican party, bluntly declared that the purpose of the CPD was "to strengthen the two party system," and Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr., the head of the Democratic Party, echoed this sentiment by saying, "We are not likely to look with favor at the inclusion of third party candidates in the debates."[30]

In the four presidential election cycles in which the CPD organized the presidential debates (1988 - 2000), only one third-party presidential candidate was allowed to participate (Ross Perot in 1992.)[31] Despite a huge increase in viewership[32] attributed to the appearance of the third-party candidate in 1992, and in direct opposition to the will of the majority of citizens,[33] the CPD repeatedly prevents significant and

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[29] Jeff Milchen, "Commission On Presidential Debates: The Illusion Of Legitimacy," *Boulder Daily Camera*, October 1, 2000.

[30] From the FAIR (Fairness and Accuracy in the Media) Press Release: *The Compromised Commission on Presidential Debates: Why Do TV Networks Allow It to Decide if the Two Major Parties Will Face Competition?*, August 29, 2000. < http://www.fair.org/articles/compromised-commission.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

[31] It has been alleged that the reason Perot was included in the televised debates was because the incumbent Republican George Bush thought Perot would siphon votes away from Bush's main party rival, Democrat Bill Clinton. George Farrah, Open Debates Executive Director, *Open Debates News Conference on the Filing of a Complaint with the IRS against the Commission on Presidential Debates*, National Cable Satellite Corporation, <rtsp://video.c-span.org//project/c04/c04041204_irscomplaint.rm> [accessed April 5, 1004].

[32] The three- way televised presidential debate in 1992 attracted more than 97 million viewers. The typical (two- way) televised debate viewership was in the 60 million to 80 million range. Ralph Nader, *Crashing the Party: How to Tell the Truth and Still Run for President* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002) p. 149.

[33] Published polls taken in the 2000 election cycle, for example, indicated that the majority of Americans wanted to include third- party candidates Ralph Nader and Patrick Buchanan in the 2000 televised presidential debates. "The recent Zogby poll found that majorities support the inclusion of both Nader and

credible third-party candidates from appearing in the televised presidential debates.[34] Unable to make their case very publicly at the most critical juncture, third-party presidential candidates are severely hobbled in their attempt to mount a credible political campaign.

Public Funding of Elections

Another legal obstacle to third parties in the U.S. is the public funding of elections that tends to support only the Democratic and Republican candidates. Public financing for presidential elections was established by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA,) and allows for partial public financing in primary elections, public funding of presidential nominating conventions, and full public financing of the general election, using funds derived through a voluntary $3 checkoff on federal tax return forms.[35] Under this law, from 1976 through 2000, there was approximately $321 million dollars in total primary election funding, of which under $10 million went to third parties, calculated by a formula based on the percentage of votes cast for each party in the previous presidential contest.   In the same period, of the approximately $123 million dollars in total presidential convention funding, no money at all went to third parties. Finally, in the same period, of the approximately $692 million dollars in total general election funding, approximately $45 million went to third-parties (of which approximately $40 million

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Buchanan in the debates even if they are below 15 percent in polls." Jeff Cohen, *Nader, Buchanan and the Debates*, <http://www.geocities.com/walrus95482/eagle2-debates.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

34 In the 2000 presidential election the CPD went still further, when they prevented one third-party presidential candidate from even setting foot on the same college campus where the debate was taking place, despite the fact that Ralph Nader had a ticket to watch the debates from another auditorium on campus, and despite, or more likely because, he had been invited by the press to be interviewed after the debate on the grounds of the campus.

35 Public Citizen, *How the Presidential Public Financing Program Works* <http://www.citizen.org> [accessed April 20, 2004].

dollars total went to the Reform party in 1996 and 2000.)[36] In practice, then, the U.S.

version of public financing of elections had the inverse impact that public financing of

elections had in other countries: In the U.S., taxpayer money further enabled the

Democrats and Republicans, while abroad, publicly-financed elections tended to create

more viable third parties in electoral systems that support proportional representation.[37]

The Media "Blackout" of Third- parties

Another legal obstacle third parties face in the U.S. is the tendency for the

"mainstream" media (the largest newspapers, magazines, TV channels, radio stations,

etc.) to "blackout" non- dominant political parties' candidates and issues. In the U.S. the

media corporations are not required by law to give equal time, or in fact any time, to

candidates running for office.[38] Even before massive media consolidation in the last

decades of the century exacerbated the problem, there was usually little coverage of third

parties in the news sources most Americans received. In this regard Ralph Nader wrote of

his 2000 third-party presidential campaign:

> We scheduled the announcement of my candidacy for Presidents' Day,
> February 21, 2000, at the easily accessible Madison Hotel in downtown
> Washington . . . . many television, radio, and print reporters showed up
> to make us think the coverage would be at saturation levels. . .That
> evening, we gathered to view the national television news. There was

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[36] Scott E. Thomas, *The Presidential Election Public Funding Program—A Commissioner's Perspective*, January 31, 2003, p.15-21. In other words, of the approximately $1.1 billion dollars of total federal presidential public funds expended from 1976 to 2000, third-parties received approximately $55 million dollars, or 5% of the total.

[37] In an interview with the author, the U.S. Green Party International Committee Co-Chair Anne Goeke indicated that "throughout Europe, Australia, and South America, Green parties have thrived where there is proportional representation, and publicly-funded elections." Interviews with Maryland Green Party Members, Spring and Summer 2002. The cassette audiotapes are in the author's possession.

[38] The exception to this general statement is public TV and radio; the charter for Maryland Public TV (MPT), for example, includes the requirement to run campaign ads and in 2000 the only TV ads for the Nader presidential campaign in Maryland aired on MPT. Email message from Dave Goldsmith to the Baltimore Green Party listserve, October 21, 2000.

not a single sentence about my announcement on any of the three major networks.[39]

What little coverage there is of third parties and their candidates in the mainstream media is almost exclusively focused on the "horserace" aspect of the contest. In other words, when a third-party candidate is featured, the coverage is usually framed to place the candidate as a marginal player, interesting only to the degree that he or she might affect the race (e.g. as a "spoiler") for the Democratic or Republican candidates.[40] Unlike countries where every candidate for public office is insured free air time, the public airwaves in the U.S. are given to private broadcasters without any requirements that the airwaves be used for the promotion of any "civic virtue" other than consumerism. One huge source of revenue for these broadcasters is the income they receive from political parties and candidates who run paid advertising for their campaigns.[41] Privately-owned broadcasting companies are opposed to "giving away" free air time to political parties, and as they are not compelled to do so by law, they choose (at least since the 1970's) instead to charge tens and then hundreds of millions of dollars for political campaign airtime in each election cycle to political parties and their candidates. The price of political "free speech" in the U.S. is high; in some circumstances, third-party political

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[39] Nader, *Crashing the Party*, p.63.

[40] Typical of this line of reporting was Thomas B. Edsall's piece in the *Washington Post* (October 23, 2000; Page A01) entitled "Nader Is Poised to Play Spoiler," in which the writer opined that, "Ralph Nader's pull with voters in crucial battleground states may, in effect, make George W. Bush the winner on Nov. 7, according to some pundits."

[41] According to Federal Election Commission (FEC) filing, the Bush and Gore 2000 presidential campaigns spent over $300 million dollars, with most of the money going toward TV, radio and print advertising. (Source: www.fec.gov) In addition, the Republican and Democratic parties, political action committees (PACs,) unions, other organizations and individuals spent millions of dollars in additional advertising fees. *Political Television Advertising (National and Featured Markets Through September 20, 2000.)* <http://www.brennancenter.org/cmagpdf/cmag2000.9.28.00.tables.pdf> [accessed April 20, 2004].

advertisements are flatly refused by broadcasters and other privately-owned media companies, even when the third party had been able to pay the going rate.[42]

Many third-party political campaigns are not able to afford the cost of national media advertising; some third-party non-presidential campaigns could not even afford local media, and many had a difficult time paying for basic items like a campaign manager, transportation, and the cost of printing campaign literature.[43] Beyond whatever self-imposed[44] campaign finance limitations a third-party campaign might have, it is almost always more difficult to get monetary donations for a campaign whose likelihood of success, when measured in election victory, is negligible. It is a truism of politics in the U.S. in the twentieth century that money tended to flow to parties and candidates that already had political power, or were perceived to be about to gain political power, and not necessarily to candidates who had the most intelligence, integrity, or ability to

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[42] One ironic instance of this ongoing phenomenon was the 1948 example of Henry A. Wallace's Progressive Party presidential campaign having received their largest campaign contributions from Anita McCormick Blaine, who was the daughter of Cyrus McCormick, who was himself the owner of the largest radio station in Chicago. When Wallace began his campaign with a nationally- broadcast radio address, McCormick refused to allow the speech to be broadcast by his station, despite his daughter's support for Wallace, and Wallace's intention of paying for the broadcast. John C. Culver and John Hyde, *American Dreamer: A Life of Henry A. Wallace* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), p. 429. More recently, political billboard ads have been refused by Clear Channel, and political TV ads have been refused by CBS-TV. Source: *NOW with Bill Moyers,* Transcript, April 26, 2002, PBS-TV. <http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript115_full.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

[43] In the 2000 presidential campaign, for example, the Maryland Green party and the Green party county locals ran no paid advertising, although they were able to get free radio coverage on a Baltimore National Public Radio (NPR) station, and Maryland Public Television (MPT) ran a Nader campaign advertisement for free. With the exception of the two- month period immediately preceding the November election, when the Baltimore Green party hired a part-time campaign worker, there were no other paid workers involved in the Maryland Green party Nader 2000 presidential campaign. Source: interviews with Maryland Green Party Members, Spring and Summer 2002.

[44] In their desire to run clean campaigns, the Maryland Green Party maintained a suggested $100 limit on campaign contributions from individuals through the 2002 election cycle, and refused campaign contributions from corporations, Political Action Committees (PACs) and unions even though higher individual campaign donation limits and contributions from corporations, PACs, and unions were legal.

articulate their ideology or issue.[45] While most third-party political campaigns in the U.S. are woefully under-funded when compared to the campaigns of their Democratic and Republican rivals, there were some notable exceptions to the rule: former president Theodore Roosevelt's campaign in 1912, and billionaire H. Ross Perot's (largely self-funded) campaign in 1992, for example, did not suffer due to lack of money.[46] It is telling that Roosevelt's 1912 campaign and Perot's 1992 campaign which were probably the two best-funded (in relation to their dominant party rivals' campaigns) third-party presidential campaigns in U.S. history were also the two most successful in terms of the percentage of the votes they received; Roosevelt received over 27% and Perot received almost 19% of the national vote.

Media-critic and professor of communications at the University of Illinois, Robert McChesney has concluded:

> We need to recognize that the political times are changing. The sort of liberal-conservative mainstream analysis that still dominates journalism, punditry and academic writing is increasingly irrelevant to U.S. politics. The support for the traditional parties is weak; it is largely the electoral laws and donations from the wealthy that keep them in business, which they well understand.[47]

In their books political and media critics Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky (*Manufacturing Consent*,) and Robert McChesney (*Rich Media, Poor Democracy,*) reveal

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[45] The nonpartisan Center for Voting and Democracy has determined that knowing who the incumbent is, and to a lesser extent which campaign has the mo st money, allowed them to predict victory in 97% of all U.S. House races since 1997. <http://fairvote.org/2002/accuracy.htm> [accessed April 20, 2004].

[46] "The [1912] Progressive party. . . won the allegiance of . . . . a bevy of men of wealth who sponsored it partly because they shared [Theodore] Roosevelt's opinion on consolidation, partly because they hoped for a new career in politics. . . It was a party with only three assets, all transitory: enthusiasm, money, and a Presidential candidate." John Morton Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p.149.
"He [Ross Perot] campaigned [in 1992] in 16 states and spent an estimated $65.4 million of his own money." *Ross Perot* entry in *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia*. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ross_Perot> [accessed April 20, 2004].

[47] Robert W. McChesney, *The Media Crisis of Our Times,*
<http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/McChesney/Media_Crisis_Times.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

the "contradiction between a for-profit, highly concentrated, advertising-saturated, corporate media system and the communication requirements of a democratic society."[48] According to Herman and Chomsky, a self-censorship occurs among the elite media spokespersons, which prevents them from exploring ideas that do not conform to the "propaganda model" of the American mainstream media:

> The 'societal purpose' of the media is to inculcate and defend the economic, social and political agenda of the privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the state.[49]

Official Party Recognition and Access to Primaries

Another legal impediment to third-party participation in elections is the importance of and difficulty of achieving "official party recognition" status in each state. In many states, official recognition is conferred upon political parties when they achieve a certain threshold of votes in the most recent presidential or gubernatorial election, or when they register a sufficient number of affiliated voters by having them sign petitions.[50] Once "officially recognized," third-parties may appear on voter registration forms, and their candidates may be able to have their candidates automatically appear on ballots (without individual petition drives) just as the Democratic and Republican parties and their candidates do.

Official party recognition by the state does not confer the right of third- parties to hold taxpayer-financed primary elections. In Maryland, for example, after the Green

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48 Robert McChesney, *Rich Media, Poor Democracy* (New York: New Press, 2000) p. ii.
49 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), p.298. McChesney and others have also noted that there is an active "access game" which rewards "compliant" journalists with on- the- record and off- the- record interviews (access) and denies "troublesome" reporters access to the seats of power.
50 Richard Winger notes that, "The ballot access laws for new and minor parties to get on the ballot for Congress are so tough, that not since 1920 has any third- party been able to place candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives on the ballot in even half of the districts!" *Ballot Access News*, <http://www.ballot-access.org/winger/fbfp.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

Party was conferred official party status, registered Green Party members were not

afforded the right to hold taxpayer-funded primaries, and registered Green Party voters

were not able to vote in primary elections even for non- partisan races. Official party

recognition is subject to periodic changes in the law, and changes have tended to make the

requirements for official recognition more onerous over time.[51]

Democratic and Republican- Only Primaries

Another legal impediment to third-party participation in the election process is the

primary election system, which is employed by most of the states. In the presidential

contest (and in most other races as well) a primary contest is held in the winter or spring

to determine which candidates will appear in the general election in the following fall. In

most states, registered Democrats and registered Republicans vote in separate primary

contests (held on the same day), while a smaller number of states allow for "cross-over"

voting in the primaries. Many states do not allow third-party-registered voters or

registered- independent voters to participate in primaries.   There is therefore a

disincentive for voters to affiliate with a third-party on their voter registration form, as it

may deprive them of the right to participate in primary contests.[52] The dominant- party

winners of the primary races run against each other in the general election that elects the

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[51] An exception to this general rule occurred in July of 2003, when the Maryland Supreme Court of Appeals overturned a lower court ruling in a case brought by the Maryland Green Party that had upheld Maryland's "two-tier petitioning requirement" (one petition drive for gaining ballot access for the presidential candidate and separate petition drives for each state and local candidate) for running for third-party candidates. Beginning with the 2004 general election in Maryland, candidates of officially recognized third-parties (including the Green Party and the Libertarian Party) will automatically appear on the ballot. "A Greener Democracy*," Baltimore Sun,* August 5, 2003.

[52] Primary election voting patterns are an interesting subject; for some voters, the primaries are more important than the general election, especially in "one- party" jurisdictions. In some states, some voters change their voter registration affiliation in order to vote in the primary of their choice (in one election cycle they might register and vote in the Democratic primary election, and in the following election cycle they might register and vote in the Republican primary election.)

officeholder. In most states, only the Democratic and Republican parties are able to run primary elections paid for by the taxpayers.[53] Therefore, the dominant parties' candidates receive public attention (through press coverage, signage, "meet-the-candidates" events, etc.) many months before third-party candidates generally do. Some voters may also be confused when they vote in the general election and see a (third-party) candidate's name appear for the first time on the ballot. These voters may wonder why that candidate was not on the (earlier) primary ballot, and if that candidate was a "Johnny-come-lately." Some voters may simply disregard any candidate's name on the general election ballot if they had not already seen it on the primary election ballot months before.

The Personal, Periodic Voter Registration System

Another impediment to third-party success is the personal, periodic voter registration system employed by most states in the U.S. Sociologist and political analyst Ruy A. Teixeira has noted that, "this [voter registration] system, based on registration through voluntary, individual initiative, makes it exceptionally difficult by international standards for U.S. citizens to qualify to vote. In most other countries registration is automatic, performed by the state without any individual initiative."[54] In other words, in the U.S. a citizen who wants to vote has to make the effort to register, and usually has to do so weeks or months in advance of Election Day. The result is that "voter registration primary deadlines [occur] before most people even began to think about the election."[55]

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[53] Not only are third- party candidates refused the right to publicly- funded primaries, third- party voters in Maryland were not even allowed to vote in *non- partisan* races in the 2004 Maryland primary election. Email from savidge01@comcast.net to the Maryland Green Party Discussion listserve, March 2, 2004.
[54] Teixeira, *The Disappearing American Voter*, p.13.
[55] David Reynolds, *Democracy Unbound: Progressive Challenges to the Two Party System* (Boston: South End Press, 1997), p.91.

Furthermore, once registered to vote, the voter's registration could "lapse" if he or she failed to vote in a certain number of successive election cycles, if the voter's name or address changed, or if the person's registration information was "purged" from the roll of eligible voters for valid reasons (if the voter were convicted of a felony for example), or for invalid reasons (like board of election clerical errors.) Once "dropped" from the voter registration list, or otherwise declared "inactive" by the local election authority, voters are not eligible to vote, until they go through the registration process again, or bring sufficient identification documentation (like a driver's license) to convince election authorities to restore their voting rights.

Significantly, Peter Argersinger has noted that the personal periodic registration system had the detrimental effect of "reducing . . . the turnout of many voters of marginal social and economic status and political interest, particularly blacks and poor whites in the South, and ethnic groups in the North."[56] In their 1988 study of American voting behavior, Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward concluded that "the registration laws in almost all states. . .[were] the critical source of nonparticipation (and thus powerlessness) of the nation's poorest and least well-educated citizens."[57]

Finally, voters who choose to register with a third-party affiliation sometimes found that their voter registration affiliation automatically switched to that of the dominant party in their jurisdiction[58] when their state de-certified their third-party, or else

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[56] Argersinger, *Structure, Process, and Party*, p.62. Especially before the voting rights legislation in the 1960s, white registrars often intimidated black registrants, preventing the latter from exercising their legal right to vote.

[57] Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Why American Don't Vote* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988.) p.68.

[58] Multiple members of the Baltimore County Green Party found that their party affiliation was "reset" to Democratic; in at least one case the affiliation was "reset" twice in as many years. Interviews with Maryland Green Party members, Spring and Summer, 2003.

they were simply dropped from the voting rolls altogether.[59] Often voters do not

discover that their voter registration "lapsed" until they appear at the voting station on

Election Day, by which time it may be too late to correct the error. Voters who choose

to affiliate with third parties also frequently lose the right to vote in party-exclusive

primary contests.

Gerrymandering

      Gerrymandering is the name given to the practice of redistricting the election

boundaries in order to give an advantage to one party. Redistricting that is ostensibly

performed to maintain a roughly equal number of voters in each electoral district, based

on the mandated federal census count taken every ten years, often becomes in practice

gerrymandering, where the dominant political party in the jurisdiction carves out districts

that maintain or extend its dominance, by creating as many "safe" districts (with a

majority of voters registered for their party) for itself, and as few safe districts as possible

for opponents.[60] The effect of gerrymandering on third parties is sometimes even more

pernicious. Third-party officeholders are sometimes targeted to be "squeezed out" of their

seats by the major parties.[61] In addition, because only third-parties are required to

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[59] Anecdotal evidence suggests that third- party voter registration in Maryland can be an onerous process. This author is aware of numerous cases in which would-be registrants had to submit multiple requests to the state board of elections in order to gain third-party registration status, or regain it after it had erroneously been changed. Source: Interviews with Maryland Green Party members, Spring and Summer, 2003.

[60] "The 'rules' for gerrymandering were simple, as summarized by a political scientist: 'Make your district majorities as small as is safe; make your opponent's district majorities as large and as few as possible; throw away as few of your own votes and as many of your opponents' as you can.'" Quoted in Argersinger, *Structure, Process, and Party*, p.75.

[61] John Eder, the first Green Party elected official in Maine found his seat in jeopardy during his first term in the Maine legislation. "Democrats say it had to be done. Republicans say they had no choice. Green Independents say that a House redistricting plan under consideration in Augusta is a brazen attempt to unseat the Legislature's only - and the nation's highest-elected Green Party member." Kelley Bouchard, "Maine Greens raise red flag at redistricting," *Portland Press Herald Writer*, Tuesday, April 1, 2003.

collect petitions for ballot access from voters in the electoral district in which they run a candidate for office, when the election district changes during the run-up to the election due to gerrymandering, all of the petition signatures gathered by the third-party candidate's campaign that belong to voters in the "old" district have to be discarded, and the candidate has to get additional petition signatures exclusively from his "new" district to make up for the shortfall.[62] This additional effort has sometimes meant the difference between achieving or not achieving ballot access for the third-party candidate in local and state races.

Shrinking of the Public Space

In a related vein, third-party efforts are hampered by the "shrinking" of the public space in America throughout the twentieth century. It is often illegal for campaign workers to attempt to collect ballot access petition signatures or to register voters for their party at those places where citizens congregate in the largest numbers: bus and train stations, airports, shopping malls, concerts and fairs, sporting events and movie theatres, pedestrian sidewalks and public parks, public and college libraries, state and federal buildings, gated communities and apartment complexes, etc.[63] In other cases campaign workers have had to pay to gain access to such public venues, or they have had to schedule in advance in order to reach their fellow citizens for the purpose of party or

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[62] In Maryland in 2002, for example, the Green Party candidate for Delegate in the 42nd District had to throw away hundreds of petition signatures, and hundreds of hours of volunteers' work when his district was re- zoned only months before the deadline for ballot access petitions. The Rick Kunkel campaign in Baltimore County, Maryland, was able to get the extra signatures in time, and his name did appear on the ballot in November, 2002. Source: Interviews with Maryland Green Party members, Spring and Summer, 2003.

[63] In 2000, Maryland Green party activists were removed from the Maryland State Fair, the Maryland Department of Motor Vehicles building, etc. and from various shopping centers and retail establishments when they attempted to gather petition signatures to put Ralph Nader on the ballot in Maryland. Source: Interviews with Maryland Green Party members, Spring and Summer, 2003.

campaign-building activities.   Third-party activists have sometimes been chased off sidewalks along public roads by the police when they attempted to wave signs or otherwise expose passing motorists to their campaign.   The enforcement of rules governing political party access to the general public has often been arbitrary and capricious, and the enforcement has sometimes been dependent on which dominant party is in power and which third-party is attempting to campaign, or even which police department or individual officers are involved.[64] Local election authorities have the right under law to invoke penalties on campaigns that have broken election laws, but have probably usually been reluctant to do so for minor offenses (such as the posting of signs in illegal locations) because their own party was likely to be guilty of the same or similar infractions of campaign laws.[65]

Voting on Work Days

Again, unlike the practice in many other countries, where Election Day is a national holiday or falls on the weekend, Americans almost always vote on weekdays (Monday through Friday,) and presidential elections are likewise always held on Tuesdays. For those third parties whose main appeal is directed to working class (as opposed to middle and/or upper class) voters, this practice of workday voting likely reduces the voter turnout of their core constituency. In some states the law requires that

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[64] For example, the law may state that political parties can not post campaign signs along public roads, but the local election authorities may decide to ignore the law, or may decide to enforce the law fairly by removing the signs belonging to all political parties, or they may selectively enforce the law against all of the parties except its own (in other words remove all campaign signs except those in support of their own party,) or enforce the law against its main rival, if the third- party was more likely to "hurt" their rival than themselves (in other words remove the main rival's signs but leave the third- party signs up.) Source: Interviews with Maryland Green Party members, Spring and Summer, 2003.

[65] In the 2000 election, the author noted that all of the Republican and Green Party yard signs at beltway entrance and exit ramps on the west side of Baltimore County were removed during election eve, while Democratic party candidate yardsigns were left in place.

private, state and government employers give their employees time off to vote, while in other states there is no such legal requirement.[66] In any event, some working-class citizens inevitably find it impractical or impossible to vote during a work day. In Maryland, for example, Election Day is declared a holiday, and some schools and government offices are closed.[67] While this may appear to be quite democratic and conducive to voter turnout, because many schools are used as polling places, schoolchildren are out of school on election days, and parents and guardians often have to stay home with them.

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[66] In Maryland the law is two hours maximum time. Federal Election Commission, *Frequently Asked Questions About Election Day and Voting Procedures*, <http://www.fec.gov> [accessed April 20, 2004].
[67] Ibid.

Voters Attitudes

The next category of impediments to the electoral success of political third parties is related to potential voters' attitudes. These include: the "spoiler issue" and the perception of the "wasted vote"; the belief that the U.S. is and should be a "two-party system"; the anger and fear of third parties by dominant party officials and especially by the dominant party-registered voting public; an increase in cynicism and voter apathy; failure of previous third-party candidacies; declining voter turnout; and the effects of party loyalty.

The "Spoiler Issue" and the Perception of the "Wasted Vote"

Perhaps the single most common reason people give for not voting for a third-party candidate (when they were aware that a third-party candidate was in the race) is that the only function of non-Democratic or Republican party candidates is to "spoil" the prospects of a Democratic or Republican rival.[68] Citizens often complain that to vote for a candidate who seemingly has no chance of winning is tantamount to "throwing one's vote away." A concomitant belief is that voting for a third-party candidate is really only a symbolic act, and probably a futile gesture at that. It seems reasonable to conclude that the poorest voters are probably the least likely to "waste" their vote on a symbolic protest, especially if the result of the election is in doubt, and if the voter is directly dependent on government largess. Many voters therefore conclude that the better course was to "vote the lesser of two evils" and by doing so, to attempt to elect the Democratic

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[68] See, for example, Maurice Duverger, "Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty System," *Party Politics and Pressure Groups* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972), pp. 23-32.

or Republican candidate they disliked least.[69] Political scientist John F. Bibby has noted:

> The most significant [factor] is the fear among voters that if they vote for a third-party candidate, they will, in effect, be "wasting" their votes. Voters have been shown to engage in strategic voting by casting ballots for their second choice when they sense that a third-party candidate has no chance of winning. Thus in the 2000 election, 15 percent of voters in a pre-election survey rated Ralph Nader more highly than either George W. Bush or Al Gore, but Nader received only 2.7 percent of the popular vote.[70]

Even though most third-parties poll poorly, the Vanishing Voter Project has determined that in late 1999, only 23% of the American public think that the two- party system works well:

> Which of the following statements is closest to your own view of the two-party system today, in terms of how well it addresses major issues and produces good candidates?
> 23% Two-party system works fairly well
> 39 Two-party system has real problems
>   but with improvements can still work well
> 28 Two-party system is seriously broken
>   and country needs a third-party
> 10 Don't Know
> 1   Refused[71]

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[69] Typical of these sentiments are the polling results from the 2003 San Francisco ABC7-TV Listens Poll *Who We're Voting For And Why*, "But many poll participants expressed frustration at their choices for governor. They say it's a choice between the lesser of two evils. The majority of participants in our ABC7 Listens Poll say they plan to make a protest vote in the governor's race. Only 35 percent say their vote is more one for that person as opposed to 61 percent who say their vote is more of one against another candidate." <http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/news/polling_center/110102_pc_elections.html#> [accessed April 20, 2004]. "Responses to a straight-up question, asking general election voters whether the two-party system is serving their needs and those of other Americans, produced a response that should scare the socks off the leaders of the Democratic and Republican Parties alike. Less than half, 48%, felt that the current two-party system is serving their needs, while 43% said it was not, and that they would consider voting for a third-party alternative." <http://www.garesearch.com/Surveys/National-Media-Survey-Aug%2099.htm> [accessed April 20, 2004].

[70] John F. Bibby, *Political Parties in the United States*, <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/election04/parties.htm> [accessed April 20, 2004]. The Vice-chair of the Oregon Democratic Party, Maria Smithson eloquently summed up this mentality with regard to the 2000 Presidential election: "[the] message is that the vote before us is *not* a vote of conscience. It's a vote of consequence. Not conscience, but consequence." Marc Cooper, "Duking it Out in the Naderhood," *The Nation*, October 12, 2000. <http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20001030&c=3&s=cooper> [accessed April 20, 2004].

[71] Vanishing Voter Project, "Weekly Poll Results, December 15-19, 1999," <http://www.vanishingvoter.org/> [accessed April 20, 2004].

While a large majority (67%) of those polled (above) felt that the U.S. political system was not functioning well, only 28% felt that a third party might help. Therefore the questions remain: do Americans think third parties are no better than the major parties, or do they think third- parties stand no chance of gaining power and influence?

The Belief that the U.S. is and should be a "Two-Party System"

Anecdotal evidence suggests that a large number of American voters believe that the U.S. government was designed by the founders to be a two-party system. This widespread sentiment at times seems almost genetic: some voters appear to have blinders to all third-party activity.[72] In an environment where "only 26 percent knew the 6-year term of office of a U.S. senator and less than half the public knows that a member of the House of Representative is elected to a two-year term,"[73] third parties are faced with the daunting tasks of getting the voters attention, explaining the purpose of their party, and defensively justifying their right to compete for votes. While major party political leaders are at times reticent to discuss specific third-party rivals, they do not hesitate to attack third parties generally.[74]

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[72] "There has never been much popular sympathy for noncentrist views in which the parties contrast sharply with each other." Nelson W. Polsby, *Party Rank and File Opt for Consensus Over Parity* (California: University of California Berkeley Vol. 41, No. 5 Winter 2000), p3.

[73] Results of a 1996 Washington Post-Harvard survey quoted in James Bovard, *The Greatest Ignorance of the Greatest Number*, Future of Freedom Foundation Daily (Virginia: The Future of Freedom Foundation, August 2003), p.1.

[74] "To underscore the danger of voting for any third- party candidate in elections this close, a statistic from the 2000 campaign may prove useful: a total of eight third- party candidates won more votes than the difference between Al Gore and George Bush nationwide." Howard Dean*, "*For Ralph Nader, but Not for President," *New York Times*, April 12, 2004.

The Anger at and Fear of Third Parties by the Voting Public and by Dominant Party Officials

Related to the general ignorance about third political parties in America is the anger and fear that third parties have sometimes provoked among Democratic and Republican party officials and among the most partisan segment of the voting public, who are aware of a third party's existence. Numerous national polls and surveys demonstrate what appears to be a disconnect between citizens' theoretical attitudes toward third parties and third-party candidates and voters' actual voting habits and expectations regarding third parties and third-party candidacies.   Gallup/CNN/USA-Today polls in 1992 and 1999 showed 59% and 67% respectively of those surveyed favoring the idea of third-parties and third-party candidates, while a 1996 Princeton Survey Research Associates International (PSRA)/ Newsweek poll indicated that only 37% of those responding thought there would be a third-party president elected in their lifetime, a 1996 CBS/New York Times poll found that only 36% thought that a third party would give voice to their own agendas, and a 1996 Media Center/ Roper poll indicated that only 37% of those surveyed had ever voted for a third-party candidate in any election, for any office.[75] It seems fair to conclude that third parties in America seem to be more honored in the abstract than in practice.

To some Americans, third parties are viewed as somewhat sinister, perhaps even unpatriotic—after all, some voters contended, why do we need more than the two choices we have always had? In the early twentieth century the Baltimore Democratic Party political boss Arthur P. Gorman, for one, denounced the possibility of third-party success

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[75] The Roper Center- *Public Opinions Matter* <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu> [accessed April 20, 2004].

as being "more objectionable even than Republican success,"[76] and much more threatening to the status quo.[77]

In 2004, Democratic party members' anger at Ralph Nader's independent run for the presidency and/or the Green party's presidential campaign was at times extreme, such as in this email comment from a Democratic party supporter:

> As a corporate-dupe and a Democrat, I've come to the conclusion that we can no longer ignore the Greens. We have to stomp them into the dirt and continue our work to move the Democratic Party to the left. The Greens aren't going to help us because their entire self-image is built on being morally superior, misunderstood, and sanctimonious. If they actually won anything, they'd simply change to another loser position because they are sociopaths.[78]

Increase in Cynicism and Voter Apathy

A more pedestrian attitude among the voting public that stands as another obstacle to electoral success is the increase in cynicism and voter apathy. After the Vietnam / Watergate era of the 1960s and 1970s especially, most Americans of all political stripes grew to regard their national government with skepticism, and sometimes outright hostility.[79] Every political scandal, every example of corruption and cronyism, tends to further insulate a jaded voting public from being able to hear or being willing to believe any political candidate, even an honest third-party leader. Additionally, the contested result of the 2000 presidential election in which the candidate with the most number of

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76 Argersinger, *Structure, Process, and Party*, p.145.

77 In the 2002 Maryland Gubernatorial election the Democratic candidate Kathleen Kennedy Townsend told the author that despite the fact she had a relative in Ireland who was in government as a third-party (Green) member, there was no place in America for third parties because the U.S. is too large and heterogeneous to support the kind of multi-party democracies that exist in Europe.

78 Geoff Staples from an email to virtual_greens@yahoogroups.com, March 15, 2004.

79 "In 1999, 29 percent of respondents say they trust the government in Washington to do the right thing, compared with 38 percent in 1997 and 21 percent in 1994 . . . The poll, *America Unplugged: Citizens and Their Government*, found that more than twice as many Americans (64 percent) feel disconnected from government than feel connected to it (30 percent)." The Council for Excellence in Government, <http://www.excelgov.org> [accessed April 20, 2004].

popular votes did not win, may have left more than half of the electorate feeling "cheated"; and that sense of "unfairness" may tend to depress future voter turn out as individual voters may have concluded that their "vote doesn't count."[80] It may be difficult for any politician to puncture the protective bubble of cynicism that encases many voters, and it is probably a still more difficult challenge for third-party candidates who first have to defend their very presence on the political stage.[81] Finally, the winner-take-all and Electoral College systems may tend to fuel voter apathy, and reduce participation.

The Failure of any Twentieth- Century Third-Party Presidential Candidate to Win

One of the major obstacles third-party presidential candidates face is the legacy of the failure of any twentieth century third-party presidential candidate to win, and their near total failure even to make a "respectable" showing. With the exception of Theodore Roosevelt's 1912 campaign (where he came in second with some 27% of the vote), every other third-party candidate came in a very distant third (or fourth, etc.) As people tend to love winners, and Americans perhaps more than most, the kind of track record that third-party presidential candidates bring to their campaigns is pitiable,[82] and thus unlikely to

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[80] Being "cheated" by the Electoral College may also have the reverse effect of mobilizing increased support for the "cheated" candidate in subsequent elections—no president who lost the popular vote has ever been reelected. Additionally, there are some aspects of the Electoral College system that redound to the benefit of third- parties, and are discussed below.

[81] On the other hand, the failure of the dominant political parties to "keep faith" with the voters offered an opportunity for third- party candidates, and is discussed in some detail below.

[82] The combined votes for ALL left-leaning (Socialist Workers Party, Socialist Labor Party, Communist, Peoples Party, Citizens Party, U.S. Labor Party, Peace and Freedom Party, Workers World Party, Workers League Party, New Alliance Party, Consumer Party, Peace and Freedom Party, Socialist Party, and the Green Party) political third- parties in ALL the presidential elections from 1972 through 2000 (1972= 146,000; 1976= 248,000; 1980= 349,000; 1984= 159,000; 1988= 293,000; 1992= 124,000; 1996= 635,000; 2000= 2,895,000) is approximately 4.25 million votes, or less than 5% of the vote in the 2000 presidential election. "American Presidential Elections 1932-2000" <http://search.eb.com/elections/etable3.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

inspire voters who only support a campaign with a reasonable chance of winning the election.

Declining Voter Turnout

      Washington Post reporter T.R. Reid concluded in 2004 that "Americans feel disconnected from government and ignored by the political process [and] . . . people are really unhappy about their role, or lack of it, in the democratic process."[83] The general decline in voter turnout also has a negative impact on third parties. Turnout in U.S. elections has tended to decline throughout the twentieth century, from a peak of 65.4% in 1908 to a low of 49.0% in 1996.[84] By the close of the century, barely half of the electorate participated in presidential voting, and state and local races drew much lower turnout rates still. Due to factors described above, political analyst Ruy A. Teixeira concluded: "On virtually every characteristic examined, the U.S. system is structured in such a way as to increase the costs and decrease the benefits of voting . . . In fact the U.S. environment seems so uncongenial to voter participation, one might wonder why turnout levels are not even lower than they are."[85] A scholar of the voting habits of the American electorate Paul D. Vann Ness concluded: "Americans don't vote because the electoral system is precisely designed to frustrate their political aspirations."[86] And since "turnout

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[83] T.R. Reid, "Most Americans Feel They're on Sidelines of Political Process, Poll Finds," *Washington Post*, March 19, 2004. Reid quotes pollster Peter D. Hart as indicating that 50 years ago 32% of Americans felt they had no say in what the government does, while in 2004 the number had risen to 46%.
[84] The decline in the percentage of the electorate participating in presidential elections in the twentieth century was not linear; the first half of the century, and especially the first third had the largest percentage of turnout, although the 1960s did see turnouts above 60%. "United States Presidential Election Results" <http://www.uselectionatlas.org/USPRESIDENT/> [accessed April 20, 2004].
[85] Teixeira, *The Disappearing American Voter*, p.17.
[86] Piven and Cloward, *Why Americans Don't Vote*, p.211.

is lowest among the poor, minorities, and the less- well educated,"[87] any third party that attempted to attract the votes of the "lowest" classes is put in the position of trying to accomplish the formidable task of establishing a new behavior (voting), instead of merely redirecting existing voters to their candidate. Historian Paul Kleppner notes that while, "[t]he functional decline of the country's political parties [since the 1960s] serves as the proximate cause of this disintegrative process. . .[t]he result has been widespread disillusionment with electoral politics and a consequently large and socially skewed decline in electoral participation."[88]

Party Loyalty

Although steadily declining throughout the century, voters' loyalty to a given political party represents a formidable challenge for third parties. In some households or extended families, members would no sooner change party affiliation then they would religious affiliation. In some communities social life seems to be entwined with party loyalty, and in some companies, party loyalty is required for employment or advancement. Though less common at the close of the century than at its start, there are citizens (voters and non- voters) who display a visceral reaction at the mere mention of the label "Democrat" or "Republican." Third-party supporters often find an unbreachable

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[87] Alexander Keyssar, *The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p.320.
[88] Paul Kleppner, *Who Voted: The Dynamics of Electoral Turnout, 1870- 1980* (New York: Prager Publishers, 1982), p. 112. Kleppner further noted that "Declining electoral participation has not been confined to one or another demographic category of nonsouthern whites; it has characterized all of them, both in presidential and off-year elections." Ibid, p. 123.

wall of party loyalty surrounding some citizens, and their attempts at proselytizing often

fall on deaf ears.[89]

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[89] This is not a new phenomenon; one hundred and seventy five years ago an astute observer of the American character noted that, "I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America." Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, edited and abridged by Richard D. Heffner (New York: Penguin, 1956), p.117.

Illegal Impediments

While the illegal impediments may have diminished in frequency and importance throughout the twentieth century, the relatively recent threat posed by electronic voting *(see below)* means that in the twenty-first century, illegal impediments may again become some of the most significant barriers to third-party electoral success. Among the major impediments in this category, in order of importance are: the fraudulent "stuffing" of ballot boxes, the false counting of ballots, and the registration of non-existent voters; the illegal purging of the voting roster before elections; unreasonably difficult access to polling stations; bribery and vote buying; partisan behavior by legislatures, election judges and trial judges and juries in election-related legal procedures; the arrests of party activists and would-be voters; the printing and distribution of false ballots and the printing of fraudulent campaign materials.

Fraudulent "Stuffing" of Ballot Boxes, the False Counting of Ballots, and the Registration of Non- Existent Voters

The most significant illegal impediment that political parties face is the fraudulent "stuffing" of ballot boxes, the false counting of ballots, and the registration of nonexistent voters. Paper ballots can be "miscounted", and illegally added or removed in secret by election authorities. In New York City in 1873, the notorious political "boss", William M. Tweed admitted under oath: "The ballots made no results. The counters made the results."[90]

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90 Ibid., 111. This precept was echoed by the maxim widely attributed to Josef Stalin that, "Those who cast the votes decide nothing, those who count the votes decide everything."
<http://www.votescam.com/epilogue.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

Adding names of non-existent voters to the voting rolls was at times so widespread that: "in 1885 . . . in nearly a third of Baltimore's 180 precincts, registrars recorded on the books more voters than a simultaneous police census found living in the precinct."[91]   More recently, allegations of widespread vote "fixing" by Democratic machines against Republican candidates were made in the 1960 presidential election in Chicago, and in the 1994 gubernatorial race in Maryland, to name only two of the best publicized cases. Third parties are almost always the easiest targets of vote tampering because they either can not field enough election judges to oversee the vote tabulation, or are barred from the vote-counting process by the *bipartisan* (Democratic and Republican Party,) *not nonpartisan* election officials.

Modern electronic vote-counting is especially subject to tampering, as Stanford Professor David Dill, a leading critic of the unaccountability and unreliability of computerized voting machines, contended in May, 2003: "Using these machines is tantamount to handing complete control of vote counting to a private company, with no independent checks or audits. These machines represent a serious threat to democracy."[92] According to the non-profit organization Campaign for Verifiable Voting in Maryland: "Maryland is using electronic voting machines that make it impossible to tell if your vote is being correctly counted."[93] One expert has concluded: "Until such time as Diebold [the manufacturer of the electronic voting systems used in Maryland] corrects these flaws, however, I would recommend against use of the post-election electronic transmission features of these machines, and I would recommend that security

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[91] Argersinger, *Structure, Process, and Party*, p.118.

[92] Verified Voting.org, <http://www.verifiedvoting.org> [accessed April 20, 2004]. The "privatizing" of the counting of ballots, like the "privatizing" of the televised debates, are troubling trends for American democracy, if not for our republic.

[93] TrueVoteMaryland.org, <http:// www.truevotemd.org> [accessed April 20, 2004].

for pre-election programming rely entirely on locked doors and a carefully recorded chain of custody."[94]

The Illegal Purging of the Voting Roster Before Elections

Perhaps most topically (in the wake of the disputed 2000 Florida presidential election contest) is the illegal purging of the voting roster before an election. Election officials sometimes remove the names of valid voters from the voting rolls, thus rendering those voters ineligible to vote. Often the voter was not aware that his or her name has been removed until they were at the polling station, by which time it was probably too late to correct the error. Harvard professor of History and Social Policy Alexander Keyssar has noted that during the Progressive Era, some election officials displayed, "their antagonism toward poor, working-class, and foreign-born voters. . .and many of them unabashedly welcomed the prospect of weeding such voters out of the electorate."[95] The outcome of the 2000 presidential race may have been decided by just this kind of illegal activity by Republican election officials in Florida, where the Republican presidential candidate's brother was governor.[96]

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[94] Douglas W. Jones, "The Diebold AccuVote TS Should be Decertified," (The University of Iowa Department of Computer Science) <http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/dieboldusenix.html> [accessed April 20, 2004]. It is also problematic that Diebold's CEO, Wally O'Dell is a Bush "pioneer" (someone who donated at least $100,000 to Bush's candidacy) who has publicly announced he "is committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president." Quoted in Alan Bisbort, "Who Counts the Votes?," *Hartford Advocate*, April 1, 2004.

[95] Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, p.159.

[96] It has been alleged by investigative journalist Greg Palast and others that the outcome of the 2000 presidential election hinged on the illegal purging of voters from Florida voter registration rolls under the pretext the purged voters were "felons". Subsequent investigation appears to show that the majority of the tens of thousands of purged voters were black (and therefore likely to vote Democratic) and were not in fact felons; "In the days following the presidential election, there were so many stories of African Americans erased from the voter rolls you might think they were targeted by some kind of racial computer program. They were." Greg Palast, *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy* (New York: Plume Books, 2003), p.11.

Unreasonably Difficult Access to Polling Stations

One more illegal way that the dominant political party hampers their political rivals is by making access to polling stations unreasonably difficult. This involves everything from deliberately circulating the wrong address and hours of the polling station, to locking the doors of the polling station during the times of maximum voter traffic. Historian Peter Argersinger noted one novel approach to impeding the will of third-party voters occurred in the late-nineteenth century when the ballots were placed in an inaccessible spot: "In one precinct of the third ward [in Baltimore] for example, the Industrials [a third-party] had to build a platform so that their supporters could reach the voting window . . ."[97] In 2000, Green party members in Maryland were barred from the polling stations once the voting ended, and were not allowed to witness the official counting of the ballots—a task which Democratic and Republican officials were encouraged to observe.[98]

Bribery and Vote-Buying[99]

For as long as there have been leaders, there have been illegal attempts to influence the succession to high offices. By the twentieth century, the U.S. had a long history of election bribery and vote buying. Historians have concluded, "Bribery and vote-buying were widely prevalent in Gilded Age [late-nineteenth century] elections."[100] Investigations by Genevieve Gist revealed vote-buying schemes that involved up to 90 percent of the voters in one rural Ohio town in the 1890s; John Reynolds estimated that in

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[97] Ibid., p.134.
[98] Source: Interviews with Maryland Green party members in the Spring and Summer of 2003.
[99] A discussion of "vote trading" appears below in the section on the Electoral College.
[100] Argersinger, *Structure, Process, and Party*, p.107.

New Jersey during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, "perhaps as much as one third of the electorate commonly accepted money for their votes."[101] Peter Argersinger has determined for these periods, "vote-buying was so widespread as to be virtually socially respectable."[102] These illegal activities were perpetrated by members of the Democratic and Republican parties, to the detriment of honest political players, third party or otherwise, and to the injury of the general public's expectations of fair elections. Throughout the twentieth century it was common practice for urban political party "ward heelers" in Baltimore and other cities to dispense "walking around money" to agents who would purchase the votes of pliable citizens. It was not uncommon for urban political "machines" to pay the same voter to vote multiple times, at the same or different polling stations, during a single election. Due to their lack of funds and lack of access to the "machinery" of voting, third parties were usually unable to expose or prevent or emulate these abuses.

Partisan Behavior by Legislatures, Election Judges, Trial Judges and Juries in Election-Related Legal Procedures

When partisan legislatures, election judges, and trial judges and juries in election-related legal procedures are placed in the position of deciding the merits of cases, the truth is not always paramount in the determination of their actions. Demonstrative of the flagrant abuses by officials, Peter Argersinger uncovered the 1897 Maryland case where,

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[101] Ibid., p.107.

[102] Ibid., p.107. More recently, vote buying briefly moved to the internet with the appearance and then disappearance of Vote-auction.com in 2000. "Anonymous bidders state their price, depending on which state the voter is from. For example, this week a vote in the safe state of Texas is worth just $4.19, but one in marginal Michigan will garner $22.73. If a majority of voters were willing to sell their votes, winning the Presidency would cost between $200 million and $1.1 billion (based on 1996 turnout figures). Given the power of the Presidency, many interest groups would consider that a steal." Andrew Leigh, Harvard University, <http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/2000/nov00/Leigh.htm> [accessed April 20, 2004].

"a score of Baltimore election judges awaiting trial for election fraud escaped prosecution

when the legislature repealed the law under which they had been indicted and then

reenacted it without providing for pending prosecutions."[103]   Records of legal

proceedings are replete with examples of dubious acquittals of known violators of

election-related laws by some of the "best judges that money could buy." Even when

election-related cases were eventually (sometimes years after the infraction) settled in

favor of third-parties, no remedy was available to reverse the election results, or to insure

that similar illegal behavior did not occur in the future. When complaints filed by one of

the dominant political parties were routinely turned aside, political third-party electoral

concerns about illegal election activities were easily dismissed.

The Arrests of Party Activists and Would- Be Voters

The most horrendous obstacles placed before all political parties were the arrests,

beatings, and killings of party activists and would-be voters. Peter Argersinger noted a

case where:

> [t]he Cincinnati police, controlled by the Democratic city
> administration, in 1884 made a sweep through an area of heavy black
> population and arbitrarily arrested 113 black males on election eve and
> sequestered them in a basement under the jail until the polls closed the
> next day, whereupon they were released without charges ever being
> pressed.[104]

For every murder or illegal imprisonment of political activists or voters, there are

many beatings, and countless harassments by local police, including arrest threats,

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103 Ibid., p.112.
104 Ibid., p.116.

confiscation of political literature, and the forcible removal of campaign workers.[105]

Representatives of political third parties are the most vulnerable to attack because they probably have less institutional support, less support in the general community, and the least amount of money with which to make bail, pay fines, and to pay for legal counsel, etc. Third-party supporters are less likely to find sympathetic judges, juries, and jailers; inside jail, third-party activists are less likely to find any Democratic or Republican activists incarcerated for similar infractions of the law.

The Printing and Distribution of False Ballots and the Printing of Fraudulent Campaign Materials

Another illegal electoral strategy employed before the use of the Australian ballot was the printing and distribution of false ballots. In this scheme, one of the dominant political parties created a ballot that looked like their opponent's ballot, bearing the other party's emblem at the top, but listing their own candidates below, causing unsuspecting (illiterate or otherwise) voters accidentally to cast the wrong ballot. Third parties were again the easiest prey for this illegal activity as they usually had the fewest number of poll workers, and were thus unable to cover all the polls at all precincts in order to stop the use of false ballots. Political printing "forgeries" survived into the twentieth century in the form of fraudulent campaign literature, meeting announcements, campaign headquarters memos, and "doctored" photographs. In one infamous 1950 case a "composite" photograph of Maryland Democratic Senator Millard Tydings, in apparent

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[105] One post- 9-11 example of political party harassment: "An official told me that my name had been flagged in the computer," a shaken [Green Party official] Oden said. "I was targeted because the Green Party USA opposes the bombing of innocent civilians in Afghanistan." "Green Party USA Coordinator Detained at Airport; Prevented by Armed Military Personnel from Flying to Political Meeting in Chicago", *CounterPunch,* November 2, 2001.

consultation with the head of the U.S. Communist Party, was distributed by Tydings'
opponent and played a part in the incumbent's defeat.[106] Third- parties are again more
vulnerable to these schemes as they lack the resources to discover, contain, and refute
these illegal devices.[107]

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[106] Jack Anderson & Ronald W. May, McCarthy, *The Man, the Senator, the "Ism"* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), p. 297-99

[107] In 2003, the Green Party candidate for major of San Francisco became a victim of a political forgery. "Nine days away from the most important San Francisco election in recent history, Willie Brown's handpicked successor Gavin Newsom has been caught forging a mass email . . . which calls for supporters of [Green Party] candidate Matt Gonzalez to protest a Tuesday campaign appearance by Mr. Newsom, where he will be accompanied by former Vice President Al Gore." IndyBay.org, <http://www.indybay.org/archives/archive_by_id.php?id=1716&category_id=45> [accessed April 20, 2004].

Positive Factors for Third- Parties

In order to round out this brief summary of U.S. elections and third-party participation, there are a few positive factors that may tend to militate marginally against the overwhelming burden that American third parties have struggled against. This category includes the Progressive Era electoral reforms; the 1960's Civil Rights Era voting reforms; the "Motor Voter" Act; the unintended consequences of the Electoral College; the Internet as an organizing tool for activists; the alternative media; Instant Runoff Voting and other voting reform measures; the declining voter party-affiliation; and the "ideological drifts" in American politics.

Progressive Era Electoral Reforms

Progressive Era electoral reforms that may have helped third-party activity include women's suffrage, the direct election of U.S. Senators, the development of anti-corrupt-campaign-practices legislation, and the adoption of the citizen initiative, referendum, and recall. These reforms, as they expanded the electorate and attempted to lessen political corruption in order to empower voters, brought many more potential and actual voters into the process, may have helped to stimulate civic participation, and may have helped to instill the importance and utility of voting in the general public. To the extent this is true,[108] then an energized electorate may have been more susceptible to third-party entreaties than one that was dispirited or cowed. On the other hand, observers note: "All told, the major political parties emerged from the era of reform less popular and more carefully regulated than before, but also, paradoxically, more firmly embedded

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[108] In 1916 (the last presidential election year before the constitutional amendment allowing women's suffrage was passed) there were approximately 18.5 million voters; in 1920 there were 26.7 million voters, an increase of over 8 million new voters.

in the legal machinery of elections . . . for third parties the reforms were damaging. . . [and] made it difficult for any but Democrats or Republicans to get on the ballot."[109] If third-party presidential support was meager in the twentieth century even with these reforms, third-party presidential support might have been non- existent without them.

Civil Rights Era Voting Reforms

The 1960's Civil Rights Era voting reforms brought millions of black voters from the South into the electorate, and gave eighteen year olds across the nation the right to vote. As these new voters tend to be poorer than the overall population, they may be more likely to listen favorably to appeals that were directed to social justice and economic equality issues—even when they are delivered by a third-party candidate, and perhaps especially when they are delivered by a black candidate. According to a recent Gallup poll, "the youngest group of voters -- those aged 18 to 29 -- are more likely than those who are older to be liberal in their views on economic issues, to be politically independent, and to rate the government and the president positively."[110] To the surprise of many, however, the youth vote (voters aged between 18 and 24 years) between 1972 and 2000, actually declined by 13% in presidential elections from 55% to 42%.[111] Furthermore, the most successful third-party presidential campaigns in the final third of the century came from the right or center of the political spectrum. Clearly, left-leaning

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[109] Arthur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick, *Progressivism* (Wheeling, IL.: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1983), p.52.

[110] Gallup Organization, *Gallup Poll Assesses Views of Young Americans*, November 5, 2003. <http://www.gallup.com> [accessed April 20, 2004]. According to the 2/26/04 Gallop poll "The Nader Factor," "Nader's 2000 support showed a downward trend with age—his support among 18- to 29- year old likely voters was 9%, compared with 5% among 30- to 49- year – old likely voters, 4% among 50 – to 64 – year- olds, and 3% among those 65 and old."

[111] The Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement at the University of Maryland. Lara Jakes Jordan, "Harvard Rips 'Old Voter' T-Shirt," *Associated Press*, March 1, 2004.

presidential candidates have not been able to take full advantage of the potential opportunities presented by these reforms.

Another opportunity for third parties came in the form of the 1993 "Motor Voter" Act, which added an addition of 9 million new registrants in the first two years.[112] The potential here for third-party success lies in the fact that these new voters have not yet committed to any party (and in fact most of them registered as "Independent") which means that their vote was still "in play", possibly even to third-party candidates. Anecdotal evidence and survey results suggest that younger voters are especially receptive to appeals from left-leaning third-party activists. *(See Maryland Green Party survey information below.)*

The Electoral College

Unique among the nations of the world, the U.S. employs an Electoral College that actually determines the winner of presidential races. The Electoral College is comprised of the representatives of the political parties in each state whose names are submitted to each state's chief election official, and who are pledged to their candidate for president. The number of Electoral College representatives is equal to the number of the state's U.S. Senators (two) plus the number of its U.S. Representatives (which is determined by census population size of the state.) Each state has differing laws about how these representatives might vote, but in general the Electoral College representatives from each state give all of their votes to the candidate who won the popular vote in their

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112 Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, p. 315.

state.[113] One of the unintended consequences of the Electoral College system is that in every presidential election there are a number of "safe states"—that is, there are states in which voting for a third-party candidate has little or no chance of "spoiling" the election for the dominant (Democratic or Republican) party's candidate in that state. In a classic case of "making lemonade out of lemons," by reminding voters in a given state that the Democrat or Republican already has a "lock" on that state, third parties are able to appeal to the voters' consciences while assuring them that they will not be influencing the ultimate result of the race in their state, or in the country as a whole.[114]

Another approach to taking advantage of the Electoral College system is the illegal practice of "vote trading." In this scheme, denizens of "swing" and "safe" states are encouraged to trade their votes: in 2000, "the idea behind vote swapping is that voters in battleground states who would like to vote for Green Party candidate Nader, but are worried that could cost Democrat Gore the overall election, can switch their vote with someone in a state that is already solidly for Gore or Republican candidate George W. Bush."[115]

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[113] A few states allow for "proportional representation" of electoral college votes, in other words they mandated or allowed the "splitting" of the electoral college votes according to the percentage each presidential candidate received of the total vote in their state. Center for Voting and Democracy, "How the Electoral College Works Today," <http://www.fairvote.org/e_college/today.htm> [accessed April 20, 2004].

[114] A "Safe States Strategy" has been proposed as one way to defeat the "spoiler" issue in the 2004 presidential election. See Ted Glick, *A Green Party "Safe States" Strategy*, Dean Myerson, *A Full-Throttle Safe-States Green Campaign for 2004*, and Gabriel Ignetti, *In Defense of a "Safe States" Strategy.* <http://www.virtualgreens.org/sss.htm> [accessed April 20, 2004]. The states that are "in play" are called "swing" states, and there it is presumably more difficult to achieve third- party presidential success.

[115] Lynda Gledhill, "California Shuts Down Vote-Trader Web Site," *San Francisco Chronicle*, October 31, 2000. Although some states have stopped the practice of vote trading, according to researcher Jeremy Derfner, the matter has not yet been adjudicated. "Is Vote-Swapping Legal?" *Slate*, Nov. 1, 2000. < http://slate.msn.com/id/92442/> [accessed May 7, 2004.]

The Internet

Since the 1990's especially, the Internet has emerged as an important organizing tool for activists, and more recently, as a significant fundraising tool as well. Web sites, listserves, and email empower third-party supporters by enhancing their ability to communicate in near "real time" with associates across the country. "Virtual campaigns" and "virtual parties" are established wherein the participants infrequently (or never) meet in person, yet are able to maintain the kind of day-to-day communications necessary to run an inexpensive, all- volunteer grassroots third-party political campaign.[116] Director of Research for the Committee for Economic Development Everett Ehrlich notes that coordinating complex tasks on a large scale no longer requires "organizational behemoths":

> The Internet has changed all that in one crucial respect that wouldn't surprise [economist Ronald] Coase. To an economist, the "trick" of the Internet is that it drives the cost of information down to virtually zero. So according to Coase's theory, smaller information- gathering costs mean smaller organizations. And that's why the Internet has made it easier for small folks, whether small companies or dark-horse candidates such as Howard Dean, to take on the big ones. . .If Dean loses the nomination, he will preserve his organizational advantage and re-emerge as a third-party force four years from now. He has done with technology what [third-party candidate] Ross Perot could not do with money alone.[117]

"Alternative" Media Outlets

There have always been "alternative" newspapers and magazines willing to promote the campaigns of third-party candidates. These traditional printed media outlets

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[116] The ultimately unsuccessful 2004 Howard Dean (Democrat) for president campaign has been credited with revolutionizing political campaigns through its use of the internet. See for example: Gary Wolf, "How the Internet Invented Howard Dean," *Wired Magazine*, January 2004.

[117] Everett Ehrlich, "Explaining the Coming Decline of the Two- Party System," *The Washington Post*, Sunday, December 14, 2003; Page B01.

were, by the final decades of the century, augmented by low- bandwidth radio stations, local-access TV channels, and "narrowcasting" internet websites capable of delivering "streaming media" in the form of voice, movies, and music. Due to the "democratizing effect of technology," third parties had a far greater opportunity to reach more potential voters for less money and less labor at the end of the twentieth century than they had at its outset.[118] The less-mainstream print publications like *The Nation* and *The Progressive* magazines, and non- profit local access cable television, National Public Radio (NPR), Public Broadcast System (PBS) and the Pacifica Radio Network (PRN) are important broadcast outlets, especially for left-leaning third-party candidacies.

The Implementation of Instant Runoff Voting

An enormous potential benefit for third parties is the implementation of Instant Runoff Voting (IRV)[119] and other voting reform measures that allow voters to rank the candidate(s) of their choice without helping the candidate(s) they disapproved of. If IRV had been in effect in the 2000 presidential election, for example, voters on the left could have voted for Nader first, and Gore second. When the votes were tabulated, those Nader votes would have been shifted to Gore, and the election outcome would have been

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[118] For example, one Green Party web- based five minute "movie" was created by an activist in a single day, and was then watched by over 100,000 viewers within 30 days, all at a cost of under a thousand dollars. <http://www.usgreens.org/movies/protest> [accessed April 20, 2004]. For all the touted benefits of the new technology however, some observers had concluded that nothing was as effective for third-party candidates, especially when they ran in local races, as face- to- face communications between candidates and voters.

[119] In an IRV election, voters rank the order of their preferences among the candidates. After the first choice votes are counted, the candidate with the fewest first choice votes is eliminated from contention. Votes for the second choice candidates on the ballots that were cast for the eliminated candidate are then redistributed to the appropriate remaining candidates. This process is repeated until one candidate has a majority of the votes and is declared the winner of the election.

reversed. In 2004, voters in San Francisco will use IRV for the first time.[120] The widespread adoption of IRV has the potential of eventually eliminating the "spoiler" factor and altering U.S. politics in favor of third-parties, as have similar measures in Western Europe.

Growth in the Number of "Independent" Voters

The fastest growing political "movement" in the U.S. at the close of the twentieth century was represented by the "Independent" or "Declined to State" voters. As American electoral system scholar Paul Kleppner noted:

> Parties have eroded because postwar developments produced new concerns and issues that could not be aggregated by the dominant mode of politics as usual. Party politics proved irrelevant to the resolution of emerging tensions because the sociopolitical conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s crosscut the partisan cleavage lines that had originated in the Great Depression. By the 1960s the existing parties failed to articulate and represent the discontent of large numbers of citizens, especially those of the young and better educated cohorts that were coming of voting age.[121]

From the 1970's through the end of the century, the rate of "independent" party affiliation remained stable at around 25% of the electorate.[122] More recently and locally, independents accounted for 26%- to 30% of all newly-registered voters in Maryland from

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120 "[Green Party] Supervisor Matt Gonzalez [held a] press conference and demonstration of IRV-ready voting equipment. On March 5, 2002, San Francisco voters adopted instant runoff voting by passing Proposition A by a 55%-45% margin. Proposition A is scheduled to take effect in the November 2004 city elections. IRV is to be used to elect the mayor, district attorney, sheriff, treasurer, city attorney, public defender, assessor and Board of Supervisors." Steven Hill, "San Francisco Scheduled to Implement Instant Runoff Voting for City Elections in November 2004," <http://www.fairvote.org/sf/> [accessed April 20, 2004].

121 Kleppner, *Who Voted*, p.136-7. Pollster Peter Hart notes that, "Our key finding was that people are really unhappy about their role, or lack of it, in the democratic process." By T.R. Reid, *"Most Americans Feel They're on Sidelines of Political Process," The Washington Post* - Mar 17, 2004, A06.

122 THE HARRIS POLL #2, January 5, 2001 PARTY AFFILIATION, <http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/> [accessed April 20, 2004].

2000 through 2003.[123] These voters represent, at least in theory,[124] opportunities for third

parties inasmuch as they do not have to break longstanding voter loyalties or otherwise

"entice away" voters from their existing political party.   In short, Independent voters

have at times been more likely to vote for a third party then either registered Democratic

or registered Republican voters.[125]

The "Ideological Drifts" in American Politics

The "ideological drifts" in American politics have often created opportunities for

third parties. When the Democratic Party moved in a more liberal direction towards civil

rights in the late 1940's and especially in the 1960's, two conservative Southerners (Strom

Thurmond in 1948 and George Wallace in 1968) were able to rally voters to their

primarily, though not exclusively, segregationist third-party campaigns. At the opposite

end of the political spectrum, after World War I, after World War II, and again in the final

decades of the twentieth century, the rightward national "conservative drift" created

openings on the left side of the political spectrum, which the progressives (Robert M.

LaFollette in 1924, Henry A. Wallace in 1948, and Ralph Nader in 2000) were each able

to exploit. In all of these cases, voters were encouraged to "send a message" to the

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123 New registrants minus removals. During this same period all new third- party voter registrations accounted for 1%- 3% per year. Maryland Board of Elections, "Monthly Voter Registration Activity Reports," <http://www.elections.state.md.us/citizens/registration/activity_reports.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

124 The March 3, 2004, Pew Center for the People and the Press *2004 Presidential Voter Profile* indicated that the majority (39%) of "swing" voters were registered independent. The poll also characterized these swing voters as predominantly female, aged 30-49, with some college, earning $30-50K annually, white, and politically moderate. While most of these swing voters attended church once a week (25%) the second-highest number (23%) seldom or never attended religious services. <http://www.pew.org> [accessed April 20, 2004].

125 According to the 2/26/04 Gallop poll "The Nader Factor", "Fourteen percent of 'pure' political independents—those who do not identify with or 'lean' to either of the two major parties—gave their support to Nader in 2000, compared with 6% among Democrats and Democratic leaners and just 2% of Republicans and Republican leaners." <http://www.gallop.com> [accessed 1/14/04].

Republicans or Democrats that they had better resist the national tide and remain true to their core ideologies or else risk losing their core constituencies.

With regard to the subject of this thesis, the rightward drift during the last third of the twentieth century created the conditions that were conducive to the growth of the Green Party. When, as leftist activist and political commenter David Reynolds notes: "the mainstream of the [Democratic] Party adopted Reaganism, trying to win over Republican voters rather than mobilize the vast half of the electorate that doesn't vote at all," the U.S. political system became one "in which two parties on the Right battle it out against each other."[126] Some liberal-leaning and even more progressive-leaning voters found themselves increasingly dissatisfied with every Democratic presidential candidate after George McGovern in 1972, as the Democratic party offered a series of "moderate" candidates who increasingly came to eschew the "liberal" label.[127] Conditions were ripe for liberal and progressive candidates to mount third-party candidacies (Jesse Jackson and Ralph Nader being the most successful of this group of relatively ineffective candidacies) with the "populist" goal of extending the "social contract" beyond the New Deal / Fair Deal / Great Society limits.

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[126] David Reynolds, *Democracy Unbound: Progressive Challenges to the Two Party System* (Boston: South End Press, 1997), p.91 & 47.

[118] "Liberals are convinced that their views are being systematically excluded from the mainstream media. They feel surrounded by hostile think tanks, cable TV hosts and newspaper columnists. 'The conservative right has out-organized, out-researched, out-written and out-talked the liberals to the point where they're almost intimidated into silence,' says former senator George McGovern [in 2003], a South Dakota Democrat who lost the 1972 presidential election in a landslide to Nixon." Kathy Kiely, "Liberals Finding their Voice", *USA Today*, December 1, 2003.

Conclusion

For all of the nineteen categories of impediments and despite the seven categories of potential benefits listed above, third parties in the U.S. during the twentieth century labored in an overwhelmingly hostile environment and delivered meager results in terms of actually winning races and wielding political power. Their main utility seems to have been their ability to promote the issues of special interest groups to a wider audience in the hope of having them included in the political conversation between the real political players: the Democrats and Republicans.

"Winner takes all" is clearly the greatest drag on the growth and development of political third- parties in America. A sort of "Catch-22" occurs wherein only political candidates who win elections gain direct political power, competitive levels of public campaign funding, competitive levels of media attention, etc. while without those advantages it is nearly impossible for candidates to win partisan elections at the higher levels of government. Political third- parties in the twentieth century lost the ability to negate the "spoiler- factor" through "fusion" voting, and had not yet gained the advantage of IRV or "preference" voting. And, even more than major party supporters, members of political third parties had even more reasons to question whether their votes would be counted fairly in a bipartisan (*not* non-partisan) election system that was susceptible to widespread fraud and abuse.

Left-leaning political third parties in America, especially in the final third of the twentieth century, metaphorically wandered in the political desert. Many of their "heroes" (third-party members, potential presidential candidates or otherwise) had been assassinated (John and Robert Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, Steven

Biko, John Lennon, etc.) discredited (Henry A. Wallace) or had died before their time

(Petra Kelly, Paul Wellstone, etc.) Many of their potential supporters remained largely

indifferent or oblivious to the existence of these third parties. For left-leaning third parties,

most of their party-building activities ended with members splitting off to form splinter

groups; forming and failing and falling apart was more often the rule than was merging

and cohering. Meanwhile all the "action" and success seemed to be taking place nearer the

opposite end of the political spectrum.

Perhaps because most Americans are more conservative[128] than the citizens of

other democracies, proportional representation and multi-party government did not have

the appeal that was necessary to develop and maintain a strong third-party tradition. As

Michael Kazin noted:

> Thus, early in the history of the United States, speakers and writers
> transformed the country from a mere place on the map into an ideology.
> Ever since, dissenters from the established order have wrestled with the
> legacy of that achievement. On the one hand, they have not needed to
> offer an alternative conception of the political good; they have simply
> accused powerful opponents of betraying the consensual creed and
> marshaled the details to prove it. However, the boon is also a fetter.
> Because the American Revolution has already occurred, advocating a
> new type of polity and a new constitution seems unnecessary,
> dangerous, close to treason. Radical transformations undertaken in other
> societies under such banners as socialism, fascism, and anticolonialism
> are thus impossible in the United States—at once the most idealistic and
> most conservative nation on earth.[129]

Therefore, in the twentieth century American society arguably became more

socially egalitarian (greater civil rights, etc.) but less economically equitable—by some

measures the distribution of wealth at the close of the century favored a few at the

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128 By "conservative" I mean "Favoring traditional views and values; tending to oppose change."
Dictionary.com, <http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=conservative> [accessed April 20, 2004].
129 Michael Kazin, *The Populist Persuasion: An American History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1995), p.12.

expense of the many to a greater degree than it had at the beginning of the century.[130] For conservatives this state of affairs was not considered a problem; conservatives and liberals spoke about the effects of "rising tides lifting all ships", and assumed that great disparities in wealth were in fact the hallmark of a sound society. Some conservatives,[131] and especially liberals,[132] spoke of "New Deals" or "Fair Deals"—implying that the point was to periodically start the game anew, and then "let the chips fall where they may" again, based on the ingenuity, determination, and pluck of a free and secure citizenry placed at the same starting line.

Progressives usually had a different vision for American society. For many progressives the object is the middle of the "game," not the beginning—they are less interested in where the chips were at some distant outset, but rather how they have accumulated over time. The remainder of this thesis explores how progressive third-party presidential candidates and campaigns attempted to bring this vision to fruition in the hostile U.S. political environment.

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[130] According to Kevin Phillips in this book *Wealth and Democracy*, in 1912 the richest man in America was John D. Rockefeller with an estimated worth of one billion dollars—some 1,250,000 times greater than the wealth of the median household of the day. By 1999, Bill Gates was the richest man in the country, with an estimated worth of eight-five billion dollars—1,416,000 times greater than the median household wealth of his day. Kevin Phillips, *Wealth and Democracy* (New York: Broadway Books, 2002), p.38.

[131] Theodore Roosevelt expressed the idea ably in his call for a "Square Deal": "If the cards do not come to any man, or if they come, and he has not the power to play them, that is his affair. All I mean is that there shall not be any crookedness in the dealing." Nancy C. Unger, *Fighting Bob La Follette: The Righteous Reformer* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), p.140. Other conservatives were of course even less "generous": "Dan Quayle, in his [Vice Presidential] acceptance speech at the 1992 Republican convention, attacked the idea of progressive taxation, in which the rich are taxed at a higher rate than the poor. His argument went like this: 'Why,' he asked, 'should the best people be punished?'" George Lakoff, *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), p.189.

[132] By "liberal" I mean "Favoring proposals for reform, open to new ideas for progress, and tolerant of the ideas and behavior of others; broad-minded." Dictionary.com, <http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=liberal> [accessed April 20, 2004].

IV. Third-party Progressive Presidential Campaigns:
A Case Study of the Impact(s) of Third Parties

Although "progressivism" has meant different things at different times in the U.S. in the twentieth century, a few basic and unchanging tenets can be discerned. First and foremost, progressives have typically believed that government had a positive role to play in curtailing the influence and power of large corporations through the creation of new laws, regulations, and oversight agencies. After the Progressive Era, and especially from the New Deal on, progressivism was both a subset of liberalism and a bridge to socialism; the progressive persuasion, especially in the second half of the century, can be thought of as pragmatic socialism or commercialism with a human face.

More recently, and unlike liberals in general, progressives have shared some of the libertarian and conservative distrust of big government and a fear of "big brother." Nevertheless, since at least the New Deal, progressives have tended to believe in a strong social contract with broadly applied public services in the establishment and maintenance of a "cradle-to-grave" welfare system. Unlike socialists, progressives generally believe in the private ownership of the means of production, at least for non- essential products and services; progressives believe independent experts could ameliorate the worse aspects of capitalism, and by doing so improve the conditions of the working class.[133]

During the "Progressive Era" (the late 1800's to the 1920's) grassroots organizations and powerful elites promoted the candidacies of progressive politicians who were elected to all levels of government, including the presidency (Wilson in 1912

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[133] If the U.S. Greens are an example of a "progressive" political party, as is the contention of this thesis, ~~then it should be noted that some pro~~gressives are clearly socialists; some U.S. Greens (and one suspects even more abroad) call for the elimination of capitalism in favor of workers' ownership of the means of production. From my experience this is not the dominantly held position among U.S. members of the Green Party.

and 1916) and across all regions of the country. Nearly all of the winning progressive[134] political campaigns were led by politicians who ran either as Republicans or Democrats.[135] During the Progressive Era, progressives led the successful fight for such diverse measures as women's suffrage, prohibition, Jim Crow laws (and their repeal) in the South, minimum wage and worker's compensation laws, safe foods and drugs, the conservation of the natural environment, the direct election of U.S. Senators, anti- child labor laws, citizen's initiatives, referendums, promotion of better health and education, and the recall of elected officials. From the 1924 presidential contest on, Progressive party (including Green) third-party candidates for president were also associated with the cause of peace through nonviolence.[136]

Progressives believe that progress is inevitable, but not necessarily positive; thus a motivated citizenry, marshalling the latest scientific methods, propelled by the desire to reform societal inequities, had to work with government to overcome the abuses inherent in unfettered industrial capitalism. As such, progressives throughout the twentieth century did not see the state so much as a potential tyrant but rather as a potential protector in their quest for a more equitable society. Moreover, after the "Gilded Age" of the late-nineteenth century, and again after the conservative ascendancy in the final third of the twentieth century, progressives saw America as having already become, or about to become, a polarized society with masses of desperately poor citizens and a few

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[134] Because it is an era, ideology, and a party, I will use the lowercase p, "progressive" to represent ideology and uppercase P, "Progressive" to represent the era and the political parties.

[135] Socialists who won elected offices in the U.S. typically ran on a socialist platform; once in office they generally attempted to implement progressive policies like citizen's ownership over municipal utilities, and government regulation (but not citizen's ownership) of the railroads.

[136] Although Theodore Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906 for brokering the peace that ended the Russo- Japanese War, TR was an imperialist and an ardent militarist. TR "always scorned opponents of wars as physical cowards." John Milton Cooper, Jr., *The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1983), p.7.

overstuffed plutocrats—a situation that presented a clear and existential threat to survival of democracy in America. In order to accommodate the needs of a new, rapidly evolving modern society, and in the defense of individual liberty, for the sake of efficiency, to satisfy a need for order, and to insure fair play, progressives sought to enlarge government to act as the citizen's counterweight to an overweening corporate octopus whose tentacles were reaching into every state house, boardroom, schoolroom, church, prison, office, factory and home in the nation.[137]

Progressivism is an ideology of enlightened affluence, and the attitude of most progressives has been one of idealistic discontent, a faith in collective uplifting of society, a hope that through the application of science and administration, society is capable of improvement. Most progressives believe that individual citizens are not autonomous actors, but are in fact part of a great web of social relations, a community, and a nation. Progressivism thus encompasses a comprehensive critique of an American society that challenges the myth of the "rugged individual."

The methodology of progressives is to investigate a perceived problem, gather data, analyze the data, propose a solution, popularize the proposed solution through education, moral suasion, and actions by professionals to dramatize the intolerable condition, and finally to hand the solution over to government to manage the results to a satisfactory conclusion.[138]   The results of Progressive Era progressives' urge to improve

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[137] "Massive corporate wealth and the nearly unbridled power of the robber barons who controlled it changed forever the relation of individual citizens to their commonwealth." Gregg Camfield, "Afterword" in Mark Twain & Charles Dudley Warner, *The Gilded Age* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.) p. 23-4.

[138] Elisabeth Israels Perry, Kathryn Kish Sklar, *Belle Moskowitz: Feminine Politics and the Exercise of Power in the Age of Alfred E. Smith* (NY: Oxford; 2000), p.78.

have been considerable; historians of the Progressive Era, Arthur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick concluded that, "no other generation of Americans has done conspicuously better in addressing the political, economic, and social conditions which it faced."[139] Among their most significant achievements were the passage of the Meat Inspection Act, the Hepburn Act to regulate railroads, the Pure Food & Drug Act, and the Mann-Elkins Act, which put telephone & telegraph companies under the supervision of Interstate Commerce Commission. The Federal Trade Commission was established to control the growth of monopolies, and the Federal Reserve Act was created to regulate money and banking. Laws providing for a graduated ("progressive") income tax, female suffrage, the direct election of senators, the citizens' initiative, referendum and recall were all approved during the Progressive Era.

Historians are of (at least) two minds regarding the Progressive Era and the success of Progressive Era reforms. Balancing Arthur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick's favorable judgment (above), are rather less encouraging verdicts by historians like Howard Zinn and Gabriel Kolko. Zinn holds that progressives were reluctant reformers interested only in stabilizing the capitalist system, and blunting the edge of a resurgent socialist movement.[140] In a similar vein, Kolko concludes that progressivism was:

> a movement that operated on the assumption that the general welfare of the community could be best served by satisfying the concrete needs of business. But the regulation itself was invariably controlled by leaders of the regulated industry, and directed toward ends they deemed acceptable or desirable. In part this came about because the regulatory

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[139] Link and McCormick, *Progressivism*, p.118.
[140] Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States: 1492- Present* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), p.353.

movements were unusually initiated by the dominant businesses to be regulated, but it also resulted from the nearly universal belief among political leaders in the basic justice of private property relations as they essentially existed, a belief that set the ultimate limits on the leaders' possible actions.[141]

Progressivism during the Progressive Era, and after, demonstrated the limits of political reform in the U.S. within the context of an expanding capitalist society. There is no doubt that there were progressive leaders and "activists" who sincerely worked for meaningful reform with the intention of bettering the lives of ordinary citizens—and to a limited extent they succeeded. It is also clear that progressives with the best of intentions sometimes found that their efforts did not bear the fruit they had anticipated because of government bureaucratic hostility or inertia, and due to the power of the very political corruption they were seeking to destroy. It is also likely that, for the reasons Kolko gives, much progressive reform was never intended to alleviate the problems that reformers were concerned about. And in a way that only a few progressives at the time fathomed, as Robert Wiebe put it, "their alterations strengthened a scheme they disliked by weaving its basic elements into an ever-tighter and more sophisticated national system. A public bureaucracy sheltered [business] as it regulated."[142]

And there was a still darker aspect to progressivism, one related to the *genuine* aims of some progressive leaders. Some reformers in the Progressive Era had no intention of allowing the "great unwashed", especially newly arrived immigrants, to determine for themselves what a fair and equitable society should look like. These progressives prevented the "others" from full participation in the decisions that affected

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[141] Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p.2.
[142] Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order: 1877-1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), p.298.

their lives through restrictive citizenship laws, and by electoral deceit and subversion. Some progressives attempted, and succeeded for a time, in regulating not just businesses practices, but also the personal morals of citizens through the misguided experiment of Prohibition.[143] Saddest still, blacks were saddled with a new form of institutionalized discrimination called Jim Crow laws, under the auspices of some "progressive" white Americans in the South.

Paralleling the nurturing and restricting *goals* of Progressives, are the intended and unintended *consequences* of Progressive third-party presidential political campaigns. The four progressive presidential races in the twentieth century in which the candidate achieved greater than one percent of the total votes, illuminate the range of possible outcomes. Each of the contests (Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, Robert M. LaFollette in 1924, Henry A. Wallace in 1948 and Ralph Nader in 2000) reveals a different aspect of the third-party influence inherent in the peculiar American presidential election system.

Theodore Roosevelt in 1912

The election of 1912 shaped up on paper quite promisingly for progressives. The Republican incumbent, William Howard Taft had as president supported even more progressive legislation than had his progressive predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt. The Democratic Party nominated one of its most progressive members, Woodrow Wilson—the former president of Princeton University and at the time the progressive governor of New Jersey. The two main third party candidates in the contest were Theodore Roosevelt

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143 Philippa Strum, *Brandeis: Beyond Progressivism* (St., Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995) p.40.

from the new Progressive ("Bull Moose") Party, and Eugene V. Debs of the Socialist Party. In other words the electorate had the choice in 1912 between a progressive Republican, a progressive Democratic, a Progressive, and a Socialist. In the end, the Progressive lost to one of the progressives, while the most widely recognized progressive politician in the country (Robert M. La Follette,) who had opposed the Progressive party's candidate, sat stewing on the sidelines.[144]

Theodore Roosevelt (TR) did not invent progressivism, but he did help popularize it, and through supporting it with his presidential imprimatur and his enormous personal popularity, (and eventually, by his inclusion in the panoply of greatest presidents on Mount Rushmore,) he legitimized progressivism and inoculated progressivism against the charges of socialism and communism. Even as he sought to limit progressive reform (at least as compared to LaFollette and other leading progressives of his time,) TR was willing to split up the Republican Party over progressivism. From the 1912 election throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, the Republican Party increasingly came to carry the banner of conservatism.[145]

It is ironic that the pinnacle of progressivism occurred precisely because the Progressive party entered and lost the election of 1912. In effect the 1912 Progressive party "spoiled" the election in favor of the progressive candidate Woodrow Wilson. It took a major party's candidate, in this case a Democrat (Wilson,) to win the election and bring the progressive ideology to fruition in national politics. Many of the planks in the 1912 Progressive party platform were enacted in the Wilson administration's first term;

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[144] Unger, *Fighting Bob La Follette,* p.200.
[145] Link and McCormick, *Progressivism,* p.41.

Wilson even reluctantly came over to the side of women's suffrage. The Wilson administration cemented progressive reforms into the U.S. system that Franklin Delano Roosevelt and later John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Banes Johnson would build upon. Many "Square Deal," "New Freedom," "New Deal," "New Frontier," and "Great Society" reforms were still standing even after decades of conservative ascendancy at the close of the century.[146]

Finally, the presidential election of 1912 demonstrated the futility of third party presidential campaigns in an era of strong party loyalty, when the most popular politician of his generation, running a first-class but third-party campaign, ended 14.5% behind a relatively unknown, but "first-party" opponent. LaFollette's refusal to join with TR did not affect the outcome of the race, but it did spilt the fledgling Progressive party, and helped to lead to its rapid demise not long after the election. Progressivism was in full blossom after the election of 1912, but soon the business recession in 1913, the wartime anti-radical drives, anti-union sentiment caused by union opposition to World War I, and Wilson's implementation of progressive reforms all conspired to finish off the first Progressive Party. The first bloom of national sentiment regarding progressivism was still strong after 1912, and the possibility that even better things were just out ahead seemed probable.[147]

When big chunks of the Progressive agenda became law (first in Wisconsin under Governor Robert M. LaFollette, then across the U.S. under Roosevelt, Taft, and

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[146] "The framework for a modern America established during the Progressive Era resonates throughout the twentieth century." Kriste Lindenmeyer, *The Progressive Era*, p. 24 in *Voyageur Teacher's Edition*, Winter / Spring 2004.

[147] "The 1912 Presidential contest [was] between two brands of progressivism—Wilson's 'New Freedom' versus Theodore Roosevelt's "New Nationalism." Alan Brinkley, *American History: A Survey,* Eleventh Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p.611.

Woodrow Wilson) progressive reformers had won about half of the domestic battle—the easy half, the half that did not much threaten business leaders or politicians, or significantly alter the distribution of wealth patterns in the country. To have achieved the other half required, at a minimum, a president with the intentions of establishing a new social contract in America, running as a major party candidate, and a citizenry persuaded to vote for the plan.

Robert M. LaFollette in 1924

In 1924, Senator Robert M. LaFollette was a presidential candidate who was committed to systemic reform, but he ran as a third-party candidate and therefore had little or no chance of winning the election. LaFollette had been the gold standard for progressivism-in-action at the turn of the twentieth century, but even he had not resolved the contradictions inherent in his own "Wisconsin Idea"[148]—how could he be both opposed to powerful big businesses and simultaneously dependent upon them for his state's tax revenues? How could he be at once for "people power" and rely on a system of political patronage? And if these apparent contradictions were only artifacts of a transitional period—where did LaFollette think the U.S. was headed, and how did he think the U.S. would get there?

LaFollette codified progressive ideology and bequeathed to both of the most successful subsequent progressive presidential candidates of the twentieth century the essential, and unchanged framework of their philosophy. Adding to the core values of

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148 The "Wisconsin Idea" included laws designed to weaken the political influence of party machines and corporations, through direct primary elections and campaign spending limits; the creation of state commissions to guide policy on railroad regulation, the environment, transportation, civil service and taxation, which relied heavily on university experts in various fields.

people over corporations, and government as protector and not tyrant, the 1924 progressives kept TR's original contribution of defending the country's renewable resources (conservation) while rejecting TR's militarism and imperialism for La Follette's "pacifism" and "isolationism."[149] LaFollette's candidacy in 1924 was not determinative of the presidential election, which was easily won by the conservative incumbent Republican, Calvin Coolidge; but the "Little Giant's" death shortly after the election coincided with the end of the nascent Progressive Party, and the Progressive Era.

Henry A. Wallace in 1948

Although only two dozen years had elapsed when the next Progressive Party candidate ran for the office of the presidency, in significant ways it may have seemed much longer to the voters in 1948. When LaFollette had run in 1924, the progressive impulse for reform in America was alive, though arguably declining, and the country had not yet experienced two nearly continuously turbulent decades where Americans faced the Great Depression, the New Deal and World War II climaxing with the U.S. nuclear bombing of Japan and the onset of the "Cold War." When LaFollette ran as the Progressive third-party candidate in 1924, he had come out of the Republican camp, after failing to overturn the conservative domination of his party; when former Vice President Henry A. Wallace ran as the Progressive third-party candidate in 1948, he had left the

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149 In truth LaFollette was not a pure pacifist, but he was an anti- imperialist. LaFollette supported the use of force in the self- defense of the nation, and while he feared foreign entanglements, he was not opposed to the U.S. venturing out into the world under four conditions: only when it was absolutely necessary, only with the intention of aiding and not plundering, only when invited and welcomed by the "masses" abroad, and only after the U.S. had gotten its own house in order by creating a just and equitable society on our own shores.

Democratic Party after trying to extend or at least maintain the liberal ideology that was still dominant there.

In 1948, after the destruction, hardships and cruelties of World War II, neither the Democratic Party, nor the electorate, nor probably the majority of citizens, was in a generous or a reformist mood. It was time for normalcy again, or if that was impossible, then entrenchment. Like George Orwell's novel *1984* (which was written in 1948) explained, Americans were told that the man recently known as "Uncle Joe" Stalin was in reality another Hitler, the Soviet Union was another nation bent on world conquest, and thus the pacifist Wallace was like (British prime minister) Neville Chamberlain—a hopeless romantic and appeaser.[150]

Wallace's candidacy demonstrated one of the real dangers that third parties pose in America: they can hurt their own cause, even when they do not "spoil" the election. Conservatives in the Democratic Party attacked Wallace as a communist during the Democratic convention of 1948; soon afterward former "New Dealers" and other members of liberal associations like the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) attacked Wallace for allowing communists to "infiltrate" his campaign organization. Liberal "red smears" of progressives like Wallace emboldened conservative attacks on liberals for being "soft" on communism at home and abroad. President Truman legitimized anti-communism in his charges against the Progressive Party. As historian Norman Markowitz has observed, "with Wallace's defeat the road lay open for McCarthy[ism.]"[151] If LaFollette had been a symptom of conservative ascendancy in the Republican Party in the twenties, Wallace was something of a catalyst for liberal decline

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150 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "Who Was Henry A. Wallace? The Story of a Perplexing and Indomitably Naïve Public Servant," *Los Angeles Times,* March 12, 2000.
151 Markowitz, *The Rise and Fall of the People's Century*, p.266.

in the Democratic Party in the fifties. If the defeat of the Progressive Party of 1948 and the ensuing Red Scare ultimately damaged liberalism for a generation, it devastated Progressive Party presidential election efforts for a half- century because from 1948 until 2000, no progressive third-party presidential candidacy emerged that was able to garner even 1% of the national vote.

Ralph Nader in 2000

The final twentieth-century flowering of a progressive third-party presidential campaign occurred in 2000, when the Green Party emerged on the political scene in America. As the rest of this thesis will detail, this fourth example of the impact of third-parties is one that functioned as a "spoiler" which, unlike in TR's case, resulted in an election that was immediately antithetical to the cause of progressivism in America.

V. The International and the U.S. Greens

In the U.S. after the horror of WWII, the shock of the "atomic age," and the fear of the Cold War, came the stifling conformity of the Eisenhower years: suburban ennui. The new TV-dominated consumer culture, the advent of easy credit, and cheap, disposable merchandise, necessitated the two-income family and gave rise to a generation of young, restless, and resentful middle-class kids. The climax of this protestation was, according to German historian Ingrid Kerkhoff:

> the "Beat Generation —a heterogeneous mix of young people, artists and intellectuals of the 1950s (and later) whose unconventional lifestyle reflected profound disaffection with contemporary society. They expressed objection and criticism against American materialism in a bitter, harsh and often abusive language. They mocked its conformity, denounced its immorality and set out 'on the road' to discover America's true spirit.[152]

After the Beats of the 1950s came the hippies of the 1960's, who shared the formers' penchant for easy sexual mores, mind- altering drug experiences, "rock and roll" music, and non-conformity with the larger American society. Some of the more serious protestors joined the civil rights movement that sought to end racial inequality; on campuses across the country organizations like Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) sought to raise the political 'consciousness' of students, faculty and the general public around issues of peace, social justice, and especially, the immorality of racism in the U.S. and of the Vietnam War.[153]

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152 Ingrid Kerkhoff, *The Beat Generation*, (Lecture at Blockseminar Universität Bremen, Spring 1999.) <http://www.fb10.uni-bremen.de/anglistik/kerkhoff/beatgeneration> [accessed April 20, 2004].
153 The 1962 SDS Port Huron statement read like a preamble to a 1980's Green Party platform. "We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit. . . While these and other problems either directly oppressed us or rankled our consciences and became our own subjective concerns, we began to see complicated and disturbing paradoxes in our surrounding America. The declaration "all men are created equal . . . rang hollow before the facts of Negro life in the South and the big cities of the North. The proclaimed peaceful

According to historians Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, "in the early 1960s, civil rights support activities gave large numbers of northern white liberals a crash course in the dynamics of mass organization,"[154] including the members of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Sierra Club, and especially, the movement for the equality of women. "Men and women [lived] as if their world was malleable to their grasp," as "liberals no longer shied away from the idea of crusades and mass movements," in what social activist and writer Michael Harrington called the 'conscience constituency' of middle class liberal activists. Unfortunately, because the "new liberalism remained a movement of, by, and for the educated middle classes," "within a very few years, the world would seem a much less 'malleable' place to American liberals."[155]

A cadre of liberal 'New Left' young idealists, many of whom had responded to President Kennedy's call for "a selfless dedication to national renewal,"[156] entered the Peace Corps (work in developing countries) and VISTA (work in poor sections of the U.S.) At colleges and universities (UC Berkeley in particular) Free Speech Movements (FSM) developed; Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) grew campus chapters across the U.S. The politics of the emerging New Left was partly molded on the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee's (SNCC) community-organizing work and stressed 'participatory democracy', including 'teach-ins', demonstrations, and voter registration as important components of a citizen's civic life. In fact, Isserman and Kazin contend that,

intentions of the United States contradicted its economic and military investments in the Cold War status quo. . ." *Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society*, 1962 <http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/huron.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

154 Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, *America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 119.
155 Ibid., 124-125.
156 Ibid., 165.

were it not for the struggle for black equality, there would have been no SDS or FMS.

Yet as Black Power consciousness grew, the political New Left began to splinter from

internal factionalism causing the high- water mark of American liberalism already to be

reached by the mid- 1960s. By the 1970s, as psychologist Sherry Ruth Anderson and

social anthropologist Paul H. Ray indicated, traditional politics seemed increasingly

irrelevant:

> The real 'juice' in progressive politics is no longer with the class and
> union and rural-urban struggles of the early 1900s; instead, the growing
> edge is in the feminist, ecological, anti– globalization, pro-civil-rights,
> pro-peace, pro-health-care, pro-education, pro-natural/organic and even
> pro-spiritual movements that together make up the New Progressives.[157]

In the wake of the civil rights, anti- Vietnam War, anti- nuclear, feminist, ecology,

and other "New Left," anti-establishment and protest movements in the U.S. and in

western Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s, activists worldwide began to coalesce around

the idea of creating a new movement beyond the "old political framework of left versus

right."[158] In 1972, the first Green party was founded in Tasmania and later the same year

the first national "Green" party, called the Values Party, was formed in New Zealand. The

Values Party contested the 1972 general election, putting forward radical new policies such

as their election manifesto, *Blueprint for New Zealand - An Alternative Future*, which

called for radical new policies such as Zero Economic Growth, Zero

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[157] Sherry Ruth Anderson and Paul H. Ray, *The Cultural Creatives: How 50 Million People Are Changing the World*, (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2001) p. 5. Whereas many of the original "Progressives" in the U.S. sought to accommodate immigrants to their new urban surroundings, the "new progressives" seek to orient U.S. citizens to the limits and opportunities of the new global paradigm.

[158] Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak, *Green Politics: The Global Promise* (New York: E.P. Dutton, Inc., 1984), p. xii. "After experiencing the charisma and idealism of [President John F.] Kennedy, the bravery and determination of [Reverend Martin Luther] King, and the social and political injustices of the American South, [the future international Green Party "superstar"] Petra [Kelly] believed she was called to politics." Jane Slaughter and Melissa K. Bokovoy editors, *Sharing the Stage: Biography and Gender in Western Civilization Vol. II* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003.), p.364.

Population Growth and abortion, drug and homosexual law liberalization. Over the next three years Green policies were debated, developed and expanded to form the basis of *Beyond Tomorrow*, the 1975 Values Party manifesto. This early "comprehensive statement of Green politics was widely distributed overseas and contributed to the development of Green parties elsewhere."[159]

From the outset, Green ideology across national borders was characterized by its blend of progressive political philosophy (people over corporations, government as a check to unbridled commercial greed, etc.,) the recognition of the "spiritual impoverishment of modern society,"[160] and the concomitant acknowledgement of the interrelatedness and need for the sustainability of all human systems.[161] This highly personal yet "holistic" approach to politics was summed up in the phrase, "Act Locally and Think Globally."[162] By the early 1970's, European citizen's groups, many of which had been inspired by the citizen groups Ralph Nader had been organizing in the U.S. since 1966,[163] began to merge into Green political groups. In 1973, Belgium elected the first Green member to a national parliament; in 1979, Greens were first elected to the (albeit powerless) European Parliament.[164] In 1983 the charismatic Green Party leader Petra Kelly was elected to the German Bundestag.[165]

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159 Christine Dann, "The History of The Green Party," <http://www.greens.org.nz/about/history.htm> [accessed April 20, 2004]. Dann's Ph.D. thesis on Green politics – "From Earth's Last Islands: The Global Origins of Green Politics" locates the development of the world's first Green parties (the Values Party and the United Tasmania Group), within the context of economic globalization, the decline of social democratic politics and the ris e of the new social and political movements of the 1960s and 70s.
160 Charlene Spretnak, *The Spiritual Dimension of Green Politics*, (Santa Fe: Bear & Co., 1986), p. 21.
161 Ibid., p. 22.
162 Alternately, the Green party members' philosophy was characterized as being "New Age" or "transformational." Source: Mark Satin, *Confessions of a Young Exile* (Toronto: Gage / Macmillan of Canada, 1976), p.1.
163 Capra and Spretnak, *Green Politics: The Global Promise*, p.116.
164 Ultimately there would be Green governmental participation at the national level in at least five Western European democracies: Finland (1995), Italy (1996), France (1997), Germany (1998) and Belgium (1999.)

Petra Kelly was born in 1947, in post-WWII Germany, and had lived in Georgia and attended college in Washington D.C. during the turbulent civil rights and anti-war period of the 1960s. A proponent of Martin Luther King Jr.'s nonviolent civil disobedience, Kelly was active in the U.S. civil rights movement and gained a reputation as a leading political activist on the campus of American University where she was enrolled. Kelly worked in the presidential campaign of Robert F. Kennedy in 1968. Her views on the environment had been radicalized by the death of her 10-year-old sister from cancer, and upon her return to Europe in the early 1970s, Kelly became a social policies and health administrator and a leading anti- nuclear activist. After her election to the Bundestag in 1983, Petra Kelly was the most prominent worldwide Green; Kelly traveled widely and powerfully communicated her vision that if the Earth was to have a future, it would have to be a Green one.[166]

From its inception "members and supporters of the [German] Green party were repelled by existing politics and political choices . . . [Petra] Kelly believed that the Greens were more than an ecological party; they advocated a nonviolent, nonexploitative society and sought solutions in decentralization, local political autonomy, and direct democracy outside the boundaries of the traditional ideologies of both the right and the left."[167] Foreshadowing similar (but not identical) tensions between U.S. Green party activists, and Maryland Green party activists decades later:

Wolfgang Rüdig, *Between Ecotopia and Disillusionment: Green Parties in European Government 1900-2003*, Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Press, 2003), p. iii.

[165] "Kelly believed that the ecology movement had to make itself heard at the parliamentary level and she argued for the creation of a full-fledged political party." Slaughter and Bokovoy, *Sharing the Stage: Biography and Gender in Western Civilization*, p.369.

[166] "After [Petra Kelly's 1983] *Meet the Press* appearance, Robert Novak, who had been Kelly's most aggressive critic told her that he wished she were on his side." Ibid., p.175.

[167] Slaughter and Bokovoy, *Sharing the Stage*, p.374 & 378.

Petra Kelly steadfastly rejected any political coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) because of her fear of the cooptation of Green principles. When the party factionalized in the mid-1980s, Kelly refused to align herself with either the so-called fundamentalist faction, which she saw as too dogmatic, or the so-called realistic faction, which she regarded as too willing to compromise Green ideals and join in coalitions for the sake of the traditional power politics she firmly rejected. From the mid-1980s, Kelly came to have less influence within the party and in German politics in general, but she continued to be deemed the foremost representative of the Greens internationally.[168]

Concurrent with, and in part inspired by Kelly and the rise of the German Green party, the first Green Party in North America was formed in British Columbia in 1983, and later the same year the Federation of Canadian Greens met for the first time in Ottawa. In the U.S., Green Party formation followed the development of Green parties in Tasmania, New Zealand, Western Europe, and Canada. The U.S. Greens grew more slowly than in the other "Western" democracies, due in large measure to the systemic impediments that severely suppressed third party political activity in the U.S., most notably "winner-take-all" elections that allocate no representation to non- majority (or non-plurality) parties.   In addition, the U.S. Greens experienced unique difficulties related to internal tensions as outlined below.

In 1984, activists and authors Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak published their influential book, *Green Politics: The Global Promise*, which was a study of the European Greens, and a call to establish a Green movement in the U.S. According to a scholar of American third parties, Micah Sifry, the book's appeal resonated with "independent peace activists, community organizers, organic farmers, religious people, bioregionalists, feminists, . . . academics, [and] union members who sought to create a new, values-based,

168 Rebecca Boehling, "Biography of Petra Kelly (1947-92)," p. 551 in Dieter K. Buse and Juergen C. Doerr, editors, *Modern Germany: An Encyclopedia of History, People, and Culture, 1871-1990* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998.)

multi-issue movement and political party in this country."[169] Many of the early U.S. Greens had been active in environmental issues since the first U.S. Earth Day in 1970, some had supported George McGovern's 1972 presidential campaign, and/or environmentalist Barry Commoner's progressive Citizen's Party[170] presidential campaign in 1980, and some had gotten their first exposure to Green political thinking through the printed, radio, and television interviews of Petra Kelly, or through the *Utne Reader* magazine's call for a Green movement in the U.S. and Mark Satin's *New Options* newsletter.[171]

In St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1984, Greens met and developed the party's "Ten Key Values"; adding to the "Four Pillars" of the German Green Party (Grassroots Democracy, Social Justice, Ecological Wisdom, and Nonviolence) the values of Community- Based Economics, Decentralization, Post- Patriarchal Values (Feminism), Respect for Diversity, Personal and Global Responsibility, and Future Focus.[172] The 1984 St. Paul meeting

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[169] Micah L. Sifry, *Spoiling for a Fight: Third- Party Politics in America* (New York: Routledge Books, 2001), p.148.

[170] "In response to the war in Vietnam. . . over 100,000 Californians registered to vote in a new political party of the Left in 1967, the Peace and Freedom Party. During 1968 the Black Panther Party provided leadership with Huey Newton, Bobby Seale and Eldridge Cleaver all running for public office on the Peace and Freedom Party ticket. By the end of the 1970s, People's Party had suffered a series of takeover attempts; those attempts failed but weakened the national organization. . . In 1971 the California-based party sought out like-minded groupings to form a national People's Party which ran Dr. Benjamin Spock for President in 1972 and Margaret Wright in 1976. Then the People's Party gave way to the Citizen's Party which ran Barry Commoner in 1980 and Sonia Johnson in 1984." Casey Peters, "Peace and Freedom Party from 1967 to 1997," *Synthesis/Regeneration 12 (Winter 1997)* <http://www.greens.org/s-r/12/12-05.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

[171] Green activists and supporters are a highly- literate group. The short list of most influential books for Greens would include: Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* (1962), Michael Harrington's *The Other America* (1962), Betty Freidan's *The Feminine Mystique* (1963), Ralph Nader's *Unsafe at Any Speed* (1965), Frances Moore Lappe's *Diet for a Small Planet* (1971), The Club of Rome's *Limits to Growth* (1972), *A Blueprint for Survival* published in the British journal "The Ecologist" (1972), E.F. Schumacher's *Small Is Beautiful* (1973), and Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak's *Green Politics: The Global Promise* (1984.) Source: Interviews with Maryland Green party members, Spring and Summer 2003.

[172] Charlene Spretnak and Mark Satin are credited with facilitating the development of the U.S. Greens Ten Key Values, based on the German Greens Four Pillars Spretnak had become familiar with in her research on the Greens in Germany. Source: *The U.S. Green Party's Ten Key Values*, <http://www.radicalmiddle.com/ten_key_values.htm> [accessed April 20, 2004].

was a catalyst for Green Party political development in the U.S., and the Ten Key Values

served as an important early organizing principal for that development. Following the St.

Paul meeting, Green activists across the U.S. began the "Committees of Correspondence"

(CoC) to promote Green-related conversations, and to build "affinity" groups among their

ranks, in order to "advance ecological populism."[173] At the outset it was not at all clear

that the CoC would or should evolve into a political party, or that its members should be

involved in electoral politics in any manner. Green locals' activities included setting up

farmer-to-consumer co-ops, educating the public about Green issues through conferences,

lectures, radio programs, and publications, as well as establishing citizen "watchdog"

groups and holding rallies and demonstrations.[174]

By 1987, according to Green Party activist, candidate and historian John

Rensenbrink, the first U.S. Green national convention was held in Amherst,

Massachusetts, where there was a meeting of:

> activists, socialists and entrepreneurs, Goddess worshippers, and solar
> engineers, old hippies and clean-cut college kids, all [of whom] feared
> the direction that corporate-dominated industrial society was heading,
> and feeling that traditional leftist and liberal solutions were not enough
> to avert a grim future.[175]

After the 1987 national meeting, the Greens began to split into two competing

organizations, largely around the issue of electoral activity.[176] Some Greens opposed the

formation of a Green political party, others thought that electoral politics should be

secondary to "activism", still others thought that electoral politics should only happen at

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173 Charlene Spretnak, *The Spiritual Dimension of Green Politics*, p.39.

174 Interviews with Maryland Green Party activists, Spring and Summer, 2003.

175 John Rensenbrink, *The Greens and the Politics of Transformation* (San Pedro: R. & E. Miles, 1992), p.108.

176 The U.S. Green "split" is a complicated (and as of this writing is a minor, but ongoing) issue. I have attempted to outline the general contours of the disagreement(s.) My main source for the G/GPUSA perspective on the split was Jodean Marks, "A Historical Look at Green Structure: 1984 to 1992," *Synthesis/Regeneration* Issue 14, Fall 1997.

the local level, while some Greens contended that running local, state, and possibly national political races could benefit Green growth in the U.S. In addition, tensions developed between Green activists around the issues of political ideology: should the Green platform be more "leftist" or more "forward,"[177] and should all decisions be made at the local levels only? Finally, there emerged tensions among Greens over what many perceived to be largely "personality" or "ego" issues.[178] Ultimately an organization called the Green Politics Network (GPN) emerged, and it was members of this group who eventually recruited Ralph Nader to stand as the first U.S. Green Party presidential candidate in 1996. Immediately after the 1996 election, Greens activists who were involved in Nader's campaign met at Middleburg, Virginia, and created the Association of State Green Parties (ASGP,), which finally became known as "The Green Party." [179]

The ongoing tensions among Green activists at the national level put a damper on local and state Green political organizing efforts, but did not cause them to cease. By

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[177] An early motto of the German Greens was that they were "neither left nor right but out in front." While some U.S. Greens held an affinity for Marxist ideology, others felt an antipathy to it, and wanted to create a political party that completely transcended the old political paradigm.

[178] In her book, Linda Martin writes that, "During the German Green Party's formative years, the division between the *Fundis* and *Realos* paralleled, almost exactly, the internal struggle of the US Green Party." Linda Martin, *Driving Mr. Nader: The Greens Grow Up* (Raymond, Maine: Leopold Press, 2000), p.121. This seems to be a mis -interpretation: while part of the tension among the German Greens dealt with the way their party distributed power internally, a large part of the tension had to do with external matters. The German Green *fundis* or fundamentalists advised against subordinating their ideals to compromises and coalitions with non- Green political parties and leaders, while the *realos* or realists countered that, as elected officials, some amount of compromise was inevitable, and political coalitions were essential if Greens were to have any chance of achieving any portion of their program. Rebecca Boehling, "Biography of Petra Kelly", p. 551 in Buse and Doerr, editors, *Modern Germany: An Encyclopedia of History.* By contrast, the major tensions between the U.S. Greens in the late 1980s and beyond were internal, and were based as much on ends (to be an electoral political party or not; to promote traditional "leftist" ideology or not) as on means (how to distribute power within the Green party.) Interviews by the author with national U.S. Green Party members in 2001-2003, and Maryland Green Party memb ers in the Spring and Summer of 2003.

[179] As late as 2004, there were still two Green Parties in the U.S. G/GPUSA was the more "leftist" and less- electoral- based organization, and was by far the smaller organization. The Green Party was the organization recognized by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and by most state Board of Elections, and was the party that was associated with Nader's presidential campaigns in 1996 and 2000. Most of the prominent early members of the G/GPUSA Party subsequently joined The Green Party, and the remainder of this study concerns itself with The Green Party, which will be referred to as the "Green Party."

1990 there were at least eight state Green Parties in the U.S., and over a hundred Green "locals"; in 1990 the Alaska Green Party became the first in the nation to achieve state recognition and ballot access after its candidate for governor received 3.2% of the vote. In 1992 Green party candidates ran races in fourteen states, and Keiko Bonk became the first Green candidate to win a partisan election in U.S. history when she came in first in her race for a county council seat in Hawaii. In 1994, Green Party candidate for governor of New Mexico, Roberto Mondragon, received national press coverage for running a strong race, which he was ultimately accused of "spoiling" for the Democratic contender.[180]

In 1995, Green Party activists in California and New Mexico mailed a letter with a survey attached to Green Party organizers across the country, outlining their plan for "The Forty State Green Party" strategy to run a candidate in the 1996 presidential election. Ultimately, consumer activist Ralph Nader agreed to "stand" (but not "run") as the Green Party presidential candidate in 1996, but with some severe restrictions. Green Party activist, candidate, and historian Linda Martin noted that:

> Nader's refusal to declare himself a candidate and thereby avoid disclosing his personal finances, made it impossible for us to raise serious campaign funds, prevented us from coordinating his travel, public appearances and media statements, and even prevented us, under the strictest interpretation of the FEC regulations, from any direct contact with the candidate or his associates. But, Nader Rules imposed a 'committee of equals' process on the Greens that evolved, almost organically, into a federation of independent Greens—'The Association of State Green Parties.'[181]

Nader received over 700,000 votes nationwide in the 1996 presidential election, but more importantly, his campaign invigorated (or reinvigorated) Green activists in more

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[180] "The party's image as spoilers for Democrats has some prominent Greens worried." Rachel Smolkin, "N.M. Rides Crest of National Green Wave," *Albuquerque Tribune*, October 24th, 1998.
[181] Martin, *Driving Mr. Nader*, p.31.

than forty states. The efforts of thousands of volunteers in organizing petition drives led to the Green Party presidential candidate's name appearing on twenty-one state ballots, and the ballot for the District of Columbia. While restrictive laws prevented the Greens from ballot access in a few states, successful and unsuccessful petition drives were instrumental in the creation of new state and local Green Party organizations, the growth of existing Green Party organizations. In the case of Maryland, the 1996 Nader petition drive acted as a precursor to the establishment of the state Green Party in 2000.

In the wake of the first Green Party presidential campaign, more Greens ran and won their contests for public offices in 1997 than in all the previous combined "odd years" elections (1985 through 1995); in 1998, a record number 127 Green Party candidates ran in twenty states, and won 31 races—representing a nearly twenty-five

Year	Number of Candidates	Number of States	Number of Victories
1985	3	2	0
1986	3	3	1
1987	8	3	1
1988	2	2	1
1989	7	3	2
1990	21	6	9
1991	15	8	8
1992	91	13	20
1993	14	8	3
1994	89	14	21
1995	12	7	2
1996	82	17	25
1997	72	13	11
1998	127	20	31
1999	96	16	12
2000	284	35	48
2001	284	27	63
2002	552	40	74

Fig. 1: U.S. Green Party Campaigns for Partisan and Non-Partisan Offices 1985-2002

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[182] Mike Feinstein, "Green Party Elections," <http://www.greens.org/elections> [accessed April 20, 2004].

percent rate of victory. Throughout the end of the 1990s, an increasing number of state Green parties associated themselves with the national Green Party organization (then called the ASGP), and for many Green activists the expectation was that the 2000 presidential election season might serve as the catalyst for an even larger round of explosive growth for the U.S. Greens.[183]

In 1996 consumer-rights activist Ralph Nader had "stood" for president as the nominee of the Green Party; in 2000, Nader ran fulltime, backed by an almost entirely inexperienced campaign team, a "war chest" between one-fifteenth and one-twentieth the size of his major-party rivals,[184] a staff of over one hundred paid campaign workers, and the efforts of over one hundred and fifty thousand campaign volunteers. In the face of difficult ballot access hurdles, a lock-out at the presidential debates, and a largely hostile media, Nader ran what one veteran political analyst said was the best presidential campaign of the season.[185] While one of Nader's intentions may have been to send a wake-up call to the rightward-drifting Democratic party leadership, for many Green activists the 2000 presidential campaign was seen as an opportunity to "break through": To get the voting public's attention, and to achieve a minimum of five percent of the vote, and the matching federal funds (public funding) that accrued with that minimum.

Setting the tone for the campaign, Nader's February 21, 2000, candidacy announcement speech was not covered by any of the major television networks, and it received little coverage in the major national newspapers. C-SPAN- (cable) TV and

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183 Source: Interviews with Maryland Green Party members, Spring and Summer 2003.

184 The Bush/ Cheney campaign spent $185 million, the Gore/ Lieberman campaign spent $120 million, and the Nader/ LaDuke campaign spent less than $8 million. Federal Election Commission, "Bush/Cheney" <http://herndon1.sdrdc.com/cgi-bin/cancomsrs/?_00+P00003335> and "Gore/Lieberman" <http://herndon1.sdrdc.com/cgi-bin/cancomsrs/?_00+P80000912> [accessed April 20, 2004].

185 David Broder, "The Best Campaign," *Washington Post*, November 5, 2000; Page B07.

National Public Radio (NPR) did broadcast some Nader campaign events; Pacifica Radio

Network and especially their flagship program "*Democracy Now*" hosted by Amy

Goodman gave Nader frequent and supportive coverage.[186] While the editors of the

Progressive magazine were supportive of the Nader 2000 campaign, *The Nation*'s editors

and writers were generally favorable but somewhat more circumspect in their evaluation

of Nader's third-party campaign.[187]

Early in the campaign Nader courted major labor unions, and while some labor

leaders seemed to give his campaign some credence, and were happy to tout Nader's

lifetime of accomplishments on behalf of protecting American workers and consumers,[188]

in the end only a handful of smaller labor organizations endorsed the Greens in 2000. On

the other hand, most of the largest environmental associations, women's and gay

organizations were positively hostile to Nader's efforts, as were a select group of former

professional colleagues, "Nader's Raiders", who publicly urged Nader to end his

campaign and throw his support to the Democrats, for fear of losing much of what Nader,

the Raiders, and the Democrats had accomplished by way of progressive reforms during

the preceding decades.[189]

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[186] Unique among American electronic media outlets, the Pacifica radio network, and especially their flagship station KPFA in Berkeley, California, has been a consistent supporter of left- leaning politics in the U.S. since at least the 1964 Free Speech Movement in Berkeley. <http://pacifica.org/about/history.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

[187] See, for example: "Real Choices, Suppressed Voices," *The Progressive*, October, 2000, and "The Election and Beyond," *The Nation*, October 19, 2000.

[188] Since 1966, Nader and his 'Raiders' were responsible for "at least eight major federal consumer protection laws such as the motor vehicle safety laws, Safe Drinking Water Act; the launching of federal regulatory agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Environment Protection Agency (EPA), and Consumer Product Safety Administration; the recall of millions of defective motor vehicles; access to government through the Freedom of Information Act of 1974; and for many lives saved." *Nader Bio,* <http://www.nader.org/enbio.html> [accessed 2/22/04].

[189] Since 1966, Nader and his Raiders have been responsible for "at least eight major federal consumer protection laws such as the motor vehicle safety laws, Safe Drinking Water Act; the launching of federal regulatory agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Environment Protection Agency (EPA), and Consumer Product Safety Administration; the recall of millions of defective

The Green Party held its presidential nominating convention in Denver, Colorado, at the end of June, which was attended by over 300 voting delegates from thirty-nine states, and over twelve hundred people attended the final nominating event; most of the attendees were young and white, and they were all enthusiastic.[190] The Green Party platform in 2000 called for: comprehensive campaign finance reform; a cut in military spending by fifty percent over the following ten years, coupled with increases in spending for social programs; reparations for slavery; the legalization of hemp and medicinal marijuana; the retiring of "third world" debt; state funding for day care and tuition-free post-secondary public education; universal health care and a single-payer insurance program; environmental taxes and the raising of corporate taxes; support for workers' right to strike; ending the death penalty and the "war on drugs"; support for the rights of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people; the conversion of weapons labs to research and development for renewable energy; support for family farms, support for organic food and the labeling of genetically engineered and irradiated food; citizens' control over corporations; livable wages; rejection of the North Atlantic Free Trade Organization (NAFTA,) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT,) the World Trade Organization (WTO;) insurance and pension reform; anti- trust enforcement; and the reduction of the national debt through tax increases on mega-corporate and wealthy interests.   Significantly, the four most successful third-party presidential campaign platforms were all similar in that they each included a call for increased governmental

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motor vehicles; access to government through the Freedom of Information Act of 1974; and for many lives saved." "Ralph Nader Bio."< http://www.nader.org/enbio.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

[190] A few attendees later commented that they were awestruck to see that the Green Party was in fact a real national political party when they filled the main hall of the assembly in Denver. Descriptions of attendees at the earlier Progressive party presidential nominating conventions, painted a remarkably stable picture: economically secure young men and women attending their first political convention. (See below.)

control over corporations, increased social welfare for citizens, a more equitable distribution of wealth, and the protection of natural resources; and after Theodore Roosevelt's (1912) campaign, all explicitly called for peace.

The highlight of the fall campaign was the "super-rallies" which filled stadiums and arenas with tens of thousands of paying fans, who were eager to hear progressive (but not self-identified Green) speakers like Jim Hightower, Michael Moore, Randall Robinson and Cornell West, as well as the music of Patti Smith, Jello Biafra, and Ani Difranco.[191] At the Madison Square Garden super-rally in October, over fifteen thousand mostly twenty and thirty-year-old white fans who had paid twenty dollars each heard Nader's vision for a new American society:

> "Imagine if we had our own TV and radio stations, instead of the corporate, homogenized media we now have . . . Imagine if they began to pay rent to us, the owners of those airwaves, for a change. . .Imagine if we could use the airwaves not just to transmit information, but to connect people to people to be creative and dynamic participants in the creation of our own civic culture, rather than a nation of spectators and purchasers, which is what big business wants. . .Imagine if workers controlled their own pension funds, so when they invest in those giant corporations they could force changes in their behavior."[192]

During the campaign hundreds of student Green Party chapters formed, hundreds of Green Party locals grew, and dozens of new Green Party state organizations were established as a result of activists organizing ballot access petition drives, voter registration drives, and Nader appearances.   The Nader/LaDuke ticket ultimately

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[191] The Nader "super rallies" were reminiscent of Henry A. Wallace's (1948) rallies where leading progressive entertainers of the day (Orson Welles, Katherine Hepburn, Charlie Chaplin, E.G. Robinson, Paul Robeson, etc.) warmed up the crowds. Culver and Hyde, *American Dreamer*, p.444.
[192] Ralph Nader quoted in Sifry, *Spoiling for a Fight*, p.181. Nader's 2000 critique of the political, corporate and media "establishment" was even more far- reaching than had been Theodore Roosevelt's (1912,) Robert M. LaFollette's (1924) and Henry A. Wallace's (1948) inasmuch as, of the four progressive third- party presidential candidates, only Nader was a true political "outsider," and not a (current or former) dominant- party politician "marinated" in big money.

appeared on the ballot in forty- three states and the District of Columbia. Nader campaigned vigorously, and his tireless energy outlasted most of his youthful entourage; Green Party vice-presidential candidate Winona LaDuke, a Native American, Harvard-educated economist, activist and writer had recently given birth to her third child and was infrequently seen on the campaign trail.[193]

The Nader campaign received the most attention when the Green Party presidential candidate was not only prevented from participating in the presidential debates, but was prevented from even watching the debates from another auditorium on the same campus where the debates took place at the University of Massachusetts in Boston on October 3, 2000.[194] Polls indicated a small spike in Nader's favor immediately

after the press coverage about the Commission for Presidential Debate's "freeze out" of Nader.[195]

In the final weeks of the campaign, the liberal media pundits, and members of the Democratic presidential candidate's campaign team, sensing the closeness of the contest, attacked Nader for being "egotistical" and "selfish." Throughout the campaign the "spoiler" issue was the mainstay of coverage with regard to the Green Party candidacy, and near the end of the contest the spoiler argument drowned out any other considerations about the Greens. The *New York Times* characterized the 2000 Green Party campaign as "Mr. Nader's Misguided Crusade."[196]

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[193] "Now first, I have to issue a disclaimer. I have a four-month old newborn, I'm definitely the only Vice-Presidential candidate who is nursing, which means that I do not travel as much as my colleague Ralph, who is not nursing in this election year." Winona LaDuke, "Being a Public Citizen," *Z Magazine*, <http://www.zmag.org/ladukepubcit.htm> [accessed April 20, 2004].

[194] U.S. Green Party Press Release , "Commission on Presidential Debates Settles Dispute, Apologizes to Ralph Nader for Removing Him From UMASS Campus During First Presidential Debate", April 16, 2002. <http://www.gp.org/press/pr_04_16_02.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

[195] Ibid., p.184.

[196] Editorial, *The New York Times,* June 30, 2000.

Ultimately, cowed by predictions of a Republican victory, many Democrats and independent voters got cold feet in the election booth, and refused to take the chance that their vote for Nader might imperil the environment, abortion, and gay rights.[197] Nader's predicted four- to- six percent polling numbers on Election Day were cut in half, as Micah L. Sifry noted:

> the Voter News Service exit polls suggest that most of Nader's votes came from young people and students, with a smattering of older independents and progressives. He got 5 percent of the eighteen–to twenty-nine vote, 6 percent pf the independent vote, and 6 percent of the self-identified liberal vote. By comparison, very few self-described conservatives (1 percent) or moderates (2 percent) tilted his way. Another indication of the leftist skew of his base: of the 9 percent of the electorate that thought Gore's positions were too conservative, Nader got 1 in ten votes. . . Nader did slightly better than his overall 3 percent showing with voters making less than $15,000 a year, his 4 percent tally with this group was undoubtedly a reflection of his base among college students rather than any connection to the urban-poor. Nationwide, he only got 1 percent of the African-American vote, a sign both of this group's strong Democratic loyalties and Nader's late and weak attempts to reach them. He got only 1 percent of the African-American vote in D.C., for example, while getting 5 percent overall there. . . In states with large university populations, he did markedly better with voters under the age of twenty-nine, accounting for 16 percent of the votes ni Massachusetts, 10 percent in Wisconsin, and 8 percent in California . . .[198]

In the aftermath of the election and the protracted, disputed election results, many Democrats and liberals, and some progressives, blamed Nader and the Greens for the election of a conservative Republican president. Nader countered that millions more Democrats had voted for the Republican candidate than had voted for him, that the

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[197] "The most disappointing thing to me was the way the polls shrank," says Nader. "They gave every indication to me of holding, going into the last weekend before Election Day, even surging in some places. . .There's this psychology among voters not to stray from the major parties." Micah L. Sifry, "Nader's Fade," *The Boston Phoenix*, November 30- December 7, 2000. <http://www.bostonphoenix.com/archive/features/00/12/07/NADER2.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].
[198] Sifry, *Spoiling for a Fight*, p.210. Democratic exit polls indicated that 25% of Nader's votes came from Republicans, 38% from Democrats, and 37% from nonvoters who would have only voted for Nader. Tim Wise, "Why Nader is NOT to Blame," *AlterNet,* November 8, 2000.

Democratic candidate Gore had not even carried his own home state, and that Green voters had helped to elect Democrats to Congress. Although many Greens were disappointed in the election results, believing that the five percent goal had been within reach, most Green activists looked back with some pride at the 2000 presidential campaign. For some Green activists, the 2000 "breakthrough" had been many years in the making, and for most the future of the Green Party looked promising. In Maryland, Green Party activists felt that, after a decade of effort, the Nader 2000 presidential election campaign was the essential force behind the establishment of the Green Party in the state.

Nader's 2000 presidential campaign was constrained by most of the same impediments that all third parties faced, including restrictive ballot access laws, an inability to hold taxpayer- supported state primaries, and especially the media "blackout" of the Nader super rallies, and the exclusion from the presidential debates by the Commission for Presidential Debates (CPD,) the creation of the Democratic and Republican parties. There was universal agreement among Green party activists in 2000, that had Nader been allowed into the televised debates his total vote count would have easily qualified the Green party for future public campaign funding. The "winner-take-all" election system in the U.S., which gives rise to voters' attitudes regarding "spoiling" the election was a huge drag on the Green party campaign in 2000, and clearly reduced the number of Nader votes. In addition, reports of illegal board of elections activities in Florida,[199] where it was alleged that thousands of legal voters were purged from the rolls, and reports of the ease with which electronic voting totals can be manipulated fueled

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[199] See, for example Palast, *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy.*

suspicions among a few Green party activists that they too were likely the victims of an organized and intentional vote undercount perpetrated by the dominant parties.

After the election, and through 2003, Greens in the U.S. celebrated a number of important milestones: in 2001, 552 Greens ran for office nationwide, with 176 winning; the Green Party's national budget was nearly one million dollars. In 2002, the Greens held their first mid-term conference in Philadelphia; in 2002, almost six million votes were cast for Green party candidates nationwide. By 2003, there were Green Parties in one hundred and four countries, and elected Green officials in more than a dozen countries. At the 2003 National Green Conference in Washington D.C. members overwhelmingly indicated that they wanted the Greens to run a candidate for U.S. president in 2004, and for the first time they approved funding for a caucus- led project when they allocated over thirty thousand dollars to the Green Party Black Caucus to promote Green Party voter registration events at predominantly black colleges and universities in 2004.[200]

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[200] Green Party 2003 National Conference, "2003 African American Outreach Proposal," <http://www.gp.org/2003meeting/blackcaucus.doc> [accessed April 20, 2004].

A Comparison of the Green Party and the Reform Party

In terms of gaining high percentages of votes in successive presidential elections, the Reform Party has been the most successful third-party in recent U.S. presidential campaigns. It is therefore valuable to compare the tactics and trajectories of the Reform and Green parties in order to understand which voters were attracted to each party, and how the parties developed. Additionally, the seeming sudden collapse of the Reform Party presents a cautionary tale for third-party supporters and others to contemplate.

Whereas the Greens are a grassroots organization, a party of, by, and for volunteer activists, the Reform Party was a top-down creation, funded by billionaire computer services C.E.O. H. Ross Perot, and managed by his lieutenants like a national corporation. The Reform Party achieved ballot access largely through paying petition gatherers across the country. After achieving impressive results in the 1992 presidential election (nearly 19%,) the erratic Perot's second presidential campaign in 1996 netted his Reform Party only 8%. By 2000, Perot had left the Reform Party, and conservative pundit Patrick Buchanan took control, splitting the party, and ultimately polling a mere .4% of the presidential vote.

According to Micah L. Sifry, the Reform Party was from the time of Perot's appearances on the Larry King TV program, indelibly stamped with the "megalomania" of its leader.[201] The "culture" of the Reform Party was strictly hierarchical and was, "ruthlessly controlled by Perot's men."[202] Where Ross Perot recruited and paid for Reform Party organizers, Green activists recruited Ralph Nader to be their standard-bearer. Where the Reform Party's *raison d'etre* was to act as a vehicle for its presidential

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[201] Sifry, *Spoiling for a Fight*, p.69.
[202] Ibid., p.71.

candidate, the Greens grew organically from activists' local activities and it was not at all clear to Green party activists that they would engage in electoral politics. Where Greens were motivated by the vision of a long-term commitment to building a third party that could radically challenge the duopoly of the primary parties at all levels and every geographic area, the Reform Party members seemed to be largely interested in helping their leader win the presidency in order to achieve a top-down reorientation of the federal government.

The statistical results (Fig. 2) indicate that both candidates received their highest percentages of votes from male voters; Perot and Nader each won about 50 percent more of the vote from males than from females. With regard to race, in 1996 Perot received his highest percentage of votes from white voters (9%), while Nader received his highest percentage from voters of the "other" races. It is noteworthy that in 1996, Perot received 4% percent of the national black vote, whereas in 2000, Nader received only 1% of the vote black. Perot received 50% more than Nader's percentage of the national Hispanic vote (3% for Perot, 2% for Nader,) but Nader received three-times Perot's percentage of Asian votes (3% for Nader, 1% for Perot.)

With regard to age, both Perot and Nader did best among voters who belonged to the youngest age group (18-29 year-olds) with Perot gaining 10% of the national youth vote in 1996 and Nader gaining half of that proportion (5%) in 2000. It is significant that Perot did almost as well among other, older age groups (although not among the very oldest category,) while Nader's appeal fell off dramatically among all older groups of voters. With regard to income, Perot and Nader displayed similar results insofar as each

candidate received his highest share of the vote from the lowest income groups, and their

lowest percentage votes from the highest income groups.

	Perot '96		Nader '00	
MALE VOTERS	10%	*	3%	*
FEMALE MALE VOTERS	7%		2%	
WHITE VOTERS	9% *		3%	
BLACK VOTERS	4%		1%	
HISPANIC VOTERS	3%		2%	
ASIAN VOTERS	1%		3%	
OTHER VOTERS	1%		4%*	
18-29	10%	*	5%	*
30-44	9%		2%	
45-59	9%		2%	
60-	7%		2%	
<$15K	11%	*	4%	*
$15-30K	9%		3%	
$30-50K	10%		2%	
$50-75K	7%		2%	
$75-100K	7%		2%	
>$100K	6%		2%	
REGISTERED DEMOCRAT	5%		2%	
REGISTERED REPUBLICAN	6%		1%	
REGISTERED INDEPENDENT	17%	*	6%	*
LIBERAL	7%		6%	*
CONSERVATIVE	9% *		2%	
MODERATE	8%		1%	
SOME HIGH SCHOOL	11%		1%	
GRAD HIGH SCHOOL	13%	*	1%	
SOME COLLEGE	10%		3%	*
GRAD COLLEGE	8%		3%	*
POST GRAD COLLEGE	5%		3%	*
PROTESTANT	8%		2%	
CATHOLIC	9%		2%	
JEWISH	3%		1%	
OTHER RELIGION	11%		7%	*
NO RELIGION	13%	*	7%	*
FIRST-TIME VOTER	11%		4%	
TOP ISSUE: TAXES	7%		2%	
TOP ISSUE: MEDICARE	6%		1%	
TOP ISSUE: FOREIGN POLICY	8%		4%	*
TOP ISSUE: ECONOMY / JOBS	10%	*	2%	
TOP ISSUE: EDUCATION	4%		3%	

**Fig. 2: National Voter Exit Poll Results: 1996 Perot Voters v. 2000 Nader Voter
Percent of the Total Vote that Went to Each Candidate**

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[203] <http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/elections/natl.exit.poll/index1.html> and
<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/results/index.epolls.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

The table also indicates that while Perot and Nader both received their highest percent of the national vote totals from registered independent voters (17% of Independents for Perot and 6% for Nader,) Perot received roughly equal percentages from registered Democratic (5%) and Republican (6%) voters, but Nader received twice the percentage of the national vote from registered Democrats (2%) than from registered Republicans (1%.) Similarly, while Perot in 1996 received his greatest percentage of the national vote totals from conservatives (9%), Perot also received substantial percentages from moderates (8%) and liberals (7%), while Nader, who received 6% of the total national liberal vote in 2000, received only one third (2%) of that percentage of the conservative vote, and a surprisingly small 1% of the moderate vote.

With regard to the educational levels of their voters, the Perot and Nader results are almost reverse images of each other. Perot did best among voters with no college education (13% of the national total of high school graduates, and 11% of the national total of voters who did not graduate from high school) while Nader did best among voters with college experience (3% each of the national vote total of voters with some college, voters who had graduated from college, and voters who had some post-graduate college education.) It is interesting that both Perot and Nader received their highest percentages of the national vote totals from voters who indicated that they had no religious affiliation. Perot received 13% of the non-religious voters' votes in 1996, and Nader received 7% of the same category of voters (as well as 7% of the national vote of those voters who affiliated with a non-Judeo-Christian religion.)

To summarize, in 1996, Perot received his highest percentages of the national vote totals from younger, white, lower-income, male conservatives with high school

educations who were registered as independent and declared no religious affiliation. These results somewhat comport with the observations Micah Sifry that the Reform Party voters were "white, heading toward retirement, culturally on the 'square' side but with a 'live-and-let-live' attitude towards others, and working in non-elite fields."[204] These Reform Party members and voters were from the "angry middle"; "more motivated by a gut-level anger and sense of betrayal than truly radical questioning of American society."[205]

Similarly, Nader in 2000 received his highest percentage of the national vote totals from among young, male, lower-income voters who were registered as independent and declared no religious affiliation. In contrast to the 1996 Perot voter, however, in 2000, Nader received his highest percentages of the national vote totals from voters who belonged to "other" races[206] (not white, black, Hispanic, or Asian,) from liberal voters, and from voters with the highest levels of education. One would conclude from these exit poll results that support for both right-leaning and left-leaning third-party presidential campaigns in the final decade of the twentieth century was most likely to come from younger male voters with lower incomes who were registered as independent voters, and who had no religious affiliation. Superficially at least, the combinations of youth with low income and independent political registration with no religious affiliation makes sense.

Where the 1996 Perot and the 2000 Nader voters differ most is in their political leanings, education, and "hot button" issues. Perot's main issue, fiscal discipline, was

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204 Sifry, *Spoiling for a Fight*, p.70.
205 Ibid., p.71
206 "Other" race was defined as persons with two or more races, or persons declaring a race other than the choices that were offered; persons not declaring any race were excluded from the racial survey results.

calculated to attract conservative voters who were concerned about the economy and who were suspicious of "big government." By contrast, Nader's main issue, the need to control giant corporations, appealed to people of all races, voters with a liberal (or progressive) bent, and voters with higher education which afforded them a broader (global) outlook on politics.

The electoral results of the two parties are also strikingly different. At its high water mark in 1992, the Reform Party polled more than seven times as many voters for president than the Green Party. The obvious reasons are clear: Perot's money bankrolled his first campaign, and federal campaign funding helped to pay for the second. Furthermore, Perot's center-right critique of a government incapable of reining in its out-of-control spending resonated with a larger portion of the electorate than the Green's forward- left analysis of corporate greed running roughshod over a helpless citizenry. Perot, although a seemingly peculiar man in appearance, and speech, was probably seen as a feisty and successful businessman whereas Nader may have been seen as a cold fish, and a scold.[207]

Most importantly, Perot's feisty style, along with a cooperative media, helped to thrust his candidacy into the national spotlight. Then, his deep pockets allowed Perot to host hour-long nationally televised "info-mercials" that captured the attention of a national audience, and sent his poll numbers upward. In 1992, Perot was invited to partake in the presidential debates (and his vice presidential candidate was allowed to

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[207] "Perot- Right Time, Wrong Man?,"
<http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/resources/democracy/perot/right.shtml> [accessed April 20, 2004].
Nader- Rachel Katz, "Rather Have Something Girly, Huh?," *The Fed*, Columbia's Subversive Newspaper, Oct. 2000.
<http://www.columbia.edu/cu/thefed/v2/archives/16/16.3-nader.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

participate in the vice presidential debates,) and this all but almost assured Perot 5% (he received 19%) of the total vote in the general election and the federal matching funding that accrue to candidates at 5% or higher. With the matching campaign funds a third party is enormously aided in the following election cycle—in fact for many Greens the goal of the Nader 2000 election was to achieve the 5% matching federal funds in order to grow the Green Party and run a stronger race in 2004.[208]

The Reform Party, however, being almost entirely a creature of its founder, foundered when Perot left the party. The Greens, beholden to no one individual[209], grew much slower but stronger and probably more resiliently. The lessons for third-party presidential politics in the U.S. is that it may take a wealthy and/or a "charismatic" candidate to score in the double digits (as did Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, Robert M. LaFollette in 1924, George Wallace in 1968, and H. Ross Perot in 1992,) but it takes a grassroots organizational structure in order to sustain a third-party beyond one or two presidential contests (as did the Socialist Party in 1904, 1908, 1912, 1916, 1920, and 1932, and the Prohibition Party in 1904, 1908, 1912, and 1916.)

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[208] Interviews with Maryland Green Party members, Spring and Summer 2003.

[209] Some Maryland Greens argued that the party was (is) beholden to Ralph Nader, as Nader was the most visible Green party candidate, and had arguably done more to build the party than had any other individual. Source: email from kzeese@earthlink.net to the MGP-Disc@yahoogroups.com listserve, April 22, 2004. Countering that contention, other Greens felt that Nader had never even been a member of the Green Party, and as such was something of an impediment to the party's future growth. Source: email from BaltiMorrill@aol.com to the MGP-Disc@yahoogroups.com listserve, April 15, 2004. Similar sentiments were expressed by Greens across the country. Source: email to the virtualgreens@yahoogroups.com listserve in the Winter of 2003 and Spring of 2004.

VI. A History of the Maryland Greens (1990-2003)[210]

In the early 1990s, the Potomac Valley bioregional Greens (with members from Washington D.C., Central Maryland, and Southern Pennsylvania) began holding regular meetings in Washington D.C. In Baltimore, Greens met at local churches, Friends meeting houses, and at the Progressive Action Center (PAC,) on Gorsuch Avenue. From the outset, the meetings were very process-oriented, and all attendees were encouraged to express themselves. To that end "facilitators" and "vibes watchers" monitored those in attendance, and directed the group in song, dance, the reading of poems, and yoga exercises in order to "balance the energy" in the room. At some meetings, participants were encouraged to 'twinkle'—to wave their open hands over their heads—instead of clapping, in order to demonstrate their approval of comments. Voting was discouraged in favor of discussions that led to consensus; discussions often revolved around the U.S. Green Party's Ten Key Values, the need for diversity, the writings of Charlene Spretnak and Petra Kelly, and the topics of "eco-feminism", "eco-spiritualism", and "deep ecology."

Greens ran candidates for Baltimore city council in 1991,[211] and Greenbelt city council in 1993. In 1992 some Greens in Maryland supported Ron Daniels' Independent

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210 Much of the un-cited information in this section came from individual and group taped interviews with Green Party activists the author held in the Spring and Summer of 2003. The audio tapes are in the author's possession. In addition, the author held untaped interviews with individual Maryland Green Party activists both in person and on the phone, as well as discussions with National Green Party rank- and- file activists and leaders. Green Party members who participated in the group interviews include: Session 1 (Spring): Hanno Beck (Baltimore County), Rick Kunkle (Baltimore County), and Alan Matlage (Montgomery); Session II (Summer): Clint Costner (Carroll), Alison Gibbons (Baltimore), Anne Goeke (Montgomery), Erik Michelsen (Anne Arundel), George Murphy (Anne Arundel), Victor Pleskaiz (Baltimore), and Elisa Thomas (Baltimore); Individual Interviews: Bob Auerbach (Greenbelt), Richard Ellsbery (Baltimore County), Mike Feinstein (California), Dean Myerson (National GP), John Rensenbrink (Maine), Linda Schade (Montgomery), and Beth Hufnagel (Prince Georges).

211 Ed Smith ran as a Democrat for Baltimore City council in order to achieve ballot access, although his campaign literature indicated that he was a Green, and his platform centered on encouraging the creation

run for President. Greens in Greenbelt, Maryland, were the first in the state to form a Green Party "local" when activists came together over the issue of expanding recycling in the city; Greenbelt Greens ran candidates for office and organized stream cleanups. By 1996, Green activists from Greenbelt, Anne Arundel County, Montgomery County, and Frederick County met to organize a petition drive to place Nader on the ballot in Maryland. Ultimately the Green Party activists gathered 3,000 signatures in 1996—far short of the 10,000 signatures Maryland law required, but they were able to get Nader listed as a certified write-in candidate who received over 600 write-in votes in Maryland in 1996. In 1997 at a gathering of Maryland Greens in Thurmont, members renewed the commitment to form an official Maryland Green Party and authorized the 2000 petition drive and the drafting of Bylaws. In 1998 Maryland Greens organized an unsuccessful attempt to collect petition signatures to put a Green candidate on the ballot for Governor. The Baltimore City local became active for about a year in 1998, and held regular meetings at the PAC, working on support for Democratic State Delegate Paul Pinsky's bill to lower the requirements for ballot access petition drives.[212]

In 1999, when it appeared that Nader might run again as a Green in 2000, Maryland Green locals began to grow, and attempts were made to start locals in areas where there was no existing Green activity. In February 2000, Ralph Nader scheduled a speech at the University of Maryland at College Park (UMCP), which was to be his first televised (on C-SPAN) address since his announcement for president. Greens at UMCP, students, and faculty hurriedly organized the Nader appearance, and in March, a dozen activists involved in the Nader UMCP event met to discuss organizing a petition drive.

and extension of bicycle trails, changing property taxes, and opposing sprawl. Interviews with Maryland Green party members, Spring and Summer, 2003.
212 Interviews with Maryland Green Party members, Spring and Summer 2003.

Beginning with a list of some three hundred contacts that had expressed an interest in the Greens, and some two thousand still-valid signatures that had previously been gathered, the activists rededicated their efforts to complete the (ultimately successful) 2000 presidential ballot access petition drive.[213]

By spring of 2000, energized by the ballot access petition drive, locals in Anne Arundel County, Prince Georges County, Fredrick County, Baltimore City, and Takoma Park began to have regular meetings, and the Maryland Green Party state Coordinating Committee (MGP-CC) formed itself, electing officers, and completing Bylaws, in part to fulfill the Maryland Board of Elections requirements for certification as a political party in the state. The MGP received about seven new activist contacts per day from tabling events, and from the national and state Green Party websites during the six months leading up to the election in November. The MGP-CC also elected delegates to the 2000 Green Party presidential nominating convention in Denver, but were concerned that their absence might affect the ongoing petition drive. As it turned out, in the summer MGP activists collected some seven thousand petition signatures in a six week period, so that by the end of July they were able to invite Nader to Annapolis to watch the MGP submit the required petition signatures (seventeen thousand were submitted, ten thousand valid signatures were required.) Nader was interviewed by the *Baltimore Sunpapers* and held a live telephone interview on the Baltimore- area National Public Radio (NPR) affiliate, WJHU (now WYPR.)

Once it was clear that the MGP had achieved ballot access, activists turned their attention to registering new Green voters, distributing Nader signs and literature, and organizing get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns. Members of the Baltimore City and

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[213] Ibid.

Howard County locals organized four rallies at the Commission for Presidential debates in Washington, D.C., which drew national and international reporters and camera crews, but no actual national media coverage. The local "alternative" press gave MGP activity some exposure,[214] Marc Steiner at the WJHU-radio station invited representatives of the Baltimore Greens on three occasions to promote the Nader campaign, and a small number of radio interviews were granted on commercial stations. Just before Election Day the *Baltimore Sun* ran a single, somewhat dismissive article on the Baltimore Greens and their efforts to promote the Nader campaign.[215] On Election Day MGP activists worked the polls in Anne Arundel, Montgomery, Baltimore City and Baltimore County. On election eve Green party supporters met in Baltimore for a "victory party" and to watch the disappointing results on TV.[216]

After the 2000 presidential campaign, Greens in Maryland continued to host regular local and statewide meetings, to sponsor park and stream cleanup events, to partake in ballot access petition drives and voter registration tabling events at fairs and other public events. As Fig. 3 indicates, Green Party registration understandably spiked in the months preceding the 2000 presidential election[217]; Green Party registration efforts

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[214] See, for example: Anne Ray, "Green Day," *Baltimore City Paper*, June 14 - June 20, 2000; Alice Cherbonnier, "Media Shut Out Nader," *Baltimore Chronicle*, June 28, 2000.

[215] Jonathan Pitts, "Something to build on: Ralph Nader's local supporters see an opportunity to force Green Party planks onto the major platforms and begin to change the political conversation," *Baltimore Sun*, November 4, 2000.

[216] In Maryland, Nader received 2.65% of the presidential vote, slightly less than the 2.73% average the Green party presidential candidate received nationwide.

[217] Across the nation, the Nader 2000 presidential election spurred the growth of state and local Green parties. "The 2000 campaign did wonders for building the Green Party," [National Green Party C-Chair Ben] Manski contends. "The national races and the local and state level races have a kind of symbiotic relationship that the more successful states recognize. The federal and state races put us on the map in regions of the country where we previously had no presence." Liv Leader, "The Greens' No-Nader Dilemma," *Mother Jones*, January/February 2004.

Fig. 3: Registered Greens in Maryland July 2000- June 2002[218]

and results tapered off substantially thereafter.[219] The MGP coordinated the printing and

mailing of a semi-annual newsletter and annual fundraising mailings to registered Greens,

the design and maintenance of state website and listserves, the sporadic publication of a

newsletter, and the sponsoring of annual statewide assemblies (in Towson in 2001,

Takoma Park in 2002, and Arnold in 2003.) Beyond the Coordinating Committee, the

MGP developed finance, membership, press and publicity, electoral, nominating,

platform, and rules and bylaws committees. Annual donations to the MGP and all of the

Green locals in the state combined were less than ten thousand dollars, and both the MGP

and the Green locals remained all-volunteer organizations.[220]

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218 Maryland Board of Elections data.

219 Numerous would-be Green party voters reported difficulty changing party affiliation in Maryland, when multiple attempts to register by mail were sometimes required before their new party affiliation would "stick". These difficulties further encouraged some Greens to believe that they were facing illegal impediments to the growth of their party. Source: Interviews with Maryland Green Party members, Spring and Summer, 2003.

220 For a six- week period immediately preceding the 2000 elections, the Baltimore local hired a part-time worker to coordinate GOTV activities. This is evidently the only instance of a paid worker for any Green Party organization in Maryland through the 2000 election. Source: Interviews with Maryland Green Party members, Spring and Summer, 2003.

Between 2000 and 2002, the MGP ran candidates in eleven partisan[221] races (Fig. 4), including two in which the Green candidates did surprisingly well. In 2001, Isaac Opalinsky came within one hundred votes of upsetting an entrenched Democratic incumbent for Alderman in Annapolis Ward one. Neither the campaign volunteers nor the candidate had ever been involved in political elections before, but Opalinsky's district was small—only two precincts, and this allowed them to go door- to- door to the two thousand homes and businesses. Opalinsky was able to talk directly with numerous voters, allowing him to cut through misconceptions about the Greens, and to demonstrate his honesty, integrity, and intelligence in person. The small scale of the campaign also allowed his campaign staff to run an effective phone banking organization, and to have an adequate number of poll workers. Although he did not win, activists across the state were inspired to believe as a result of the race, that it was not a question of if, but of when the first Green candidate would win in Maryland. Additionally, after the election Opalinsky was invited to sit on a number of local commissions.

Year	Candidate	Location / Office	Place	Votes	Pct.
1993	Hopi Auerbach	Greenbelt City Council	7th of 8 running for 5 seats	550	6%
1999	Bob Auerbach	Greenbelt City Council	7th of 7 running for 5 seats	680	8%
2000	David M. Gross	U.S. House of Rep. D1	3rd of 3 running for 1 seat	73	<1%
2001	**Isaac Opalinsky**	**Annapolis Alderman Ward 1**	**2nd of 2 running for 1 seat**	**527**	**42%**
2002	Morning Sunday	Baltimore House of Del. D43	5th of 5 running for 3 seats	152	<1%
2002	**Linda Schade**	**Takoma Park House of Del. D20**	**4th of 6 running for 3 seats**	**10101**	**15%**
2002	George W. Murphy	Carroll Co. Commissioner	8th of 8 running for 1 seat	2876	2%
2002	Bob Lewis	St. Mary Co. Commissioner D4	3rd of 3 running for 1 seat	1655	7%
2002	George Law	Anne Arundel Co. Council D2	3rd of 3 running for 1 seat	1991	10%
2002	**Rick Kunkel**	**Baltimore Co. House of Del. D42**	**7th of 7 running for 3 seats**	**5464**	**4%**
2002	Beth Hufnagel	Maryland Comptroller	3rd of 3 running for 1 seat	3635	<1%
2002	David M. Gross	U.S. House of Rep. D30	7th of 7 running for 3 seats	2536	2%
2002	Bob Auerbach	U.S. House of Rep. D5	3rd of 3 running for 1 seat	186	<1%

Fig. 4: Maryland Green Candidates for Partisan Public Offices 1993-2002

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221 Partisan races are races in which the candidates run under a party label, while non-partisan races are races where the candidates do not have to declare party affiliation.

222 Mike Feinstein, "Green Party Elections," <http://www.greens.org/elections> [accessed April 20, 1004], and from the Maryland Board of Elections, and county boards of elections. In the races with the lowest

In 2002, another notable Green campaign was run by community activist Linda Schade, in her race for Maryland House of Delegates in district twenty, in southeast Montgomery County. Schade was a full-time campaigner, who worked every day for the nine months preceding the election. Her campaign included hundreds of volunteers, of which approximately ten percent were registered Greens, ten percent were registered Independent, one percent were registered Republican and the rest were registered Democrats, in a heavily Democratic district. The Schade campaign distributed over sixty-five thousand pieces of literature that were mailed or hung on doorknobs. The Schade campaign's professionally designed literature including hundreds of yardsigns, and a website which promoted her campaign theme of "Fresh Air / Clear Politics"; no paid advertisement was employed in her campaign. For a third-party candidate, Schade got good exposure through the local and statewide press, was invited to one of the candidate's debates, held local cable and radio interviews, and was featured in *USA Today* in conjunction with Ralph Nader's appearance at her fundraising event. Schade may have been the first Green party candidate in the country to receive endorsements of both the local Teamsters union and the Sierra Club—a realization of the "blue-green" coalition Nader was unable to achieve in 2000.[223]

A major internal tension developed during the Linda Schade 2002 campaign with regard to the issue of campaign donations. Possibly unique among state Green parties in the U.S., the MGP recommended a one hundred dollar campaign donation limit for candidates running in the state; the Schade campaign ultimately raised $32,000, but the candidate felt she had been accused of acting unethically by taking up to $1,000 ($4,000

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votes and percentages, the Green Party candidates ran as write- ins. The campaigns highlighted in bold are discussed in detail in this chapter.

[223] Telephone interview with Linda Schade, August, 2003.

was the legal limit in Maryland.) Schade's first campaign manager quit over the donation limit, and bad communications between her campaign and the MGP-CC halted her campaign a month before kickoff, causing Schade to conclude that the "Maryland Green Party was much more of a problem for me than the Democratic Party."[224] Some Maryland Greens felt that Schade's accepting and then reneging on her commitment to limit her campaign contributions to $100 was unilateral and disrespectful of the party's membership. From a philosophical point of view, as one Maryland Green wrote, "the influence of money on candidates (and the Party) is subtle and moral rectitude is no protection against it. Indeed, common courtesy [thanking a donor] can be the tragic failing."[225]

Schade was attacked by Democrats who claimed that a "Vote for Schade is a Vote for Bush," and who employed race-baiting rhetoric by alleging that as a white candidate, she would be taking a black delegate's seat if she were elected. On Election Day the Schade campaign fielded one hundred and twenty poll workers, and the candidate came in fourth in a six- way race for three seats—seats that the Democratic slate swept.

By contrast to Linda Shade's somewhat fractious campaign, Rick Kunkel's 2002 race for the Maryland House of Delegates in the forty-second district in northern Baltimore County engendered no internal divisiveness with respect to the campaign

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[224] Ibid

[225] Email message from Maryland Green Party Coordinating Council member Alan Mattlage to the Finance Listserve group of the MGP, November 3, 2003. The debate over campaign contribution limits occupied a lot of MGP member's attention from the 2002 elections through January of 2004 when it was decided that each local would determine its campaign limit. Source: Maryland Green Party discussion listserve (mgp-disc@yahoogroups.com) and interviews with Maryland Green Party members, Spring and Summer, 2003.

funding issue.[226] On the contrary, Kunkel used his self-imposed funding limit as a key plank in his platform. Kunkel wrote that:

> Campaign finance reform was the primary focus of my candidacy. I was the only candidate in the race to put the issue on the table. I didn't simply talk about the need for "clean" campaigns. I ran one. I set a contribution limit of $100, and refused money from corporations, unions, PACs, and other "special" interests. I did this voluntarily because it was the right thing to do. I would suggest that *all* Green candidates give this strategy careful consideration.[227]

Kunkel, a full-time social worker, was a part-time campaigner with a "staff" of about twenty-five volunteer workers who dedicated most of their energy to sign-waving at busy street intersections during weekday rush hours, and to canvassing door-to-door on weekends. Kunkel's campaign raised approximately seven thousand dollars, and most of that money went towards postage for campaign fliers and for purchasing yard signs. Kunkel was invited to speak at sparsely-attended candidate forums and was offered perfunctory coverage in most of the local newspapers. The *Baltimore Sun* set the tone for print coverage of the Kunkel campaign by not including him in their general coverage of the primary party candidates in his race, but instead they published a feature story (with a front page photograph) some days later which could be charitably characterized as the "other unusual candidates" treatment.[228]

In spite of having a tiny budget (approximately one-twentieth of the highest finisher in his race) and campaign organization, Kunkel ultimately received over 5,400 votes in his district where there were only 167 registered Greens. Kunkel credited his

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[226] In fairness, it should also be noted that the Schade campaign organized the activities of hundreds of volunteers, while the Kunkle campaign had only a few dozen active supporters. Source: Telephone interview with Linda Schade, August, 2003.

[227] Rick Kunkel, "Report from the Rick Kunkel Campaign," December 12, 2002.

[228] Michael Ollove, "Lean and Green", *Baltimore Sun*, October 30, 2002.

"Not For Sale" motto and his squeaky- clean campaign with catching the voters and the other candidates by surprise.[229] Ultimately, Kunkel came in last in his seven-person race in which the three Republicans won.

A lesser ongoing tension among Maryland Greens revolved around the issue of paid staff versus an all-volunteer structure. Some Greens argued that the best way to grow the party was slowly, and without relying on paid workers, who, it was thought, would tend to dominate the party and tend to diminish volunteer activity. Other Greens thought that there was not an unlimited amount of time with which to grow an alternative political party in the U.S., and that many opportunities were inevitably squandered by any organization that was completely reliant on the good intentions of part-time volunteers. By their nature, many Greens were fearful of the corrosive influence of money, and also seemed to be "genetically predisposed to opposing the power of organized hierarchies,"[230] which together had the effect of creating the phenomenon of the "tyranny of structurelessness" whereby "unofficial channels of information, and hence control and power, developed to fill the void"[231], where inertia and inefficiency often triumphed over individual initiative and timely response, and where only members with enough time and money can afford to participate. Ralph Nader warned about the dangers of Green organization in 2004:

> The Greens are such that they can be controlled by a small clique if
> they are not careful, and there is a clique that wants to control them.

[229] Source: Interview with Maryland Green party members, Spring and Summer, 2003.

[230] Sifry, *Spoiling for a Fight*, p.184. In addition, Greens sometimes adopted "extremely minimalist expectations and talk of wondering [sic] in the wilderness of a single digit third party universe for generations. Not only do I not think it has to be that way, but such a minimalist perspective I think is a prescription for the more or less rapid collapse of the Green Party, or at least its degeneration into an even smaller sect." New Jersey Green party member, Gabe Gabrielsky, in an email to the virtual_greens@yahoogroups.com listserve, February 16, 2004.

[231] Capra and Spretnak, *Green Politics,* 218.

And its not all that apparent that that's not happening to some Greens.[232]

In a related vein, many U.S. Greens shared international Greens' mistrust of leaders[233] (especially charismatic ones), and U.S. Greens were enamored of consensus-building to the extreme: most Maryland Greens would have probably preferred that a thing not get done at all than for it to get done the "wrong" way. Through their dogged determination to remain a radically decentralized organization of independent locals,[234] there seemed to be a danger that the Greens, because they were a political party comprised of people who, by and large, only reluctantly became involved in politics, might become an anti- party party of insular and self-indulgent individuals enjoying the martyrdom of being a misunderstood, if enlightened sect.[235] In this regard, sociologist David Croteau has noted that most middle-class activists found their political work to be "fulfilling" and/or "fun"—in short "comfortable," and as they were rarely working for their own immediate welfare, success for these activists was not measured entirely, or

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[232] Quoted in "Nader Considers Raiding Another Campaign," Walt Shepperd, *Syracuse New Times*, February 18, 2004.

[233] This mistrust of authority is clearly in part a result of the 1960's student protests on both sides of the Atlantic against "authority" figures in college administration and in government. Carried from "external" conflicts into intra- party dynamics, the effect of this mistrust was corrosive. Petra Kelly articulated this attitude ably, "we bring just as much disarray and just as much upset upon ourselves. We bring it right smack into our own Green movement through internal fighting; old power tactics; loveless, hard, and endless argumentative turmoil in the process of 'full-consensus decision- making;' and through a game familiar to all here, called 'Mistrust the people You Have Just Elected!" Petra Kelly*, Nonviolence Speaks to Power* (Honolulu: Matsunaga Institute for Peace, 1992), p.18. Kelly frequently lamented the fact that "the passion displayed in the infighting was all too often lacking in our treatment of genuine political issues." Ibid., p.126.

[234] This non- hierarchical structure resisted take- over attempts (like Patrick Buchanan's "hijacking" and the subsequent destruction of the Reform Party in 2000,) but also stymied growth by retarding the ability to mobilize individuals for concerted efforts either in a timely way or at all.

[235] "My assessment is that the Greens are more interested in posturing and claiming to be morally superior to the lowly Democrats than doing the actual work required to elect people." Geoff Staples (host of *Radio Left* internet talk show), email to virtual_greens@yahoogroups.org listserve, March 12, 2004. Gabe Gabrielsky, in an email post to the virtual_greens@yahoogroups.com listserve, February 17, 2004.

even primarily in electoral results.[236] New Jersey Green Party activist Gabe Gabrielsky echoed this general "sectarian" criticism:

> It's no accident that when Green leaders like [New Jersey Congressional candidate] Ted [Glick] and [California Senatorial candidate] Medea Benjamin, function as leaders of the peace movement they do so as individuals and not as representatives of the Green Party. . . the very fact that they would be wisely reluctant to do otherwise is an indication that the [U.S.] Green Party is hardly a party worthy of the name, but really little more than a sect, a very large sect to be sure, but a sect nonetheless. I think this sectarian mentality is corroborated by the ecstatic enthusiasm that many Greens have over paltry single digit voter returns.[237]

Tensions also developed inside other Green party locals in Maryland for reasons unrelated to money and leadership. In Baltimore City during the 2000 presidential election campaign, some members felt that there was an undue emphasis on procedures and process as opposed to obtaining results—whereby much energy was drained away in seemingly fruitless discussions about theoretical concerns to the detriment of actual activity-producing planning. Further, some Greens felt that a single disruptive individual was allowed to consume large quantities of time and energy in the name of procedural fairness, which discouraged some potential Green supporters from joining the local, and caused some existing members to leave.[238] It was common for Greens to "butt heads" over philosophical and sometimes practical problems; these and other "ego issues" were notorious in the national Green party, and can easily be explained by the fact that highly-intelligent and passionate volunteer activists, working in powerless fledgling

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[236] David Croteau, *Politics and the Class Divide: Working People and the Middle-Class Left (Labor and Social Change)* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995)
The notion of "success" varied widely among Green activists, as well. One Green activist noted that she, "Did not expect to encounter so many Greens (or greens) who are steadily looking ahead to a crash and are focused on preparing for it, psychologically and practically." Email from pilpintuu@wildmail.com to the greensUSA@yahoogroups.com listserve, February 13, 2004.
[237] Gabe Gabrielsky, in an email post to the virtual_greens@yahoogroups.com listserve, February 17, 2004.
[238] The Nose, "Green Out," *Baltimore City Paper*, June 6-12, 2001.

organizations, were more susceptible to quitting and beginning a new group than were paid members of mature organizations that already wielded authority.

Finally, with respect to the long-term viability of the MGP, probably the most significant activity of the MGP during this period was the *Maryland Green Party v Maryland Board of Elections* successful lawsuit which overturned the "two- tier" petition requirement for ballot access in the state. Ever since 1971, Maryland required third parties to collect ten thousand valid petition signatures to qualify as a party in the state, and to be able to run a candidate for president. In addition, every third-party candidate for local or statewide office had to collect even more petition signatures in order to appear on the ballot. After the July 2003 decision overturned this practice, all third parties in Maryland were able to run full slates of ballot- access candidates once the state recognized their party. Maryland Greens were understandably elated that beginning with the 2004 elections their national, state and local candidates would automatically appear on the ballot in Maryland.[239]

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[239] Maryland Greens were also concerned that the Democratic Party- dominated Maryland legislature might re- write the ballot access laws to again stymie third party participation before the 2004 General elections in an effort to curtail the emerging Republican party threat in the state.

VII. Statistical Analysis of the Maryland Greens

In an effort to determine the makeup of Maryland Green Party support, a statistical analysis of four cohorts follows: the fifty- four thousand Maryland voters who supported Green Party candidate Ralph Nader in the 2000 presidential election; a random survey of the five thousand registered Green Party voters in Maryland; a survey of fifty-one Maryland Green Party "activists"; and a survey of the subset of registered Maryland Green party voters who will be referred to as the "Core Greens." "Activists" were registered Green Party members who were involved in local, state, or national Green Party activities beyond merely registering Green and voting. "Core Greens" were registered Green Party members who indicated that they would not have voted for any presidential candidate in 2004 if the Greens had not run a candidate. Many, but not all, Core Greens were Green Activists.[240]

Approximately 54,000 Marylanders voted for the Green Party presidential candidate Ralph Nader in the 2000 election. By far the most voters for Nader in 2000 came from the most heavily-Democratic counties in the center of the state (see Fig. 5): Montgomery, Baltimore County, Baltimore City, Anne Arundel, Prince Georges and Howard counties.[241]

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[240] {See the *Appendix* for an explanation of the survey, and its distribution and analysis.}
[241] Of the top five counties by percentage of their vote for Nader in 2000, two (Kent and Talbot) were not in the center of the state: Montgomery (3.38%), Kent (3.35%), Howard (3.25%), Baltimore City (2.88%), Talbot (2.8%) and Baltimore County (2.83%.) Although (predominantly black) Prince George's county had a relatively high total vote for Nader in 2000, it had the lowest percentage (1.66%) of Nader 2000 voters in the state.

Fig. 5: 2000 Nader Voters in Maryland by County

These counties (and Baltimore City) contained the largest numbers (total population), as well as the highest percentage of highest-income and most-educated citizens in Maryland. Using regression analysis in order to determine the correlation coefficient, Fig.6 reveals the results of the relationship between the Nader vote in the 2000 election and various variables, by precinct, for all Maryland counties.

Income	0.55
Education	0.63
Percent of Vote for Democratic Presidential Candidate 2000	0.57
Percent of Vote for Republican Presidential Candidate 2000	-0.13
White Voting Age Population (VAP)	0.66
Black Voting Age Population (VAP)	-0.23

Fig. 6: 2000 Maryland Nader Vote by Precinct, All Counties Correlation Coefficient of Variables[242]

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[242] Maryland precinct voter data is from School of Public Affairs, American University, Federal Elections Project Sponsored by the National Science Foundation, "2000 Election Data by State." The unit of analysis is precinct results for all precincts in Maryland in the 2000 general elections. <http://www.american.edu/academic.depts/spa/ccps/elections/states.html> [accessed April 20, 2004]. Maryland demographic data is from the U.S. Census Bureau, "Census 2000 Data for the State of Maryland, General Demographic Characteristics (DP-1)," The unit of analysis is precinct results for all precincts in Maryland in the 2000 general elections. <http://www.census.gov/census2000/states/md.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

As the table shows, there were strong, positive correlations between Nader votes cast and income, education, votes for the Democratic presidential candidate and for white voters. There were weaker negative correlations between Nader votes cast and votes for the Republican presidential candidate, and for black voters. These results are consistent with a working hypothesis that Nader 2000 voters in Maryland were more likely to be wealthy, highly educated, Democratic-leaning, and white; Republicans and blacks would less likely to have voted for Nader in 2000 in Maryland. As Nader ran as a progressive candidate, it makes sense that he would have a positive appeal to (liberal) Democrats and a negative association for (conservative) Republicans. With regard to race, these results comport with anecdotal evidence of the races of Nader supporters at meetings and demonstrations, and a somewhat less but still strong preponderance of white supporters at Green party voter registration drives and other events in the state. It is also revealing that of the eleven Maryland Green party candidates (1993 – 2002) only one (Morning Sunday) was black, in a state with a twenty-seven percent black population. Further analysis, based on surveys of randomly-selected registered Green voters, is presented (below) to determine if the positive relationships between income, education and white race, and the negative relationship to black race that are suggested in the table are true for Maryland Green supporters.

Not surprisingly, the counties in Maryland that had the most number of Nader 2000 presidential voters, were the same counties with the highest number of Green Party registered voters in 2002.[243] This suggests that voters who registered for the Green Party

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[243] These central counties also accounted for the greatest percentage of registered Green Party voters in Maryland: Montgomery (21%), Baltimore City (18%), Baltimore County (13%), Anne Arundel (11%), and Prince George's (7%.)

in Maryland are also likely to be wealthier and better educated than the average

Marylander. According to the results of three hundred and sixteen returned surveys of a

randomly-selected group of registered Greens in Maryland in 2003, and an additional fifty-

one Maryland Green Party activists however, a plurality of registered Greens, Green

Fig. 7: 7/02 Registered Greens In Maryland by County

Party activists, and Core Greens were of only average wealth as compared to the state's

population as a whole (see Fig. 8.) The average per capita income in Maryland in 2000

was $25,614[244], and the greatest number of registered Greens (26%), Green Party activists

(36%), and Core Greens (28%) were within the twenty–to–forty thousand dollar range.

However, there are a large number of registered Greens in the less than ten thousand dollar

range (21%,) and this group is, for reasons noted below, more likely to be comprised

mainly of younger voters, many of whom were college students, than of Marylanders

mired in poverty.

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[244] Data derived from Population Estimates, 2000 Census of Population and Housing, 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, County Business Patterns, 1997 Economic Census, Minority- and Women-Owned Business, Building Permits, Consolidated Federal Funds Report, 1997 Census of Governments. "U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts 2000," <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/24000.html> [accessed April 20, 2004].

Personal Income in 2002	Registered Greens	Green Activists	Core Greens
Less than $10k	21% (62)	13% (6)	17% (8)
$10-$20k	15% (45)	7% (3)	13% (6)
*$20-$40k	26% (77)	36% (16)	28% (13)
$40-$60k	20% (58)	29% (13)	20% (9)
$60-$80k	9% (25)	11% (5)	20% (9)
$80-$100k	6% (18)	4% (2)	0%
More than $100k	3% (9)	0%	2% (1)

Fig. 8: 8/03 Survey of Registered Greens & Green Activists Personal Income in 2002 [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

Therefore, a reasonable inference is that registered Green voters, like voters in general throughout the U.S., are likely to be at least marginally wealthier than the average citizen. Near the top end of the income distribution scale ($60,000 and higher), there were marginally more wealthy Core Greens than there were registered Greens or general Green Party activists.

	Registered Greens	Green Activists	Core Greens	All Marylanders[245]
*Post- Graduate College	45% (138)	57% (27)	64% (18)	13.4%
4- Year College	31% (97)	26% (12)	7% (2)	18%
2- year College	12% (38)	11% (5)	0%	5.3%
High School	12% (38)	6% (3)	29% (8)	46.7%

Fig. 9: 8/03 Survey of Registered Greens, Green Activists, All Marylander's Level of Education [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

The results of the surveys related to education levels were remarkable (see Fig. 9): all groups had far higher levels of education than did the average Marylander. Most amazing, for all groups, the most common category of educational achievement was a post-graduate degree; fully 45% of registered Green voters, 57% of Green Party activists, and a stunning 64% of Core Greens in Maryland held a masters or doctoral degree!

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[245] Source: U.S. Census Bureau, DP-2. "Profile of Selected Social Characteristics: 2000 Data Set: Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF 3) - Sample Data," 25 years and older. <http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=04000US24&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_DP2&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&-redoLog=false> [accessed April 20, 2004].

The results of the surveys clearly support the assertion that Greens in Maryland had a much higher level of education than the average citizens, and they almost certainly had higher levels of education than other non-Green Party voters (i.e. more than Democratic or Republican voters.) One inference would be that, as education levels rise, wealth and income levels tend to rise, as does interest in politics and therefore access to information about "alternative" political parties. The Green Party platform promoted the ideal of "free" universal education through college, which might reasonably appeal to voters with higher educations, and a strong positive correlation between attitudes about the need for environmental protection—a cornerstone of Green philosophy—and education levels has been widely noted.[246] On the other hand, it is again likely that no one who voted for the Green Party presidential candidate in Maryland in 2000 thought that Nader would win and be in a position to implement policy. Other progressive party presidential campaigns in the twentieth century, including those of Theodore Roosevelt (1912), Robert M. LaFollette (1924), Henry A. Wallace (1948) revealed similar strong popular support among voters with higher educational levels, and activist support among college students.[247]

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[246] "The Gallup Survey of American Attitudes, which has been conducted since 1936, seeks to determine issues of importance to Americans. . . The interest began in the late 1970s when the Gross Domestic Product reached $4,500 per capita (measured in 1992 dollars, the bench mark used in the study), according to [analyst Don] Coursey. Interest peaked in the late 1980s during a period of relative economic prosperity, when 3.5 percent of the respondents identified the environment as an important concern." William Harms, "Environmental cleanups linked to economic issue", *University of Chicago Chronicle*, Jan. 20, 1994, Vol. 13, No. 10. <http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/940120/coursey.shtml> [accessed April 20, 2004].

[247] T.R.- "The [1912 Progressive Party convention] delegates typified the economically secure, college-educated younger men and women, previously uninvolved in politics, whom the Progressive party attracted in all parts of the country." John Milton Cooper, Jr., *The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 188.

LaFollette- "The Progressives gathered in Cleveland on July 4, 1924 for their nominating convention—labor, farm-labor, Socialists, and the Committee of Forty-Eight, plus other smaller organizations. Delegates were serious and young, mostly under forty by some accounts; undergrads from ivy league colleges, quixotic, but never cynical, refreshingly enthusiastic. . ." Kenneth Campbell MacKay, *The Progressive Movement of 1924* (New York: Octagon Books, 1972), p. 110.

The survey results with regard to race strongly support the inferences drawn from the statistical analysis of statewide data presented above (and also comports with the table of Perot and Nader voters in the Reform Party vs. Green Party analysis above.) As Fig. 10 shows, the overwhelming majority of registered Greens, Green activists, and Core Greens were white. Only four percent of registered Greens were black in a state with a twenty- seven percent black population.   Surprisingly, while the 2000 Maryland registered Green survey included no (zero) black activists, some seven percent of these black voters indicated that they would not have voted at all if Nader was not in the presidential contest in 2000. This would seem to indicate that either Maryland Green activists had not taken advantage of the potential to recruit more black members from within the ranks of Core Greens and/or that some percentage of black Core Greens were unwilling, unable, or uninterested in participating in Green Party activities (beyond voting.) A number of explanations have been offered by Green party activists[248] to account for the negative correlation between Green support and black race: that the Green Party was unknown among most black voters; that blacks who do know about Greens think that Greens are "more concerned with trees than with poor people"; that blacks were "married" to the Democratic party; that blacks tended to follow the lead of their clergy who were themselves "married" to the Democratic party; that black voters were more dependent on government largesse, and therefore could not afford to "waste" their

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Wallace- The Progressive Party of 1948 held its convention in Philadelphia in July and drew some 3,200 delegates. Most of those attending the convention were young, and many had little practical political experience; "Hundreds had hitch-hiked to the convention. . .and scores lived in tent-towns on the convention hall parking lot." Howard K. Smith, *The Wallace Party*, *Nation* (August 7, 1948), p. 146. Quoted in Allen Yarnell, *Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p.104.

[248] Source: Interviews with Maryland Green Party members, Spring and Summer, 2003.

votes in "protest"; that Nader had made no special appeal to blacks; that the Greens were not serious about fundraising and supporting their party and candidates monetarily.[249]

	Registered Greens	Green Activists	Core Greens	All Marylanders[250]
*White	89% (271)	93% (41)	91% (40)	61%
Black	4% (11)	0%	7% (3)	27%
Mixed	2% (7)	5% (2)	0%	2%
Asian	2% (5)	0%	2% (1)	4%
Other	1% (2)	0%	0%	2%
Hispanic	1% (2)	0%	0%	4%
Native American	1% (2)	2% (1)	0%	0%

Fig. 10: 8/03 Survey of Registered Greens, Green Activists, All Marylander's Race [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

Despite the "black- friendly" nature of the Green party platform (reparations for slavery, emphasis on the crime of racism, universal health care, "free" pre-K through college education, the end of the "drug war" and the "prison industrial complex", etc.,) despite the fact that the Nader campaign recruited a number of high-profile black leaders for support (Randall Robinson, Cornell West, Manning Marable, etc.,) and despite the fact that the geographic center of Green support was located in areas with high (and even majority) black populations, Greens in Maryland had made almost no inroads into the black community, as documented by the stunning failure to attract many black registered

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[249] One Maryland Green Party activist and candidate wrote that, "For the mo st part, people of color—especially those who are not middle- and- upper- class,-- will not take our [Green Party] message of economic justice or the MGP seriously if we are unwilling to become an economically sustainable institution." Joseph Horgan in an email to the Finance@mdgreens.org listserve, November 3, 2003. Throughout the 2002 election cycle and for a year after, MGP members were involved in a heated debate about the issue of restricting campaign donations to something less than the legal limit. The "purists" argued for strict limits ($100 or less) while the "realists" wanted Maryland Green party candidates to be able to receive the full legal limit. Ultimately the issue was decided on the basis of "local autonomy" whereby each candidate, in consultation with the local(s) where he or she runs, would decide what if any self-imposed campaign donation limit would be in effect. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the MGP is in the minority of state Green Parties in the U.S. with regard to its' "purist" attitudes about money.
[250] U.S. Census Bureau, "Census 2000 Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File, Matrices PL1 and PL2."

voters or activists.[251] In this regard, the experience of black political activist and former third-party presidential candidate Ron Daniels is instructive:

> As I move around the country promoting the idea of an independent presidential campaign in '92, I frequently encounter potential supporters in the Black community who are very skeptical about entering into a multi-racial coalition with progressive Whites. There is intense concern that white folks will dominate the coalition and that Black issues will be lost in the drive to present a "peoples' agenda."[252]

Nationally, there is also a well-funded and concerted effort to drive a wedge between environmentalists and people of color. Paul Driessen, the author of *Eco-Imperialism: Green Power, Black Death* (Free Enterprise Press, 2003,) the Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise (CDFE,) and other writers and organizations have explicitly linked the rise of famine, disease and death in third-world countries to the "misguided" activities of ecologists and environmentalists.[253] In the print media, on television, and especially on talk radio, "eco-fascists" have been decried for causing or at least exacerbating the misery among people of color in the third-world.[254]

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[251] While T.R. was an unabashed racist, Robert M. LaFollette's (1924) Progressive party presidential campaign reached out to black voters, and he has been credited as being the first presidential candidate in U.S. history to speak out against the KKK by name in a stump speech {Nancy C. Unger, *Fighting Bob La Follette: The Righteous Reformer* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000) p.289}; Henry A. Wallace's (1948) Progressive party presidential campaign also attracted attention and support in the black community—especially in the South where he and his running mate demanded to speak before integrated audiences, even at some personal peril. {Norman Markowitz, *The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism*, *1941-1948* (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p.290.} Ralph Nader, by contrast, perhaps because of his laconic speaking style and colorblind attitude, did not connect with or inspire many black voters. Interviews with black members of the national Green Party at the 2003 Green Party National Convention, July, 2003.

[252] Reynolds, *Democracy Unbound*, p.240.

[253] According to the *New York Times*, CDFE's founder and President Alan Merril Gottlieb shifted the Center's focus when he realized the fundraising potential of opposing environmentalism, 'For conservative fundraisers like Mr. Gottlieb, the enemies were Senator Edward M. Kennedy and the threat of gun control. But now Mr. Gottlieb has found a better target. "For us" said Mr. Gottlieb... "the environmental movement has become the perfect bogeyman." GMWatch.org, <http://www.gmwatch.org/profile1.asp?PrId=248&page=C> [accessed April 20, 2004].

[254] *Rush, Newspeak and Fascism: An Exegesis*, Cursor.org. <http://www.cursor.org/stories/fascismiii.php> [accessed April 20, 2004].

The survey results with regard to voting patterns and party loyalty support the inferences drawn from the statistical analysis of statewide data presented above. As Fig. 11-13 indicates, the large majority of registered Greens and Green activists in Maryland formerly considered themselves Democrats, would have voted for the Democratic candidate for president in 2000 if the Greens had not fielded a presidential candidate, and as many as 11% of registered Greens and 5% of Green activists intended to vote Democratic in the 2004 presidential elections, as of the Spring /Summer of 2003.[255]

	*Dem.	None	Ind.	Rep.	Lib.	Other
Registered Greens	58%	29%	5%	5%	2%	1%
Green Activists	65%	20%	7%	4%	2%	2%

Fig. 11: 8/03 Survey of Registered Greens, and Green Activists, Previous Party Affiliation [PERCENT]

	*Dem.	None	Lib.	Rep.	Soc.	Other
Registered Greens Surveyed	77%	16%	3%	2%	0%	0%
Green Activists Surveyed	59%	34%	5%	0%	2%	1%

Fig. 12:   8/03 Survey of Registered Greens, and Green Activists, Alternate 2000 Presidential Candidate Choice [PERCENT]

	*Green	Dem.	Undecided
Registered Greens Surveyed	59%	11%	30%
Green Activists Surveyed	87%	5%	8%

Fig. 13: 8/03 Survey of Registered Greens and Green Activists 2004 Presidential Voting Intention

These results make perfect sense if one accepts the notion that the Greens are a modern expression of progressivism in American politics. A reasonable hypothesis is that a number of the most liberal and progressive Democrats were dissatisfied with the direction the Democratic party was heading in 2000, and were dissatisfied with the Democratic candidate, or changed party affiliation to support the progressive party and

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[255] The timing of the survey might represent something of a temporary nadir of Green party enthusiasm in Maryland, coming as it did between the enormous, global, but ultimately unsuccessful anti- war protests (Winter 2003,) and the elation at winning the lawsuit allowing third party ballot access (Summer 2003.)

candidate.[256] It is significant that close to a third of all registered Greens, and one fifth of

Green Party activists in Maryland declared no previous party affiliation. The assumption,

which will be explored in detail below, is that many of these voters and activists were

young, and many were first-time voters. The higher percentage of Green party activists

(65%) as compared with registered Greens (58%) who had previously affiliated with the

Democratic Party is probably an artifact of age: being older than registered Green voters,

Green activists understandably had had more opportunities to affiliate with other political

parties. It is also noteworthy that Green support also came from Independents and even

from some voters who had previously registered with or had voted for candidates from

political parties on the right- hand side of the U.S. political spectrum. This indicates that

some of the Green Party's appeal resonated with some conservatives; Libertarian support

for the Greens may be in part explained by their desire to help the strongest third party in

the race.[257]

It is noteworthy that some sixteen percent of registered Green voters and fully one

third (thirty-four percent) of Green Party activists would not have voted at all in 2000, if

the Green Party had not run a presidential candidate that year. Statistical analysis by

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[256] The results of this survey of Maryland activists and registered Greens generally comport with national surveys of the general voting public. According to the 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey, liberals had the highest favorable attitudes towards Nader (33%) while only 18% of conservatives had a favorable opinion of him. National Annenberg Election Survey, March 26, 2004, "Public Attitudes About Nader Decline Sharply Since 2000 As He Starts his White House Run, Annenberg Data Show."

[257] Anecdotal evidence of Green party support among some conservatives may be explained in part by Ralph Nader's standard stump speech, which included a reference to the "commercialization of childhood"; some Libertarians indicated support for the Greens based on a shared platform plank that opposed the so-called "war on drugs." According to Voter News Service 2000 election exit polls 58% of Nader voters voted for a Democrat for the House of Representatives, and only 27% voted for a Republican. David E. Rosenbaum, "Relax, Nader Tells Democrats, but Math Says Otherwise," *New York Times*, February 24, 2004.

political scientist Barry C. Burden[258] indicated that nationally, approximately thirty percent (30.5%) of Nader voters would have stayed home if the Green party candidate was not in the race. Burden's results are nearly twice as high as those revealed by the survey of Maryland Green registered voters, a cohort that is likely to be even more dedicated to the Green party candidate than the general population (most of whom Burden found to be registered Democratic voters) of Nader voters. Furthermore, as Maryland was a "safe state" in 2000, one reasonable explanation for the large discrepancy may be that Burden's data came from Voter News Service exit polls on Election Day in 2000, while our data came from surveys taken in the spring and summer of 2003. A reasonable inference would be that future support for the Green Party or any progressive third party candidate waned in the interim between Election Day 2000 and 2003. If this inference is correct it may be explained by Green voters' regret regarding the drift of national politics in the U.S. since the razor-close contested 2000 presidential election, and may indicate short-term weakened support for future Green party presidential candidacies.

The Maryland voters who indicated that they would not have voted at all in 2000 if the Green party's candidate was not in the race comprise the Green voter core of supporters in Maryland, and can probably be considered the members most likely to continue to support progressive political candidates in the future. It may be revealing, and if so it does not auger well for the continuing growth of the party, that almost one third (30%) of registered Greens were undecided in 2003 as to whom they would vote for in 2004 for president—this is probably a reflection of both the high degree of

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[258] *Did Ralph Nader Elect George W. Bush? An Analysis of Minor Parties in the 2000 Presidential Election*, Barry C. Burden, www.fas.harvard.edu/~burden. Voter News Service 2000 election exit polls indicated that 28% of Nader voters would not have voted at all if Nader was not in the race in 2000.

dissatisfaction these voters had with the current administration in Washington and the lack of an announced Green party presidential candidate at the time of the survey, and may well predict a substantial drop- off in total Green party presidential votes in 2004 as compared with 2000.

With respect to age, the data reveal that a majority of Green Party support among registered voters came from the youngest voters. As Fig. 14 reveals, the mean age of all registered Green voters in Maryland in 2003 was thirty- three, but the modal age (that is, the single age that occurred the most among the group) was nineteen. As the legal age for registering to vote in the U.S. was eighteen, this table indicates that the Greens appealed mostly to (nearly) the youngest possible voters. The modal average age of nineteen is a reflection of the outreach effort that was made at college campuses, at concerts and other venues where Maryland Greens held petition signature gathering and voter registration drives, and to internet outreach. The Green Party in Maryland, like progressive parties specifically, and third parties generally, gained a disproportionate amount of support from younger and previously less-engaged voters.

	Mean	Median	Mode
All Registered Greens	33	29	19
Green Activists Surveyed	45	44	44
"Core" Greens Surveyed	38	32	20

Fig. 14: 1/03 and 8/03 Survey Average Age of All Registered Greens, Green Activists and Core Greens

This statistic would seem to bode well for the Maryland Green Party insofar as, if the Green Party retains their loyalty, and if the Greens maintain the trend, the percentage of registered Greens and of Green voters will grow with each passing presidential election cycle. It also tends to confirm the earlier conjecture that the relatively high proportion of low-income Maryland Green supporters, and the relatively high proportion

of voters without previous party affiliation, were artifacts of youth (that is voters living with their parents and/or attending college) rather than of poverty. The disconnect between the modal average age for registered Greens (19 years) and Green party activists (44 years) indicated that the primary source of Green voting strength did not translate into non-voting activities among the largest single population group (by age) for the Maryland Green party.[259]

Another remarkable survey result had to do with religion, as Fig. 15 demonstrates: For both the Maryland Green registered voters and the Green Party activists, the leading religion was none. Almost half (forty-eight percent) of registered Green voters, and forty-four percent of Green Party activists claimed no religious affiliation whatsoever. If

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
*None (none, atheist & agnostic)	48% (128)	44% (19)
Catholic	17% (47)	12% (5)
Protestant	11% (30)	7% (3)
Jewish	5% (13)	7% (3)
Unitarian	4% (11)	7% (3)
Pagan	4% (10)	0%
Buddhist	4% (9)	9% (4)
Christian	2% (7)	7% (3)
Faith / Spiritualist	1% (5)	7% (3)
Quaker	1% (4)	0%
Baptist	.5% (2)	0%
Muslim	.5% (2)	0%
Hindu	.5% (2)	0%

Fig. 15: 8/03 Survey Religion of Registered Greens, Green Activists [Percent (Count)]

only ten percent of Americans were atheists and agnostics[260], then Maryland Greens were four or nearly five times as likely to have no religious beliefs than the general population.

One suspects that there is a high correlation between levels of education and

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[259] It is likely that regardless of political persuasion, most political party activism comes from older and more experienced members.

[260] According to the *CIA Factbook*, religious affiliation for the entire U.S. in 1989 was, Protestant 56%, Catholic 28%, None 10%, Jewish 2%, and all others 4%.

atheism/agnosticism and that in good measure explains the phenomenon.   Other

researchers have also noted a strong correlation between progressivism and nonreligious-

affiliation; Louis Bolce and Gerald De Maio content that:

> Secularists strongly favored the progressivist positions; religiously traditional Democratic delegates [to the 1972 Democratic presidential nominating convention] opposed them. The difference over policies and candidates between traditionalist and secularist Democrats had less to do with disagreement over the future course of New Deal liberalism then with the divergent moral outlooks animating their competing world views.[261]

The "moral outlook" that characterized Progressives (including Greens) at the

close of the twentieth century can arguably be summed up as being a vision of America

that looked a lot like social democratic Western Europe, with a strong social contract that

mitigated some of the need for religious faith by reducing some of the risks inherent in

modern life by guaranteeing an adequate amount of food, shelter, heath care, etc. for

every member of society. Throughout the twentieth century, progressives continued to

add workers' rights, women's rights, civil rights, gay rights, etc., in an effort to extend

and expand America's social contract to Western European dimensions. It is therefore not

surprising that U.S. Greens, like their compatriots in Western Europe (and elsewhere)

would reflect the same attitudes towards religion and social justice.[262]

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[261] Louis Bolce and Gerald De Maio, *Our Secularist Democratic Party*, p.3 www.thepublicinterest.com. Accessed 4/20/04. Putting a different perspective on the results of our study, Bolce and De Maio found even higher percentages of atheism among progressives in the Democratic camp than this study found for atheists among Maryland Greens.

[262] The secularization of Europe has been recently noted where, for example, in France, "about one in 20 people attends a religious service every week, compared with about one in three in the United States." Frank Bruni, "Faith Fades Where It Once Burned Strong," *New York Times*, Oct. 13, 2003. Along these lines, Nicholas D. Kristof noted in "Believe It or Not," *New York Times*, August 15, 2003 that: "Americans are three times as likely to believe in the Virgin Birth of Jesus (83 percent) as in evolution (28 percent.)" To the extent that Greens (and other progressives) in the U.S. are similar to Western Europeans, they are dissimilar to "average" Americans.

In addition, the percentage of Greens who were members of the Catholic Church was higher than those of Protestant denominations, although there were twice as many Protestants as Catholics in the general population in the U.S. There is a remarkably wide range of religions represented among Maryland Greens, including some (like Pagan and Faith/Spiritualist, for example) that are quite as "alternative" as the Green Party itself is within the framework of American political spectrum; it may be inferred that Maryland Green supporters were free thinkers generally. It may be surprising that Quakers, who honor the nonviolent tradition that is at the core of the Green philosophy, are not more strongly represented. As one might expect, Jews and Unitarians are represented in numbers beyond that of their percent in the population at large.

The primary reason that Maryland voters registered with the Green Party, as was arguably the case for progressive party presidential supporters throughout the twentieth century, was because of their antipathy to what they perceived to be the overbearing influence of corporations. As Fig. 16 indicates, almost a third (30%) of survey respondents felt they were taking a stand against corporate control, while over half (54%) of the Green activists indicated that they supported the Greens because a whole range of Green values were consonant with their own attitudes, including, citizens' control of corporations.

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
*Anti- Corporate Control	30% (111)	16% (8)
*Agree w/ Green Platform, Values	27% (98)	54% (27)
Need Third Parties	27% (97)	22% (6)
For the Environment & Future	16% (58)	12% (6)
Brings My Values Into Action	0%	14% (7)

Fig. 16: 8/03 Survey of Registered Greens, Green Activists Reason for Being Green
[Percent (Count)]

With regard to Green values, both cohorts placed Social Justice at the top of the Green "Ten Key Values" list, with the other "Four Pillars" rounding out the other top spots. Of all possible Green Party-related activities, registered Green voters were most likely to attend demonstrations and rallies, while Green activists were most likely to attend Green Party meetings. Both groups felt that registering new members was the most important Green activity, and both groups thought that recruiting candidates and running for office was next in importance. With regard to issues, both groups thought that energy policy and livable wages were paramount.

A composite description[263] of the "typical" Maryland Green supporter in 2000, then, might be a young, single white male of European ancestry with no religious affiliation who had a college degree, lived in his own home in the suburbs, worked full time in the field of education, and was formerly a Democrat. The "typical" Green activist was in his forties, without any school- age children, who attended Green Party meetings, worked on Green candidate campaigns, dedicated less than ten hours a month to Green Party- related business, belonged to a Green Party local which had ten to twenty members who were actively promoting issues, and were running candidates for public office. He felt that the chief obstacles to the Green Party's growth were too few members, and his party's main successes were running campaigns and gaining ballot access.

The designation of "he" for the typical MGP activist, while being an accurate portrayal of the survey results, is nonetheless problematic. For unknown reasons a much higher percentage of male MGP activists returned completed surveys than did female MGP activists, which certainly skewed the results of the survey. According to MGP Co-Chair Pat Cruz, women are well-represented at MGP events and activities if not

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[263] Based on the survey results that appear in the Appendix.

meetings, where some women find the *Roberts Rules of Order* approach to organizing discussions non-conducive to a free-flow of ideas. Furthermore, Pat Cruz speculated that in many Green party activist's households only one member may be able to find the time for political activities, and because many Greens may also be "stuck" in the traditional American family model wherein wives and mothers have more family obligations to fulfill than do husbands and fathers, males are available to attend Green Party activities.[264]

The results of the MGP surveys generally comports with the national results from the 2000 presidential election exit polls detailed in Fig. 4. In both sets of surveys a profile of the "typical" national Nader voter and the average Maryland registered Green voter share similar demographic characteristics with regard to age (Fig. 14), sex (Appendix #2), education (Fig. 9) and religion (Fig. 15): in both cases they are young men with college educations and no religious affiliation.

In two other areas there is some divergence between the national and the state survey results: the typical race (Fig. 10) of the national Nader 2000 voter was "other", while in Maryland it was white, and the average income (Fig. 8) of the national voter was under $15,000 while the Maryland registered Green voter's income was in the range of $20- 40,000. These discrepancies may be accounted for by the facts that Maryland may have fewer people of "other" races than other states[265], and that Maryland is a richer than average state.

What is most striking about all of the demographic analysis (the 1996 national Perot voters, the 2000 national Nader voters, the 2000 Maryland Nader voters, and the

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[264] Telephone interview with MGP Co-Chair Patricia (Pat) Cruz on April 25, 2004.

[265] "Other" race was defined as persons with two or more races, or persons declaring a race other than the choices that were offered; persons not declaring any race were excluded from the racial survey results.

2000 Maryland Registered Green voters, activists, and "core" Greens) of third-party presidential voters and supporters is that regardless of previous political affiliation or present political tendencies (conservative, liberal, etc.) they are all more likely to be young men without religious affiliation. Based on the strength of these studies it seems reasonable to conclude that there is a nexus between (relative) youth and an independent streak characterized by a lack of allegiance to political parties and to organized religions.[266]

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[266] This trend toward "youth" support for third- party candidates seems to have continued into the 2004 presidential election. According to the results of the Newsweek/Genext Poll of April, 2004: "The presumptive Democratic candidate's strength among the youth vote has been disproportionately dissipated by the entrance of independent Ralph Nader into the presidential race. In the latest GENEXT poll, the consumer advocate earns 11 percent of the under- 30 vote. While Nader's showing is down 1 point from a month earlier, it still is nearly double the 6 percent of voters who said they would vote for him in the AP/Iposo poll of all voters." Jonathan Darman, "The Vanishing Young Kerry Voter", *Newsweek,* April 22, 2004.

VIII. Conclusion

In 2000, for the first time in more than a half-century, a progressive political party's presidential candidate achieved over one percent in the polls. As the most successful third-party progressive presidential campaign in three quarters of a century, the Greens in 2000 represented something new on the American political scene. Part of, and influenced by, a growing worldwide movement, activists in America were drawn to the Green Party for more than a decade before 2000, in response to what they perceived to be the deep- seated hypocrisy and corruption at the heart of both of the major political parties. For many Green activists, after years of saying "a pox on both your houses," the need to try to build a viable alternative political party served both a personal psychological need, as well as, they hoped, fulfilled the existential necessity of saving their country and their planet from the devastation wrought by the unleashing of unbridled corporate greed.[267]

Like a hybrid seed, the ideals that formed the core of the U.S. Green Party grew up in the hothouse of the American "New Left" social movements of the 1960s, grew to maturity in a structurally-accommodating Western European[268] electoral political environment in the late 1960s, the 1970s and early 1980s, before being replanted on American soil in the mid- 1980s. As the U.S. Greens grew in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the political climate in America was ideally suited to mobilizing like-minded activists: The rightward drift of American politics through the ascendancy of conservative ideology created a duopoly of political power based on ideals that were inimical to progressivism. Tweedledee increasingly looked like Tweedledum as the left

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[267] Source: Interviews with Green party members, Spring and Summer, 2003.
[268] As well as Tasmania and New Zealand.

side of the mainstream political spectrum in America was abandoned by the Democratic Party from the Reagan administration through the close of the century and beyond.

Greens moved to fill the void on the left, but they did not rush in: A largely leaderless party of heretofore apolitical activists with few funds, wholly dependent on the vagaries of an ever-fluctuating cast of volunteers had to move slowly. Some Greens, consciously or otherwise following the pattern of the German Green Party, made a virtue of these "defects" by codifying rules that all but mandated slow growth: the rotation of leaders, party and campaign contribution limits and restrictions, consensus requirements for important decisions, and the reluctance to compromise and make alliances with "others." Having no power but the purity of their ideals, some U.S. Greens hoped that would be enough to "disturb the universe", albeit slightly, for the better. As believers in ecological wisdom and real social justice, U.S. Greens were radical, but as proponents of actual grassroots democracy and nonviolence their aspirations did not bend towards revolt. And the U.S. Greens were usually inherently honest in a venue where their opponents were ruthless.

When judged by their limited goals of running candidates and gaining ballot access, the Maryland Greens were a qualified success. When compared with other third parties in American history, by 2002, the U.S. Greens' accomplishments after more than a decade of organizing were much less impressive. The perverse logic of American politics enshrined in the winner-take-all system was a formidable obstacle that even an anti- party political party faced, which forced a "Leninist" logic on all parties not in power that the worst things were the better were their chances—in other words, the Greens looked good to the extent that the duopoly in power was perceived to have failed.

But by the same perverse logic, their best intentions notwithstanding, through their efforts to improve American society, third parties can and did make things much worse, at least in the short- term.

After 2000, the sober reality that dawned on many Greens was that despite the best of intentions, in a nation that was nearly evenly divided between Democratic and Republican voters, the winner-take-all system could easily mean that their small efforts to "disturb the universe" could spell the difference between the annihilation and the survival of the planet. This "regret" was ably articulated in a letter to the editor by a young writer who summed up his journey from being a Nader supporter in the 2000 presidential election to being a Democratic supporter in 2004 by concluding that:

> "Politics, like it or not, is about pragmatism . . . It's not about idealism,
> and it's not really about changing the system, not all that much." [269]

Finally, judging by the relative lack of success of U.S. political third parties in the twentieth century, and the specific lack of success of the Greens, it seems fair to conclude that the U.S. electoral system may be good for the maintenance of a republic, but bad for the promotion of a democracy. The U.S. electoral system ensures stability and tends to elevate centrist leaders, but it discourages a majority of citizens from participating and therefore retards the development of a social cohesion that presumably accrues to a nation where a majority of its citizens are invested in the outcome of the political process.

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[269] Nathan Bierma, "A Reversal on Ralph," *Baltimore Sun*, March 7, 2004. Echoing this sentiment, media critic Robert McChesney has written about the 2004 presidential election: "I don't think Ralph should run. . .I doubt he would get half the number of votes he got in 2000. And it would be bad for the Greens. Core elements of progressive constituencies, exactly the groups the Greens need to build upon, will revolt with open contempt—far worse than 2000—to anything that helps keep Bush in office. . .Running a presidential candidate in 2004 for the Greens is probably a quantum leap off a cliff. It's the Greens' Jonestown." Micah L. Sifry, "Ralph Redux?," *The Nation*, November 24, 2003.

IX. Appendix

There are four distinct cohorts analyzed in the tables below: All Registered Greens; Registered Greens Surveyed; Green Activists Surveyed; and Core Greens Surveyed.

The group "All Registered Greens" is comprised of the 5,003 voters who were registered with the Maryland Board of Elections (MBOE) as of January, 2003. The voter registration information was mailed to the author by the MBOE on a computer CD ROM, and the data was exported into a Microsoft *Excel* spreadsheet, parsed and normalized.

Regression analysis was achieved by running the CORREL function in *Excel* which returns the correlation coefficient between two data sets (columns of numbers in the spreadsheet.) Correlation coefficients describe the relationship between two variables which are considered positively correlated if high values of one are likely to be associated with high values of the other (for example, precincts where voters have high levels of education, Green party voter support is high.) They are negatively correlated if high values of one are likely to be associated with low values of the other. Correlation coefficients are always within the range of -1 (perfect negative relationship) and 1 (perfect positive relationship.) A "strong" correlation would be at least .5 and higher. R squared is the "coefficient of determination," i.e. a measure of what percentage of variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variable. Thus in Figure 6 (page 87) for example, a correlation coefficient of .55 between income and the Nader vote means that about 30% of the variation in the Nader vote is explained by

(rising) income; the correlation of .63 means that about 40 percent is explained by (rising) educational level.

The group "Registered Greens Surveyed" is a subset of the group "All Registered Greens" and is comprised of 316 detailed surveys that were returned from a mailing that was sent to a randomly- selected sample of 1,000 members of the group "All Registered Greens." Randomness was achieved through the RAND function in Excel which returns a random number greater than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1, evenly distributed throughout the list (columns of voters in the spreadsheet.)

The group "Green Activists Surveyed" is comprised of 51 detailed surveys that were returned from a mailing to 86 members of the Maryland Green Party (MGP) and all of its local chapters. Every officer of the MGP as of January, 2003 received a detailed survey, and every contact person for each MGP local received a request to send me every active member's contact information so that I could send them each a detailed survey. An "active" member was defined as a member who had either attended a meeting, or had participated in some Green Party activity (tabling, petition gathering, voter registration, protesting, etc.)

The group "Core Greens Surveyed" is a subset of the group "Green Activists Surveyed" and includes only those members who indicated that they would not have voted for any presidential candidate in the 2000 presidential election if Nader (the Green Party candidate) was not on the ballot.

The asterisk (*) symbol in the tables below indicates the number 1 ranking.

1. AGE [YEARS]

	Mean	Median	Mode
All Registered Greens	33	29	19
Green Activists Surveyed	45	44	44

2. SEX [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	*Male	Female
All Registered Greens	55% (2761)	45% (2225)
Green Activists Surveyed	59% (30)	41% (21)

3. WHY ARE YOU A GREEN? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
*Anti- Corporate Control	30% (111)	16% (8)
*Agree w/ Green Platform, Values	27% (98)	54% (27)
Need Third Parties	27% (97)	22% (6)
For the Environment & Future	16% (58)	12% (6)
Brings My Values Into Action	0%	14% (7)

4. PREVIOUS PARTY AFILIATION [PERCENT]

	*Dem.	None	Ind.	Rep.	Lib.	Other
Registered Greens Surveyed	58%	29%	5%	5%	2%	1%
Green Activists Surveyed	65%	20%	7%	4%	2%	2%

5. IF THE GREEN PARTY DID NOT RUN A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN 2000, WHICH OTHER PARTY'S CANDIDATE WOULD YOU HAVE VOTED FOR? [PERCENT]

	*Dem.	None	Lib.	Rep.	Soc.	Other
Registered Greens Surveyed	77%	16%	3%	2%	0%	0%
Green Activists Surveyed	59%	34%	5%	0%	2%	1%

6. WHICH PARTY'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE DO YOU INTEND TO VOTE FOR IN 2004? [PERCENT]

	*Green	Dem.	Undecided
Registered Greens Surveyed	59%	11%	30%
Green Activists Surveyed	87%	5%	8%

7-8. WHO WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE THE GREEN PARTY RUN FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT IN 2004? [(COUNT)]

	President	VP
Registered Greens Surveyed	*Nader (80)	*LaDuke (14)
Green Activists Surveyed	*Nader (10)	*McKinney (4)

9. RANK THE GREEN PARTY TEN KEY VALUES IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE [RANK (AVERAGE)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
Ecological Wisdom	2 (3.4)	3 (3.8)
*Social Justice	1 (3.0)	1 (2.1)
Grassroots Democracy	4 (5.1)	2 (3.4)
Non violence	5 (5.7)	4 (4.5)
Decentralization	9 (7.4)	10 (7.7)
Community-Based Economics	7 (5.8)	7 (6.1)
Feminism	10 (7.6)	9 (7.6)
Respect for Diversity	6 (5.6)	6 (5.8)
Personal & Global Responsibility	3 (3.8)	5 (5.5)
Future Focus	8 (6.5)	8 (7.2)

10. WHICH GREEN PARTY ACTIVITIES DO YOU PARTICIPATE IN? [RANK (AVERAGE)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
Park/ Stream Cleanup	2 (66)	6 (18)
Voter Registration Drive	5 (33)	4 (25)
Work on Campaign	4 (42)	3 (33)
*Demonstrations / Rallies	1 (87)	2 (37)
*General Meetings	3 (58)	1 (39)
Retreats / Workshops	7 (15)	7 (17)
Parties / Socials	6 (29)	5 (22)

11. WHICH GREEN PARTY ACTIVITIES ARE MOST IMPORTANT? [RANK (AVERAGE)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
*Register New Members	1 (3.69)	1 (2.93)
Recruit Candidates / Run Campaigns for Public Office	2 (3.78)	2 (3.38)
Monitor / Report on Green Issues	3 (4.18)	5 (5.03)
Student Outreach	7 (5.14)	6 (5.10)
Minority Outreach	6 (5.08)	4 (4.22)
Small Business Outreach	8 (6.26)	9 (7.47)
Community Organization Outreach	4 (4.80)	3 (4.13)
Press & Publicity	5 (4.87)	7 (5.38)
Fundraising	9 (6.55)	8 (7.30)

12. RANK THE NATIONAL GREEN PARTY DEMOCRACY ISSUES IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE. [RANK (AVERAGE)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
*Political & Electoral Reform	1 (1.93)	1 (1.74)
Political Participation	2 (2.64)	3 (2.56)
Community & Local Politics	3 (2.85)	2 (2.49)
Foreign Policy	4 (3.26)	4 (3.40)
Party Politics	5 (4.24)	5 (4.55)

13. RANK THE NATIONAL GREEN PARTY ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE. [RANK (AVERAGE)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
*Energy Policy	1 (4.02)	1 (3.93)
Nuclear Issues	10 (7.52)	8 (7.05)
Waste Management	7 (6.20)	9 (7.30)
Fossil Fuels	5 (5.91)	5 (5.26)
Renewable Goods	8 (6.33)	7 (6.59)
Transportation Policy	6 (6.07)	6 (5.73)
Clear Air / Greenhouse Effect / Ozone Depletion	2 (4.44)	2 (4.45)
Land Use	4 (4.93)	4 (4.76)
Water	3 (4.73)	3 (4.74)
Agriculture	9 (7.20)	10 (7.32)
Biological Diversity	11 (7.62)	11 (8.33)

14. RANK THE NATIONAL GREEN PARTY ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE. [RANK (AVERAGE)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
Eco-Nomics	3 (4.90)	3 (4.58)
Re-asserting Local Citizen Control Over Corporations	2 (4.51)	2 (3.33)
*Livable Income	1 (3.60)	1 (2.84)
Community Involvement	4 (5.91)	4 (5.29)
Small Business and Job Creation	5 (5.95)	6 (6.93)
Trade	9 (8.12)	11 (8.64)
Rural Development	13 (8.71)	12 (9.50)
Banking For People	10 (8.21)	10 (8.41)
Insurance Reform	6 (6.73)	7 (7.05)
Pension Reform	11 (8.38)	13 (8.97)
Anti-Trust Enforcement	7 (6.90)	5 (6.07)
Advanced Tech / Defense Conversion	12 (8.67)	8 (7.08)
The National Debt	8 (7.85)	9 (8.09)

15. RANK A SELECTED LIST OF MD GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2003 LEGISLATIVE ISSUES IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE. [RANK (AVERAGE)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
Public School Construction- Use of Solar Energy	2 (6.10)	4 (6.05)
Public Schools Charter Act	10 (8.73)	12 (10.15)
*Death Penalty Moratorium	3 (6.48)	1 (4.08)
Study Commission on Public Funding of Campaigns	8 (8.06)	2 (4.36)
Procurement- Minority Business Opportunity	14 (10.16)	11 (10.08)
Small Business Health Insurance Affordability Act	5 (7.06)	5 (6.56)
Products with Mercury Labeling and Disposal Act	13 (9.66)	10 (9.16)
Asbestos- Criminal Penalties	16 (10.60)	15 (11.16)
Campaign Finance- Attribution of Contributions	7 (7.61)	3 (5.67)
Agriculture- Confinement of Pregnant Sows- Prohibition	15 (10.32)	16 (11.63)
Natural Resources- Leghold Traps- Prohibition	11 (8.87)	13 (10.29)
*Sustainable Forestry	1 (5.49)	6 (6.80)
Public Schools- Indoor Air Quality Inspections	9 (8.07)	7 (7.29)
State Government- Buildings- Green Buildings	6 (7.30)	8 (7.42)
Environment- State Used Tire Cleanup & Recycling	4 (6.98)	9 (8.33)
Darrell Putnam Medical Marijuana Act	12 (9.47)	14 (11.05)

16. WHAT IS YOUR RACE? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed	All Marylanders[1]
*White	89% (271)	93% (41)	61%
Black	4% (11)	0%	27%
Mixed	2% (7)	5% (2)	2%
Asian	2% (5)	0%	4%
Other	1% (2)	0%	2%
Hispanic	1% (2)	0%	4%
Native American	1% (2)	2% (1)	0%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File, Matrices PL1 and PL2.

17.WHAT IS YOUR RELIGION? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
*None (none, atheist & agnostic)	48% (128)	44% (19)
Catholic	17% (47)	12% (5)
Protestant	11% (30)	7% (3)
Jewish	5% (13)	7% (3)
Unitarian	4% (11)	7% (3)
Pagan	4% (10)	0%
Buddhist	4% (9)	9% (4)
Christian	2% (7)	7% (3)
Faith / Spiritualist	1% (5)	7% (3)
Quaker	1% (4)	0%
Baptist	.5% (2)	0%
Muslim	.5% (2)	0%
Hindu	.5% (2)	0%

18.WHAT IS YOUR ANCESTRY / ETHNIC ORIGIN? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
*European	88% (247)	93% (42)
African	4% (10)	0%
Middle Eastern	2% (6)	0%
Latino	2% (6)	0%
Mixed	2% (6)	7% (3)
Asian	1% (4)	0%
Native American	1% (4)	0%

19.WHAT IS YOUR MARITAL STATUS? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed	All Marylanders[2]
*Married	47% (143)	47% (21)	52.8%
Never Married	41% (125)	38% (17)	28.8%
Divorced	9% (29)	9% (4)	6.5%
Separated	2% (6)	4% (2)	3.1%
Widowed	1% (4)	2% (1)	6.5%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3; 15 years and older.

20. WHAT IS THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION YOU HAVE COMPLETED? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed	All Marylanders[3]
*Post- Graduate College	45% (138)	57% (27)	13.4%
4- Year College	31% (97)	26% (12)	18%
2- year College	12% (38)	11% (5)	5.3%
High School	12% (38)	6% (3)	46.7%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3; 25 years and older.

21. WERE YOU EVER IN THE MILITARY? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed	All Marylanders[4]
*No	87% (272)	89% (42)	86.6%
Yes	13% (39)	11% (5)	13.4%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3; 18 years and older.

22. WHAT IS YOUR HOUSING STATUS? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed	All Marylanders[5]
*Own	57% (163)	66% (29)	67.7%
Rent	40% (114)	27% (12)	
Live w/ Parents at Home	2% (5)	7% (3)	
Live at Dorm at College	1% (2)	0%	

[5]Source: U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts 2000.

23. WHAT IS YOUR RESIDENCE LOCATION? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
*Suburban	68% (206)	62% (30)
Urban	21% (65)	21% (10)
Rural	11% (32)	17% (8)

24. WHAT IS OCCUPATION STATUS? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
*Full Time	60% (178)	54% (24)
Part Time	14% (40)	20% (9)
Student	13% (38)	4% (2)
Retired	9% (25)	16% (7)
Unemployed	3% (9)	0%
Home Maker	1% (3)	4% (2)
Self- Employed	0%	2% (1)

25.WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATIONAL INDUSTRY? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
*Education	39% (66)	47% (14)
Government	28% (48)	20% (6)
Health	17% (30)	13% (4)
Retail	9% (15)	7% (2)
Manufacturing	3% (6)	3% (1)
Wholesale	2% (4)	0%
Not-For-Profit	1% (2)	10% (3)
Military	.5% (1)	0%

26.WHAT IS YOUR UNION STATUS? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
*Not a Member	88% (268)	80% (37)
Member	12% (35)	20% (20)

27.WHAT IS YOUR PRIMARY MODE OF TRANSPORTATION? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
*Car	81% (250)	89% (40)
Public Transportation	9% (28)	9% (4)
Bicycle	6% (17)	0%
Walking	3% (8)	2% (1)
Motorcycle	1% (3)	0%

28.WHAT WAS YOUR PERSONAL INCOME FOR 2002? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
Less than $10k	21% (62)	13% (6)
$10-$20k	15% (45)	7% (3)
*$20-$40k	26% (77)	36% (16)
$40-$60k	20% (58)	29% (13)
$60-$80k	9% (25)	11% (5)
$80-$100k	6% (18)	4% (2)
More than $100k	3% (9)	0%

Average per capita income in Maryland in 2000 was $25,614. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts 2000.

29.WHAT SCHOOLS DO YOUR CHILDREN GO TO? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
*No School- Age Children	72% (197)	69% (30)
Public School	15% (42)	35% (11)
Pre- School	6% (17)	2% (1)
Private School	5% (14)	2% (1)
Home School	2% (6)	2% (1)

30. WHAT IS YOUR SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE FOR NEWS? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Registered Greens Surveyed	Green Activists Surveyed
*Newspapers	24% (73)	38% (17)
TV	13% (38)	9% (4)
*Radio	31% (91)	22% (10)
Magazine	3% (9)	2% (1)
Internet	29% (88)	29% (13)

Activist Survey Results

3A. WHICH ACTIVITIES DO YOU PARTICIPATE IN? PARTY BUILDING ACTIVITIES. [TOTAL (RANK)]

	Green Activists Surveyed
*Attend Local Green Meetings and Events	42(1)
Contribute Money to the Party	38(2)
Join & Read Green Listserve(s)	35(3)
Collect Petition Signatures	32(4)
Attend State Green Meetings and Events	31(5)
Help at Tabling Events	27(6)
Outreach to Other Organizations (Networking)	24(7)
Write Letters to Newspapers	24(8)
Serve as a Local Green Party Officer/ Official/ Delegate	18(9)
Offer Public Testimony	17(10)
Call in to Talk Radio	16(11)
Serve as a Statewide Green Party Officer/ Official/ Delegate	14(12)
Help with Mailings	13(13)
Attend National Green Meetings and Events	13(14)
Write for the Green Party Newsletter(s) and/or Websites(s)	11(15)
Help with Phone Trees	7 (16)
Serve as a National Green Party Officer/ Official/ Delegate	4 (17)

3B. WHICH ACTIVITIES DO YOU PARTICIPATE IN? POLITICAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES. [TOTAL (RANK)]

	Green Activists Surveyed
*Work on a Green Party Candidate(s) Campaign	32(1)
Distribute Literature, Yardsigns, etc.	31(2)
Put a Bumper Sticker on your car	30(3)
Work the Polls on Election day	29(4)
Contribute Money to the campaign	28(5)
Put a Yardsign on your lawn	24(6)
Outreach to Other Organizations (Networking)	19(7)
Help at a Houseparty	17(8)
Ask for Monetary Contributions to the campaign	12(9)
Host a Houseparty	10(10)
Run for Public Office	9 (11)

4. APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY HOURS / MONTH ON AVERAGE DO YOU CONTRIBUTE TO THE GREEN PARTY (LOCAL, STATE, AND NATIONAL) DURING CAMPAIGN SEASONS? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Green Activists Surveyed
*1-10 hrs. /month	32% (14)
10-20 hrs. /month	28% (12)
20-30 hrs. /month	12% (5)
30-40 hrs. /month	5% (2)
More than 40 hrs. /month	23% (10)

5. APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY HOURS / MONTH ON AVERAGE DO YOU CONTRIBUTE TO THE GREEN PARTY (LOCAL, STATE, AND NATIONAL) DURING NON-CAMPAIGN SEASONS? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Green Activists Surveyed
*1-10 hrs. /month	47% (20)
10-20 hrs. /month	31% (13)
20-30 hrs. /month	10% (4)
30-40 hrs. /month	2% (1)
More than 40 hrs. /month	10% (4)

6. HOW MANY ACTIVE MEMBERS ARE IN YOUR GREEN PARTY LOCAL? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Green Activists Surveyed
1-10	29% (12)
*10-20	40% (17)
20-30	17% (7)
30-40	14% (6)

7. WHAT ARE / WERE THE MAIN GOALS AND ISSUES THAT YOUR GREEN PARTY LOCAL IS / WAS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Green Activists Surveyed
*Promoting Issues	47% (19)
Running a Campaign for Public Office	20% (8)
Petitioning and / or Voter Registration	18% (7)
Building the Local	15% (6)

8. WHAT ARE / WERE THE CHIEF SUCCESSES OF YOUR GREEN PARTY LOCAL? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Green Activists Surveyed
Promoting Issues	26% (10)
*Running a Campaign for Public Office	51% (20)
Petitioning and / or Voter Registration	10% (4)
Building the Local	13% (5)

9. WHAT ARE / WERE THE CHIEF OBSTACLES OF YOUR GREEN PARTY LOCAL? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Green Activists Surveyed
*Too Few Members	48% (20)
Two Party System / Spoiler	24% (10)
Not Organized	21% (9)
Media Hostility	7% (3)

10. WHAT ARE / WERE THE MAIN GOALS AND ISSUES THAT YOUR STATE GREEN PARTY IS / WAS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Green Activists Surveyed
*Gaining Ballot Access	39% (12)
Petitioning and / or Voter Registration	19% (6)
Promoting Issues	19% (6)
Building the State and Locals	13% (4)
Running Campaigns for Public Office	10% (3)

11. WHAT ARE / WERE THE CHIEF SUCCESSES OF YOUR STATE GREEN PARTY ? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Green Activists Surveyed
*Gaining Ballot Access	43% (14)
Building the State and Locals	24% (8)
Promoting Issues	18% (6)
Running Campaigns for Public Office	12% (4)
Petitioning and / or Voter Registration	3% (1)

12. WHAT ARE / WERE THE CHIEF OBSTACLES OF YOUR STATE GREEN PARTY ? [PERCENT (TOTAL)]

	Green Activists Surveyed
*Too Few Members	28% (10)
Two Party System / Spoiler	24% (8)
Unfair Ballot Access	18% (6)
Lack of Funds	18% (6)
Not Organized	9% (3)
Media Hostility	3% (1)

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